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Abstract 
Germany is currently undergoing a profound transformation of its national energy system 
through an abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and a simultaneous phase-out of nuclear 
energy. This energy transition, Energiewende, was first conceived by ecological and anti-
nuclear movements in the 1970s, introduced into politics in the 1990s and 2000s, and became 
societal consensus following the Fukushima nuclear incident of 2011. The achievement of its 
objectives relies on a shift from fossil and nuclear energy to renewable energy sources and an 
overall reduction in energy consumption. This is a significant challenge for Germany's 
energy-intensive economy and centralized, fossil fuel-based energy system. It entails more 
distributed electricity generation, higher volatility of supply, different requirements to the 
electricity grid and infrastructure, and structural changes to the energy system and its actors. 
A successful transition will require comprehensive socio-technical change such as the 
development, introduction and diffusion of new technologies, infrastructure, organizations, 
and business models. To address this challenge, the political strategies and policies that 
devise and implement Energiewende seek to induce private firms to deliver the necessary 
novelties. Innovation is considered key to achieve Energiewende objectives, reduce the costs 
of transforming the energy system, and bolster the international competitiveness of German 
firms in the environmental and green energy space. Especially firms of the energy technology 
value chain, i.e. firms providing products or services related to the production, transport and 
consumption of energy are encouraged to explore, develop, implement and adopt 
technological and organizational solutions for the energy transition.  
To date there is a limited understanding to what extent and how Energiewende 
policies have indeed fostered such innovation and there are several controversies regarding 
their effect. Most importantly, controversies exist regarding the impact of the Energiewende's 
core policy Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG), the effect 
of the proclaimed "accelerated Energiewende" after Fukushima in 2011, and the changes 
triggered inside of firms.  These controversies are due to three research gaps: first, 
Energiewende is often reduced to a single policy and not understood as a complex, systemic 
transition process, second, research with a comprehensive understanding of innovation is 
missing, and third, there is a lack of investigations on the actor level. 
This thesis contributes towards closing the research gaps and addressing these 
controversies by investigating the innovation effect of Energiewende through a series of 
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qualitative, exploratory company case studies. An integrated conceptual framework that 
draws on the multi-level perspective in sustainability transitions research, environmental 
economics, and organization and management studies is used to investigate corporate 
innovation activities with episodic interviews with managers of incumbent and start-up firms 
from the energy technology value chain. The objective of the thesis is to clarify the recurrent 
controversies in the empirical assessment of an innovation effect, identify areas of tension, 
and draw implications for policy makers and firms as to how to induce and navigate 
innovation in the context of socio-technical change. Due to the exploratory, case-study based 
nature of the empirical research findings are not universally representative and applicable. 
The case study findings indicate that the Energiewende policy mix had a mostly 
positive effect on innovation activities. Especially the strengthening of particular markets and 
the systemic change induced by policies such as the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) presented firms with disruptions and opportunities to 
which they responded with innovation activities. This holds for innovation activities in a wide 
range of products, services, business models and internal organizational structures. The EEG 
in particular seems to have triggered innovation activities not only in the immediate 
technology area of RES technologies, but furthermore also in complementary technologies 
and – through the systemic change it enabled – also in wider systemic solutions. The 
accelerated Energiewende following Fukushima led incumbent energy suppliers to intensify 
innovation in their business models and boosted Energiewende-related innovation activities 
that were already ongoing in energy technology and materials firms. Inside of firms, 
innovation activities were influenced by strategic, structural and organizational parameters. 
For incumbent firms especially, the response to the changing energy system was tainted by a 
corporate cognition revolving around the superiority of a fossil-nuclear based energy system. 
The analysis also finds tensions with regards to the effect of Energiewende policy on 
innovation, in particular with respect to path dependence of systemic regulation, an emphasis 
on short-term incentives, and the focus on the national political jurisdiction. Implications 
from these results for policy makers and firms are presented. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Germany is currently undergoing a profound transformation of its national energy system as 
it shifts its electricity supply from conventional fossil and nuclear energy sources to 
renewable energy. This transformation is characterized by a dual objective where the 
abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is pursued in parallel with the phase-out of 
nuclear energy. Since the installation of the electricity grid network in the late 19th century 
Germany relied on large power plants fired with hard coal, lignite and nuclear power, to 
cover its electricity demand. The oil crisis of the 1970s, the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 
1986, and growing anti-nuclear, environmental, and climate protection movements, however, 
fostered mounting concerns regarding the environmental impacts, safety, and security of 
supply of such an energy system. First political initiatives to increase the use of renewable 
energy sources (RES) in the 1990s led to the adoption of the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) and a feed-in tariff subsidy scheme for electricity from 
renewable sources in 2000 and subsequently an unprecedented growth in renewable 
electricity generation. The long-term strategy to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by moving to a nearly full electricity supply from renewable sources and significantly cutting 
energy consumption were stipulated in the 2010 Energy Concept (Energiekonzept). 
Controversial for decades, the nuclear question was resolved in 2011 when the nuclear 
accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi power plant led the government to accelerate the phase 
out of nuclear energy. The term Energiewende became mainstream use afterwards and 
replaced previous discourses on nuclear phase-out and renewable energy.  
Energiewende is shaped by a political course of action. The overarching targets, set by 
the 2010 Energy Concept and its 2011 amendment following Fukushima, encompass a 
nuclear phase-out to zero capacity in use until 2022 as well as a 40% reduction of GHG 
emissions by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. Achieving these 
overarching targets depends on changes to the supply of energy, especially through the 
increased use of renewable energy, and changes to the demand for energy through increased 
energy efficiency. The Energy Concept also sets targets pertaining to these areas: 
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 Renewable energy: gross final energy consumption 18% share by 2020, 60% 
share by 2050; gross electricity consumption 35% share by 2020, 80% share by 
2050  
 Energy efficiency: primary energy consumption reduction of 20% by 2020, 50% 
by 2050, compared to 2008 (Bundesregierung, 2010) 
The Energiewende strategy is implemented through a mix of policy instruments which 
regulate, incentivize and support behavior that will help achieve the targets described. The 
policy mix covers several areas incl. renewable energy, energy efficiency, electricity market 
design, emissions trading and transmission and distribution grids. Key policies include the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) of 2000 as well as its 
various amendments, public support for research and development in energy technologies 
such as the Energy Research Program (Energieforschungsprogramm) and standards and 
regulations for the energy consumption of products and processes. 
An energy system without GHG emissions and nuclear energy will significantly differ 
from the one that Germany has hitherto relied on. Changes are still materializing as the 
transition has not yet reached a final state. However, several changes seem probable: On the 
supply side, capacity installed for power generation is becoming more distributed. Electricity 
from renewable sources (RES-E) is typically generated on a smaller scale, which means that 
there will have to be a larger number of production sites in order to be able to cover the 
electricity demand. Also, the majority of electricity production from renewable energy 
sources (RES) will likely take place far removed from centers of demand as the bulk of 
electricity from wind is generated in Germany's North, while population hubs are in the 
middle and the south of the country. In addition to that, electricity production is getting more 
volatile as RES are subject to natural fluctuations of e.g., solar irradiation or wind and cannot 
easily be dispatched at will. On the demand side, industrial and residential electricity 
consumers are backward integrating and turning into power producers as generation capacity 
is installed on and in private buildings. This means instead of simply taking energy from the 
grid they may also feed into the grid, become self-sufficient and go off-grid, or alternate 
between the two. These developments pose challenges for energy security and the balancing 
of supply and demand. On the physical side, the grid will need to be able to transport 
electricity larger distances and distribute electricity as well as collect it. On the virtual side, 
energy management, i.e. the ability to increase or reduce electricity generation or 
consumption, is becoming more important in all nodes of the system. An additional challenge 
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is to manage stability in the system as a whole given the risk of volatility. Electricity markets 
need to be designed in a way that they provide the right price signal for individuals to take 
decisions that create a well-functioning system for everybody. With all of this may come the 
necessity for energy storage of various forms from large hydro pumped storage to batteries or 
power-to-gas storage systems. Lastly, as a consequence of these changes to the system, the 
actors in it and the balance of power among them will change as well. This has already 
started to materialize with the slow demise of the large electricity suppliers – previous 
monopolists and cash cows in the system.  
To accomplish the energy transition, Energiewende politics must ensure a successful 
development of the energy system towards its future target state, although the exact state is 
not yet clear. Novelties will have to emerge and ultimately form a new system. This may 
require the development and implementation of new technologies, infrastructures, 
organizations, and business models. An important objective of Energiewende politics is 
hence to contribute towards the transition of the energy system by fostering "innovation". The 
Energiekonzept as well as related publications by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy mention the importance of innovation in many instances (BMWi, 2012a, 2014f; 
Bundesregierung, 2010). For the success of Energiewende, innovation is needed to: 
 Lower the costs and increase the performance of technology 
 Develop solutions for current barriers of Energiewende  
 Secure technological leadership and competitiveness of German firms 
(Bundesregierung, 2010) 
Energiewende and innovation are interrelated. While Energiewende is expected to 
influence corporate innovation, a relationship exists in the reverse as well. Corporate 
innovation will determine the success of Energiewende and the intensity or direction it takes 
may itself trigger political reactions. Furthermore, as Energiewende and corporate innovation 
take place and change over time, a complex web of interdependencies and linkages is likely 
to emerge. 
While 2016 has marked the fifth anniversary of the current Energiewende strategy and 
many policies have their origins long before this, the innovation impact of Energiewende has 
hitherto not been fully investigated and sufficiently assessed. The official monitoring reports 
for Energiewende do not include systematic assessments of the innovation effect (Löschel, 
Erdmann, Staiß, & Ziesing, 2014c). Other academic publications vary widely in their 
conclusions and range from identifications of an overall positive effect on innovation 
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dynamics (Ragwitz et al., 2014; Ragwitz, Huber, & Resch, 2007) to inconclusive results 
(Wangler, 2012), and indeed even negative effects (Böhringer, Cuntz, Harhoff, & Otoo, 
2014; EFI, 2014; Frondel, Ritter, Schmidt, & Vance, 2010). Three controversies are 
particular striking. First, there is a controversy around the innovation impact of the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the legislative center piece of Energiewende. Second, 
there is disagreement to what extent and how the "accelerated Energiewende" after the 
Fukushima nuclear incident induced additional innovation activities. Third, arguments 
revolve around the extent to which Energiewende has triggered changes within incumbent 
firms in the electricity and energy technology sectors.  
1.2 Research questions and objectives 
The motivation of this doctoral thesis is to address this knowledge gap and help reconcile the 
conflicting empirical evidence. Given the lack of empirical knowledge regarding the firm 
level innovation effects of Energiewende, the research interest of this thesis is a 
comprehensive exploration of such an effect. The guiding research question is hence: 
 
What is the impact of Energiewende on corporate innovation? 
 
To investigate this question the two main concepts, Energiewende and corporate innovation, 
will need further clarification. Both will be defined in more detail later in this thesis (cf. 
sections 2.3 and 3.2). To briefly summarize the definitions here: Energiewende is understood 
as a political course of action that drives a transition towards sustainability, more specifically 
the transition of the German energy system towards being free of GHG emissions and nuclear 
energy. Corporate innovation is understood as the intentional and targeted invention, 
implementation and diffusion on parts of private firms of a subjectively new or improved 
product, process, strategy, organization or business model that is perceived to be relevant in 
the context of Energiewende. The focus of this thesis is hence explicitly on the activities of 
private firms. While all types of organizations and even individuals can engage in innovation 
activities, profit-oriented, private sector firms are at the centre of delivering the innovations 
sought after by the policy makers of Energiewende. They contribute the majority to economic 
activity in Germany and have the capabilities to not only invent and develop new solutions, 
but also implement and diffuse them. The research interest and in particular the broad 
definitions of Energiewende and innovation as well as the focus on private firms addresses 
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research gaps currently found in the literature on an innovation effect of Energiewende, they 
will be presented in more detail later (cf. section 4.3).  
Overall, the investigation of the research interest throughout this thesis proceeds in 
three steps, each of which is further subdivided into three research questions:  
 
First, Energiewende is positioned in the context of innovation from both a theoretical 
and a substantive point of view. The following research questions are asked: 
I.1.    What is Energiewende and what are its claims regarding innovation? 
I.2.     What is the current evidence to suggest an effect of Energiewende on 
innovation? What research gaps and controversies exist? 
I.3.      How can Energiewende be positioned in the relevant academic literature? 
 
Second, the effect of Energiewende on corporate innovation is empirically explored. 
With respect to this empirical investigation the following three research questions are asked: 
II.1.    How have German firms over time changed their innovation activities in the 
light of Energiewende?  
II.2.    What is the impact of the individual components of the Energiewende policy 
mix on these innovation dynamics? 
II.3.    What is the impact of confounding factors and how do they interact with the 
components of the Energiewende policy mix? 
 
Third, the findings from the empirical investigation are used to draw implications that 
are relevant to politics and firms. This involves answers to the following research questions:  
III.1.   How have the case study findings addressed the controversies in the existing 
literature? 
III.2.   What tensions or other issues emerge from the case studies? 
III.3.   How can policy makers induce innovation for a systemic change towards 
sustainability? How can firms navigate such change? 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of these research steps and questions.  
By investigating these research questions this thesis will shed light on the innovation 
effect of the German energy transition especially with respect to corporate reactions in terms 
of innovation activities. In addition to expanding the general understanding of the innovation 
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effect of a socio-technical transition such as Energiewende and contributing to the respective 
academic literatures, the objective of this is to provide policy makers and firms with better 
strategies to navigate innovation in the context of socio-technical transitions towards 
sustainability. The contribution of this is threefold: First, for academia, research gaps and 
controversies in the ongoing debate on the innovation effect of the energy transition will be 
clarified. Second, policy makers in Germany will get insights into how Energiewende 
influences innovation and consequently get cues for how to induce corporate innovation 
activities in light of a systemic transformation towards sustainability. Third, firms will be 
able to compare their own innovation activities to findings of the empirical research and 
challenge their existing strategies for coping with external influences such as a politically-
induced change. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of research questions 
 
1.3 Research design  
This doctoral thesis is positioned in the academic field of the multi-level perspective in 
sustainability transition studies, a growing body of research that investigates socio-technical 
transitions towards a more sustainable society from an interdisciplinary point of view (Geels, 
2002, 2010, 2011; Markard, Raven, & Truffer, 2012). The literature holds that transitions are 
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complex, multi-faceted processes that evolve over time and can therefore not properly be 
captured in linear cause-effect relationships. While this perspective is very suitable to 
investigating a complex systemic transformation such as the transition of the energy system 
in Germany, a couple of adjustments need to be made to be able to adequately address the 
research questions. Sustainability transitions research does typically not assess the effect of 
policies and does not study actors. Therefore the empirical investigation in this thesis relies 
on an integrated conceptual framework that combines basic premises from sustainability 
transition studies with insights from environmental economics and organization and 
management studies. The conceptual framework structures the data collection and analysis 
process and provides cues for the interpretation of research findings. Given the exploratory 
research interest no hypotheses are formulated. As such the analysis remains flexible and 
open to new, unexpected insights emerging throughout the empirical investigation.  
The empirical investigation relies on qualitative research methods and uses 
exploratory case studies of firms in the energy technology value chain. A total of 37 case 
studies were conducted. The case studies combine interviews with managers of these firms 
with primary and secondary data collected from websites and other public data sources. The 
interviews are the core of the data collection and provide an insider's perspective to the 
research question that cannot be obtained from archival data research. The interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured way employing an episodic interview style that integrates 
narrative elements with conceptual answers to questions.  
The choice of an exploratory research design with an integrated conceptual 
framework and qualitative methods is appropriate given the open nature of the research 
interest, the limited existing knowledge in this area and the complexity and interrelatedness 
of the phenomenon under study. Qualitative research aims to understand phenomena by 
taking into consideration their complexities and specific social contexts. This means the 
research is not designed to test the causal relationship between two variables, but rather to 
generate new knowledge and understand the nature of interaction of a set of factors whose 
boundaries are often unclear (Flick, 2014, p. 90; Lamnek, 2006, p. 216). Such a design is 
especially applicable to research topics that are complicated as they stretch across a large 
variety of actors and an extended period of time and have not been sufficiently explored 
before (Flick, 2014, p. 150). All of these apply to the research interest at hand. Given the 
exploration of a complex phenomenon through selected qualitative case studies, the findings 
of this thesis are not universally applicable or generalizable beyond the specific context set by 
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the research interest. A more detailed explanation of the conceptual framework as well as the 
research design, methods and limitations will follow later in this thesis (cf. chapter 5 and 
section 6.1). 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized in eight chapters. Table 1 provides an overview of the structure with 
the main chapters and their contents, as well as the respective research questions they address 
(cf. Figure 1). 
Chapter 1 (this chapter) provides an introduction to the entire thesis with a review of 
background, research objectives and questions, research design, and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical foundations of the thesis including the origins of 
innovation studies in the works of Joseph A. Schumpeter and other early contributors (section 
2.1) and the three different strands of theoretical literatures relevant to studying the research 
questions of this thesis; sustainability transitions research (section 2.2.1), environmental 
economics (section 2.2.2), and organization and management studies (section 2.2.3). 
Furthermore the concept of innovation for this thesis is defined (section 2.3). 
Chapter 3 turns to the substantive core of this thesis, the German Energiewende. It 
first elaborates that anthropogenic global warming and climate change have made transitions 
towards a more sustainable energy system a phenomenon in many countries around the world 
today (section 3.1). Next it defines the use of the term Energiewende in this thesis (section 
3.2) and turns to a brief historical review of the German energy transition from its early days 
during the oil crises and green societal movements of the 1970s to the 2016 worries about 
target achievement (section 3.3). In the course of this review, strategy, policy instruments and 
policy process of the Energiewende policy mix are presented in their respective historical 
contexts. The last section of the chapter (section 3.4) deduces the implicit and explicit targets 
of the German Energiewende policy regarding innovation. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the current state of research regarding an innovation effect of 
Energiewende in both the official monitoring process installed by the federal government 
(section 4.1) as well as the empirical investigations and reviews of independent academic 
researchers (section 4.2). The chapter concludes by pointing out three research gaps and three 
controversies found in the current state of research in order to address them by the empirical 
research carried out later in this thesis (section 4.3). 
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Chapter 5 develops the integrated conceptual framework for the empirical 
investigation drawing on the previously elaborated strands of literature (sections 5.1 and 5.2). 
It also presents the firms of the energy technology value chain as the research case of the 
empirical investigation and points out different groups of firms in the value chain and the 
specific role that innovation has in their sector (section 5.3). 
Chapter 6 constitutes the core of the empirical investigation and therefore the longest 
chapter in the thesis. First, research methods and process employed in the qualitative case 
studies are described (section 6.1). Second, the findings of the case studies are presented in 
thick descriptions organized by research question and following the main elements of the 
conceptual framework: changes to innovation activities and the development of innovation 
dynamics (section 6.2), impact of the Energiewende policy mix (section 6.3) and impact of 
context factors and firm characteristics (section 6.4).  
Chapter 7 takes the qualitative case studies one step further and presents an extended 
discussion of the findings. First, the three controversies identified earlier (cf. section 4.3) are 
revisited in lights of the findings of the empirical research in this thesis (section 7.1). Second, 
three areas of tension impeding innovation in the context of Energiewende and which 
emerged throughout the case studies are elaborated (section 7.2). Then, the results are 
reviewed in terms of implications for policy makers and firms (section 7.3).  
Chapter 8 concludes the doctoral thesis with a summary of main results and 
contributions along the research questions (section 8.1), a discussion of limitations and 
avenues for further research (section 8.2) and a final overall conclusion (section 8.3).  
 
Table 1: Main chapter structure of the thesis 
Thesis Chapter  
Research 
question 
addressed  
1.  Introduction 
Background, motivation, research questions and approach  
2.  Theoretical foundations of innovation and transition studies  
Origins of innovation studies and three relevant literatures to the research question  
3.  Energiewende and its intended innovation effect  
History of the energy transition and  review of innovation as a policy objective I.1  
4.  Current state of research regarding an innovation effect 
Review of current state of empirical research, identification of three controversies I.2  
5.  Conceptual framework for empirical enquiry I.3 
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Integrated research framework based on sustainability transitions, environmental economics and 
organization and management studies  
6.  Findings of exploratory company case studies  
Corporate perceptions of Energiewende and changes in their innovation activities II.1-3  
7.  Extended analysis and discussion 
Three controversies revisited, emerging tensions and implications for politics and firms III.1-3  
8.  Conclusion 
Summary of findings, contribution, avenues for further research  
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2 Theoretical foundations of innovation and transition studies  
This chapter lays out the foundations of this dissertation in terms of the theoretical literature 
in innovation studies and clarifies the use of the terms Energiewende and innovation in this 
thesis going forward.  
Innovation studies is a large and diverse research field that spans across several 
academic disciplines. Following the works of Joseph Schumpeter a large number of 
researchers in economics and business have studied innovation related to economic growth, 
the role of firms, and the role of politics. For the research interest of this thesis, three 
theoretical literatures are of particular importance: sustainability transitions research, 
environmental economics, and organization and management studies. Sustainability 
transitions research, especially the multi-level perspective, has become a useful umbrella for 
the investigations of transitions towards a more sustainable society taking an interdisciplinary 
and evolutionary perspective. Environmental economics is the main literature body where 
investigations of the innovation effect of environmental policy take place. Organization and 
management studies is concerned with the role of firms in innovation i.e. how they are 
affected by external change and how they respond to it in terms of innovation activities.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows: First, the origins of innovation studies in the works 
of Joseph A. Schumpeter as well as basic concepts related to the role of politics and firms in 
the process of innovation are introduced (section 2.1). Second, the multi-level perspective in 
sustainability transition studies (section 2.2.1), environmental economics (section 2.2.2) and 
organization and management studies (section 2.2.3) are elaborated in turn, focusing on 
assumptions and major contributions that may be relevant to the research questions. Due to 
the vast size of the innovation literature the review of its theoretical foundations in this 
chapter, however, remains at a rather high level1. Third, the definition of innovation for the 
use in this thesis is established (section 2.3). 
  
                                                 
1 More detailed introductions to the field are provided by e.g., Cohen (1995, 2010) with respect to the 
economics and industrial organization literature post-Schumpeter, Ahuja, Lampert and Tandon (2008) regarding 
innovation in the management literature, and Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2003) discussing the economics of 
technological change including different theoretical underpinning, and Markard, Raven and Truffer (2012) or 
Geels (2002, 2004) for sustainability transitions and the multi-level perspective. 
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2.1 Origins and basic concepts in innovation studies 
2.1.1 Schumpeter and creative destruction 
The academic study of innovation has its roots in the theories of economic progress and 
technological change advanced by Joseph Alois Schumpeter in the first half of the 20th 
century. Schumpeter was the first to identify innovation in the form of creative destruction as 
key to economic change and develop hypotheses about the drivers of innovation activity. His 
theories on innovation constitute the foundation for the field of innovation studies across all 
subject disciplines.  
Schumpeter studied the process of change in a capitalist society and observed that 
economic progress is achieved when conventional ways of doing things are replaced by new 
and better ways. In a continuous process of renewal innovations are introduced to society, 
gain popularity, overtake and eventually replace what was previously there. They become the 
new status quo until they in turn are pushed aside by the next cycle of innovations. 
Schumpeter  called this renewal process creative destruction (1942), a term that encapsulates 
that a status quo is overhauled in a radical, possibly violent way, but that hints to the 
constructive beginning of something new and better.  
Schumpeter's theory is usually summarized in a linear, process-based model in which 
economic change proceeds in three steps (Godin, 2006; Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2003). The 
first step, invention, means coming up with a new idea, often achieving a scientific or 
technological breakthrough that leads to the development of a new product or process. This 
novelty, however, has no value by itself. It only develops significance for economic progress 
if it is put to proper use. Here comes innovation, i.e. the implementation, of the new idea. 
Innovation means for "getting things done" (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 152). It captures the 
realization of the new idea on part of the innovator, who can, but does not need to be the 
inventor. Typically this is associated with the commercialization or introduction to market of 
an invention, but non-market implementation may of course be equally important (Jaffe et al., 
2003). Lastly, in order to have an effect on the wider economy, the innovation needs to 
spread. Diffusion is the third step and denotes the adoption of the innovation by other 
economic actors and hence its successful establishment in a market. Change on an economy-
wide level is the cumulative economic effect of these three steps. 
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Figure 2: Simple 3-step innovation process model after Schumpeter (Quotes from Schumpeter, 1942, 1947) 
 
 
In the Schumpeterian theory innovation is endogenous, i.e. it is understood as the subject and 
result of economic activity. Schumpeter attributed innovation to the activities of 
entrepreneurs and private companies that pursue the introduction of novelties in anticipation 
of financial rewards. He proposed two models of evolutionary process in capitalism: In his 
Mark I theory entrepreneurs found innovation-based companies, successfully grow them and 
replace established business in the process. For this they need the proper entrepreneurial 
spirit, an "aptitude that is present in only a small fraction of the population" (Schumpeter, 
1942, p. 132). They cede entrepreneurship when their companies become the new generation 
of established ones constituting a new generation of business. Industry incumbents are hence 
defenders of the status quo that are overcome by the new and better ways of entrepreneurial 
companies. In his Mark II theory Schumpeter expands this view to include innovation "from 
within" (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 83) established firms. Focusing on organizational aspects 
rather than individual and industrial ones as in Mark I, Schumpeter asserts that successful 
firms do both at the same time; hold on to routines and engage in innovative activities. Large 
firms are able to re-invest excess profit from monopolistic activities into workforce and 
research and development thereby increase production and in turn generate more profit and 
continue to grow. Barriers to innovation may exist in both. An individual entrepreneur is 
often faced with a lack of financial resources to realize their idea or impeded by other 
external resistance to change, a large established organization finds it difficult to break with 
routine activities and avoid organizational complacency and gluttony (Andersen, 2013).  
While especially after Schumpeter innovation became closely associated with 
technological change, Schumpeter does not limit innovation to technological aspects only. He 
mentions at least five ways "to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production", several of 
which may supersede a mere technological definition (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 132): 
1. Introduction a newly invented or improved product  
2. Introduction of a new production process 
3. Development of a new source of supply 
4. Development of a new market for products 
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5. Reorganization of an industry  
To take away, Schumpeter created the field of innovation studies by developing a process-
based concept of innovation where innovation is – on a micro level –the exploitation of a new 
idea, which leads to– on a macro level – the change of economic structures over time. While 
technological change is important, Schumpeter's view of innovation is not limited to 
technological aspects only, but includes all kinds of renewals. Change is a key characteristic 
of capitalism. The economy is changing all the time and equilibrium is only a transient phase. 
While Schumpeter's conception of the innovation process still prevails today it has 
also been taken up and adjusted by various literature streams as explained in the upcoming 
sections. 
2.1.2 Innovation and economic growth 
The interest of economists in the study of innovation surged when technological change was 
found to be an important driver of economic development and prosperity. While the first 
formal model, today known as neoclassical growth theory, still considered technological 
change an exogenous and residual factor in economic growth, subsequent models of the new 
growth theory placed innovation at the core of economic development and studied it as an 
endogenous factor resulting from the growth of knowledge through private and public 
investments in technological research and development and human capital.  
Robert M. Solow (1956, 1957) developed the so-called neoclassical growth model in 
which he formalized the link between economic development, increases in labor and capital, 
and technological change1. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function where the two 
production factors labor and capital determine output, Solow studied economic growth in the 
United States in the first half of the 20th century. He found that the productivity growth 
observed in that period could not be explained by the corresponding increase in the two 
conventional production factors alone. Since economies only accumulate wealth when they 
increase output in relation to the size of their labor force, it is relative measures such as 
output per capita that capture the value of economic growth to residents of a country2. Solow 
                                                 
1 Independent of Solow, Trevor W. Swan (1956) developed a similar model. Therefore the elaborated model is 
also referred to as the Solow-Swan Neoclassical Growth Model. 
2 This statement is over-simplified for the sake sticking to the line of argument; economic research has long 
demonstrated that in addition to relative economic output other factors such as health, education distributional 
issues may also play a role (cf. e.g., (Easterlin, 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Stiglitz, 2012). 
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found that a remaining factor, the so-called Solow residual, explains much of the productivity 
increase. On average about 60 % of growth in labor productivity per country is attributed to 
this effect today (Easterly & Levine, 2002). Solow coined the residual "technical change", or, 
"any kind of shift in the production function" (Solow, 1957, p. 312) and framed it as an 
exogenous factor that occurs spontaneously in an economy. Without elaboration of origin or 
antecedents technology assumed to be a public good that is widely available in a perfect 
market. The impact of the neoclassical growth model on innovation research is hence 
ambiguous: while it asserted the importance of innovation, it did not address how innovation 
is achieved and limited its study from the outset by declaring it exogenous.  
This view was challenged by the new growth theory and endogenous models of 
economic development (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1987). Instead of taking innovation for 
granted and studying its impact on productivity and growth, scholars in this tradition sought 
to identify the components of the Solow residual by including them explicitly in their growth 
models. The objective was to find out what influences technological change, why the Solow 
residual varies across countries and to what extent economic growth continue.  Studies with 
endogenous models showed that technological change is not "manna from heaven" (Freeman, 
1994, p. 463), but the result of deliberate investment in factors that drive productivity. The 
most important factor was found to be the stock of knowledge embodied in humans and 
technology (Arrow, 1962b; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986). Humans develop their knowledge 
stock through education or experience. The technological knowledge stock grows through the 
exploration, development and implementation of technology through for example 
investments in research and development (R&D), a factor that has empirically been linked to 
economic growth (Griliches, 1979; Grossman & Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1986, 1990).  
2.1.3 Market failures and innovation policy 
Establishing that innovation is not exogenous, but the result of the activities of economic 
actors opened the door for economists to analyze the functioning of the market for 
innovation. Several market failures were identified, which in turn provided the rationale for 
innovation policy in order to pursue socially-optimal levels of innovation. 
Independent of new growth theory, the induced innovation hypothesis provided 
evidence that innovation is a "purposive economic activity"  (Jaffe et al., 2003, p. 469) and 
technological change therefore endogenous. Sir John Hicks noted in the 1930s that a change 
in the relative prices of production factors triggers invention targeted at optimizing the use of 
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these production factors in the new price setting (Hicks, 1932). This induced innovation 
hypothesis was formalized in economic models by several researchers in the 1960s (Ahmad, 
1966; Kamien & Schwartz, 1968) and developed further in the 1970s (Binswanger, 1974). 
While Hick's hypothesis targeted process innovations i.e. changes to the way that production 
factors are used in the production process, the same logic may apply to product or other types 
of innovations. 
Research showed that neoclassical assumptions that the market for innovation was 
perfectly competitive1 and would thus result in a socially-optimal level of innovation could 
not be upheld. The most important market failure in the context of innovation stems from the 
special nature of knowledge. Knowledge that is created in the innovation process is a 
nonrival or public good that appreciates with use. Once it has been created it can be shared 
and used by other economic actors and therefore multiplies in value. The creation of 
knowledge through private innovation activities hence has positive externalities that yield 
dynamic increasing returns to society (Romer, 1994; Stiglitz, 2008). However, it also means 
that since investor in knowledge creation are not rewarded for these positive externalities, 
they do not have the incentive to provide knowledge creation to the extent desirable from a 
social point of view. Hence private investments in human capital and R&D are likely to be 
below the socially-optimal level (Coe & Helpman, 1995; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1987, 
1990). 
In addition to the positive externalities of knowledge, more failures in the market for 
innovation were discovered over time. Monopoly power plays a role since the products of 
knowledge creation such as new technologies are not always available to all economic actors, 
but subject to monopolistic practices (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; 
Romer, 1990). Intellectual property rights targeted at inducing innovation through limiting 
the positive externalities explained above may indeed create such a market failure (Swann, 
2009). In addition to this, monopolies can also occur naturally around innovations due to 
increasing returns to scale of information and network externalities. Lastly, information 
asymmetries between buyer and seller may exist and impede the innovation process (Swann, 
2009).  
The academic field of innovation economics and innovation policy is fundamentally 
concerned with devising policies in order to address market failures that cause an under-
                                                 
1 Neoclassical theories often implicitly work with the assumption of complete markets with perfect competition, 
equilibrium pricing at the intersection of supply and demand, and rational economic actors (Weintraub, 1993). 
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investment in innovation. Three types of policy instruments are typically distinguished in 
innovation policy, depending on where in the innovation process they intervene in order to 
address market failures: supply-side measures, or technology-push, and demand-side 
measures, or demand-pull, and framework conditions, or systemic policies. The distinction 
emerged in the 1960s and has been the topic of fierce debates, especially between 
technology-push and demand-pull policy instruments (Di Stefano, Gambardella, & Verona, 
2012).  
The technology-push perspective is rooted in the Schumpeterian and other (Bush, 
1945; Godin, 2006; Rogers, 1962) linear models of the innovation process where 
technological change is the ultimate consequence of scientific research and invention. 
Therefore politics can best support innovation by strengthening invention and innovation 
through e.g., granting property rights or directly financing research and development 
activities (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Myers & Marquis, 1969). In contrast to that demand-
pull proponents argue that innovation is the result of market forces. Demand-side and market 
factors such as latent demand (Schmookler, 1962, 1966), the potential to develop new 
markets (Vernon, 1966), customer and user utility (Von Hippel, 1976, 1994), or  changes to 
market factor prices (Hicks, 1932) are needed to trigger innovative activities by companies in 
the first place. They therefore call for policy makers to influence the market demand through 
financial support for the adoption of new technology or public procurement. In addition to the 
direct positive effect on technological diffusion, demand-pull policies are expected to have an 
indirect, dynamic effect on earlier stages of the innovation process (Schmookler, 1962; Von 
Hippel, 1976). It has, however, become consensus now that both, technology supply and 
market demand, are required for technological progress and that the sequence and interaction 
of them plays a critical role. Depending on the barriers and challenges to innovation existing 
in a particular situation both types of policies plus conducive framework conditions may be 
needed (Di Stefano et al., 2012; Nemet, 2009).  
2.1.4 Firms as actors in innovation 
Firms are important actors in the innovation process as their "activities aggregate into overall 
levels of economic performance"  (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 6). They conduct innovation 
activities when their expected return outweighs the costs. Several factors influence this 
expectation of a return.  
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 Firms are active throughout the innovation process and especially critical in the later 
stages that entail the implementation and diffusion of a novelty (cf.  
Figure 2). For invention, companies invest in R&D, and set up and operate large 
laboratories and research centers that work on the generation of new ideas, scientific 
breakthroughs and technological inventions. However, invention also takes place outside of 
corporate realms and without an immediate commercial purpose, for example in military 
research centers and universities (Nelson, 1993) or through individual and collective 
initiatives (Quiggin, 2006; Von Hippel, 2001). Of the three innovation process steps, 
companies are even more important in the latter ones. The actual innovation, that is the 
implementation of the idea often through commercialization, bringing-to-market and scaling-
up, takes place almost exclusively through business organizations. Even if some ideas at first 
flourish and spread outside and without the involvement of firms, a corporate organization is 
usually taken on at some point (Audia & Rider, 2005).  
It has been well-established that companies invest in innovation activities because 
they expect an economic return from it (Arrow, 1962a; Cohen, 2010; Griliches, 1957; 
Nelson, 1971; Schmookler, 1962). While theories of the firm have evolved beyond the 
conception of companies existing for the sole purpose of maximizing profit, the basic tenet 
that firms are rational actors and are therefore profit and value oriented still holds (Jensen, 
2001; Rumelt & Lamb, 1997). All the activities that companies can engage in with the 
purpose of creating and introducing novelties are hence investment activities that are 
ultimately geared at generating profit, increasing the value of the entity that undertakes the 
activity, and securing longer term corporate survival. The challenge of innovation activities is 
that these investments do in general not generate a timely and certain return. Investments in 
innovation are linked to great uncertainty over their outcome including the risk of complete 
losses and long pay-off times. Companies hence need to take these risks into account in their 
investment decisions. This is especially true for investments related to activities very early in 
the innovation process. Early inventive activity such as basic R&D, i.e. research that is not 
yet geared towards a specific commercial application, or creative activities and 
experimentation are far from delivering a return on investment (Von Hippel, Thomke, & 
Sonnack, 1999). As a consequence there is a tendency of firms to underestimate the 
importance of these activities (Arrow, 1962a; Nelson, 1971). In light of the profit motive of 
companies, some perspective on the future i.e. the expectation of a return from innovation is 
needed to engage in innovation in the first place. Empirical research shows that market 
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opportunity, technological opportunity, and appropriability of the return are key factors in 
R&D investment decisions as they provide a cue to the economic return expected from the 
activity (Jaffe et al., 2003). 
2.1.5 Evolutionary perspectives in innovation studies 
Evolutionary perspectives in innovation studies emerged as an alternative to neoclassical 
equilibrium models. They are based on the Schumpeterian doctrine of continuously changing 
societies and reassert the role of micro level and industry level studies of innovation 
(Freeman, 1994).  
Evolutionary perspectives assume bounded rationality of these actors as they possess 
limited access to information and limited capacity to process it (March & Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1965). That means rather than optimizing and taking decisions that maximize 
personal utility, actors satisfice and take decisions that are sufficient and satisfactory given 
their limitations in terms of knowledge and understanding. Decision-making is guided by 
shortcuts, routines, norms, rules, and the knowledge of past experience  (Nelson & Winter, 
1982). A consequence of this is the emergence of path dependence. Because actors use the 
status quo and existing knowledge in their decision making, the development of the future is 
influenced by the past (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). Furthermore, learning and the accumulation 
of knowledge play an important role in evolutionary approaches. Through learning actors 
seek to improve their decision-making as they develop better behaviors and coping strategies. 
Spillover is thereby, however, no externality or market failure, but a testimony to the 
complexity and interrelatedness of knowledge (Dosi & Nelson, 1994).   
Innovation and technological change are in evolutionary economics investigated as a 
process over time. Change on a macro scale is explained through the cumulated of the 
behavior of microeconomic actors (Dosi & Nelson, 1994). The dynamics and pathways of the 
transition process are more important than the outright comparison of two states (Dosi & 
Nelson, 1994). Evolutionary economics often borrows from evolutionary theory in biology. 
An example of this is Nelson and Winter's 1982 phase model of technological innovation that 
uses the metaphor of variation, selection and stabilization to describe technological evolution 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Change does hence not lead to a pre-determined equilibrium state, 
but is an open-ended evolutionary process that is shaped by the past. 
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2.2 Three perspectives to study the effect of Energiewende on innovation 
2.2.1 Multi-level perspective in sustainability transitions research 
2.2.1.1 Assumptions and core concepts 
Sustainability transitions research is an interdisciplinary approach to study the dynamics of 
transitions towards a more sustainable society. In recent years the interest in studying such 
transitions has surged as exemplified by an increased number of publications and academic 
journals devoted to the topic (Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2010; Markard et al., 2012; Van den 
Bergh, Truffer, & Kallis, 2011). Sustainability transitions research stands in the tradition of 
evolutionary economics and shares a lot of the same basic assumptions such as the bounded 
rationality of actors and the conviction that society is continually changing. It has built on and 
further developed important concepts from evolutionary economics such as cognitive 
frameworks, technological paradigms and technological regimes (Dosi, 1982; Geels, 2002, 
2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982).   
Sustainability transitions research is rooted in the conviction that environmental and 
social problems are side-effects of a modern, industrial society. They are deeply embedded in 
the way economy and society function and need to be regarded comprehensively and in their 
context in order to be adequately addressed (Grin et al., 2010). The remedy means a full 
transformation of a current socio-technical system incl. infrastructure and patterns of supply 
and demand in e.g., the energy, agriculture and transport sectors. Change does not come easy; 
due to historic technological trajectories and path dependence we are locked into the current 
system of dominant technologies, sunk investments in infrastructure, political and economic 
institutions and habitual lifestyles. While socio-technical systems are in principal dynamic 
and can change, the various linkages and interdependencies among the nodes in a system 
exhibit a high resilience towards change. In a stable system change tends to be incremental 
and directed only at improving the system, hence reinforcing it instead of breaking it down 
(Geels, 2002, 2004).  
The notion of a system, often referred to as socio-technical system, is core in the 
sustainability transitions literature. It is the current socio-technical system that needs to 
change in order to get to a more sustainable future state. A socio-technical system is defined 
in an abstract, functional way as the combination of elements needed to fulfill a certain 
societal function. A societal function usually equals as a particular sector of the economy, 
21  
 
such as energy, transport or water. The system comprises everything that is needed to fulfill 
this function from the supply to the demand side (Geels, 2004). Elements of the system 
include actors (governments, companies, individuals), institutions (laws, norms, regulations), 
material artifacts (physical assets, infrastructure, networks) and knowledge (tangible, 
intangible). These elements are closely linked and interdependent. This definition explicitly 
encompasses producers as well as users of technology (Geels, 2004). The term socio-
technical also captures the social dimension of technological innovation. Transitions require 
not only a change of technology, but changes to the way that technology is used (Markard et 
al., 2012).  
The two defining terms, sustainability and transitions, are rather broad concepts. 
Sustainability refers to the understanding suggested by the Brundtland commission where 
sustainable development is the endeavor to meet "the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland et al., 
1987, p. 41). This encompasses foremost environmental, but also social aspects. Views on 
what constitutes sustainability can, however, vary and are expected to change over time 
(Garud, Gehman, & Karnøe, 2010). The term transition exemplifies the fundamental changes 
that are required throughout the system to achieve sustainability. Changes are far-reaching 
and concern all elements of the system. They may take several decades to unfold. A 
sustainability transition is hence a long, open-ended, and comprehensive change process. 
Sustainability of production and consumption is the ambition and provides a general sense of 
direction, but the transition has no pre-determined final state. The term system innovation is 
often used interchangeably with sustainability transition. System innovation means renewal 
of a socio-technical system and is hence largely synonymous. However, the term transition 
stresses the process nature of change, which is why it has emerged as the preferred term in 
the literature  (Augenstein, 2015, p. 60). 
2.2.1.2 Alternative approaches in sustainability transitions research 
A couple of approaches have become well established and widely used in sustainability 
transitions research: the multi-level perspective, strategic niche management and transition 
management, and technological innovation systems (Markard et al., 2012; Van den Bergh et 
al., 2011). It should be noted that these approaches are heavily interlinked and share similar 
assumptions, concepts and contributing authors. They are most usefully distinguished in the 
way they are applied. The multi-level perspective (MLP) and technology innovation systems 
22  
 
(TIS) build overarching heuristics to analyze transitions. In contrast to that strategic niche 
management (SNM) and transition management (TM) look at transitions from a governance 
perspective and device a set of guiding principles and policy recommendations for the 
management of transition processes. They are not policy instruments in a traditional sense, 
but additional ways of thinking about the role of governance in sustainability transitions 
(Voß, Bauknecht, & Kemp, 2006). 
While all approaches have their merits and therefore their rightful place in 
sustainability transitions research, the MLP is best suited for the research interest in this 
thesis. The MLP provides a framework for the investigation of transition processes from a 
systemic perspective. SNM, TM and TIS are fundamentally governance approaches that 
focus on procedure and process design in public policy and do not lend themselves to the 
research question of assessing an effect of a transition on innovation. Therefore, before 
focusing on the MLP (section 2.2.1.2.4), the other approaches are summarized below for the 
sake providing a comprehensive overview of sustainability transitions research. 
2.2.1.2.1 Strategic niche management 
Strategic niche management (SNM) is particularly concerned with the creation and 
governance of strategic niches. Proponents of the approach argue that new technologies 
require a shielded space where they can evolve through experiments. These experiments 
explore technological possibilities, but also the application and implementation of technology 
in society. Consumer needs are part of the experiments as are technological properties and 
production processes. These experiments trigger an open-ended search and learning process 
around all socio-technical aspects of a new technology and may lead to changes in the way 
that technology is designed or used (Hoogma, Kemp, Schot, & Truffer, 2002; Kemp, Schot, 
& Hoogma, 1998; Markard et al., 2012). The niche hence enables social learning, the 
development of expectations and visions and the building of actor networks (Augenstein, 
2015, p. 100). SNM offers governments advice on how to use niches for socio-technical 
exploration. In contrast to other governmental technology strategies, SNM stresses the 
inclusion of user preferences and rejects pure technology-push ideas. It recommends 
government-funded pilot and demonstration projects with a focus on open-ended exploration, 
involving all relevant societal actors, making interactions transparent and anticipating a 
strategy for up-scaling the niches as well as obstacles that then need to be overcome 
(Hoogma et al., 2002). SNM is an interesting concept with elements that recall management 
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literature on infant industry protection and clusters (Porter & Stern, 2001; Westphal, 1982), 
the practicality of SNM remains limited as policy recommendations are rather abstract and 
with the exclusive focus on niches address only one aspect of sustainability transitions. In so 
far it can enrich policy debates on how to best design support schemes for technological 
exploration activities, but not replace other innovation and environmental policy instruments. 
2.2.1.2.2 Transition management 
Transition management (TM) takes a broader and more comprehensive approach to the 
management of transition processes by combining concepts from socio-technical transitions 
with complex systems theory and the literature on governance. TM was developed in a 
practical context through a joint project of researchers with a Dutch national ministry with the 
aim to develop a process for integrating sustainability into Dutch policy-making. To this end 
TM proposes a cyclical process: establishing a transitions arena with a broad variety of 
stakeholders, developing a shared vision, defining paths towards achieving this vision, setting 
up experiments that can help realizing certain paths and continuously monitoring, evaluating 
and improving the transitions process (Loorbach, 2010). TM hence provides a practical and 
action-oriented framework for influencing transitions towards sustainability (Markard et al., 
2012). It stresses the long-term, evolutionary and iterative nature of transition processes and 
emphasizes that governance needs to be reflective of all developments in order to be able to 
successfully shape a transition (Voß, Smith, & Grin, 2009). TM does not address other 
mechanisms of transition such as e.g., niche-regime dynamics (Augenstein, 2015, p. 104). 
Despite its development in a practical context, TM has been of limited use in policy-making. 
Experience from the application of the framework in the transition of the Dutch energy sector 
has shown that issues, which are not explicitly addressed in the theoretical framework, can 
impede its usefulness in practice. Such issues concern political realities of asymmetric power 
relationships, e.g., between actors of the established regime and niche actors, or political 
struggle that can lead to a dilution of sustainability targets, or the neglect of long-term 
strategies in favor of short-term instruments (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Kern & Smith, 2008). 
So, to a certain extent what applies to SNM also applies to TM, while it can enrich the 
political process the usefulness and practicality of its application still need to be discerned or 
the TM adjusted in such a way that it becomes robust in the light of the issues mentioned 
(Voß et al., 2009). 
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2.2.1.2.3 Technological innovation systems 
Technological innovation systems (TIS) is another approach in sustainability transition 
research. The TIS literature looks at transition processes through socio-technical systems and 
aims to understand why and how sustainable technologies penetrate such systems. In the 
definition of TIS, socio-technical systems are dynamic networks of agents in a particular 
sector or industry and in the context of a given institutional infrastructure. These actors drive 
the development, implementation and utilization of a technology. Through an analysis of the 
interactions between these agents, barriers to the diffusion of the technology are identified. 
Institutions are of special importance as they influence the interaction between agents and 
hence the functioning of the innovation system (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, & 
Rickne, 2008). Ultimately, the objective of TIS is to inform policy making (Markard et al., 
2012). TIS has made important contributions to the collective understanding of innovation 
systems, including the identification of certain processes in innovation systems that need to 
run well for the system to be successful, and the enhanced understanding of market failures 
through a focus on actor networks (Bergek et al., 2008). Fundamentally, however, TIS does 
not address structural change as it is only focused on technological diffusion within a network 
of actors (Geels, 2010). It does not offer a suitable perspective to investigate the research 
interest of this thesis. 
2.2.1.2.4 The multi-level perspective 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) is an analytical framework to study changes in a socio-
technical system on three levels: landscape, regime and niche. Investigating the interaction 
between these three levels it aims to identify and describe patterns and mechanisms through 
which transition processes occur. It was developed by Frank W. Geels and others (Geels, 
2002; Rip & Kemp, 1998) and combines learnings from evolutionary economics (Dosi, 1982; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982), technology studies (Hughes, 1987), institutional economics (North, 
1990), and sociology (Giddens, 1984). It has mainly been used to explain historical 
transitions (Geels, 2002), however, is increasingly being employed in the study of current and 
ongoing transitions as well (Augenstein, 2015; Geels, 2012; Kern, 2012; Van der Vleuten & 
Högselius, 2012). 
The socio-technical regime forms the core concept of the MLP. A regime is a set of 
rules that govern the behavior of actors in a socio-technical system. The concept of regime is 
25  
 
very similar to the definition of institutions as "rules of the game" (North, 1990) in new 
institutional economics. A regime combines various types of rules as diverse as formal laws 
and regulations, behavioral routines and standards, societal norms and biases, political 
paradigms, and shared beliefs and values. The difference is that a regime is defined with 
respect to a particular socio-economic system. A regime is the "deep structure" (Geels, 2011, 
p. 31) or implicit logic that determines the stability of that system and directs its development 
in a certain way. Rules are manifested in the cognition of actors and embedded in all other 
tangible and intangible system elements (Geels, 2004). While a regime is not material per se, 
the representation and reproduction of the rules of the regime in the material artifacts of the 
system reinforces its strength. Geels distinguishes seven dimensions in a regime: technology, 
user practices and markets, symbolic meanings of technology, infrastructure, industry 
structure, policy and techno-scientific knowledge (2002, p. 1262). Regimes are characterized 
by path-dependence and technology lock-ins that render them highly stable and persistent 
over time. Incremental innovations and improvements in line with the regime shape 
technological trajectories that reproduce the basic tenets of the regime (Geels, 2002). 
Regimes are, however, not static, but subject to change due to internal and external 
developments. Rules in a regime are semi-coherent; while their broad alignment gives the 
regime stability, there can also be discrepancy between rules of different subsystems, creating 
the opportunity for tension and change to the regime from within (Geels, 2004). In addition, 
change can also come from the two adjacent levels, landscape and niches. 
The socio-technical landscape is the wider macro environment surrounding a regime. 
It captures elements of society that cannot be directly influenced by actors and are hence even 
harder to change than regimes. This includes culture, fundamental values and beliefs, but also 
material assets such as large networks of infrastructure or spatial and natural conditions. It 
also comprises other non-technological and very diverse factors such as global commodity 
prices, demographic change or political and economic turmoil. Landscapes do change, but 
much slower than regimes. On the other side, landscape events can trigger regime changes  
(Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007). 
Lastly, niches constitute the micro level and major source of novelties in the MLP. 
Niches develop innovations that are radical and challenge the basic rules of a regime. New 
technology emerges in niches, where it is shielded from competition and market forces. 
Niches are important as they enable learning processes through developing a technology, 
using and applying it and studying its performance and side effects. Niches also foster actor 
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networks surrounding a technology (Geels, 2002).  Examples of niches include exploratory 
corporate laboratories, university research centers, or military institutions that operate distinct 
from ordinary, regime-compliant science institutes.  
The degree of structuration, and with it resistance to change, increases with the levels. 
Niches are the most dynamic and less stable level, while landscapes are the most stable, and 
regimes are somewhere in-between. A transition is characterized by interaction of these three 
levels in a dynamic way: niche innovations build momentum and break into established 
regimes, landscape developments destabilize regimes and create windows of opportunity for 
technological niches, regimes can destabilize from the inside through divergence of the rules 
of their constituting social groups. By focusing on reiterative action the MLP rejects the idea 
of linear causality and replaces it with "processes at multiple levels that influence and 
reinforce each other" (Geels, 2011, p. 29). A successful transition is marked by a complete 
regime shift that occurs because of the "alignment of developments" on all levels (Kemp, 
Rip, & Schot, 2001). Recent theoretical literature on the MLP has emphasized that levels do 
not represent a hierarchy in terms of more or less important for transition, but only represent 
different levels of structuration and predisposition for change (Geels, 2011). 
 
2.2.1.3 Transitions in the multi-level perspective 
Empirical work using the MLP is usually directed at the dynamics between the levels and the 
identification of transition mechanisms. Transition mechanisms are varied by nature of the 
change within the different levels and the interplay between them.  
On a basic level, Geels and Kemp (2007) define a transition as a dynamic process of 
change across all three levels where a socio-technical systems is changed through landscape 
pressures, weakening of the established and emergence of a new regime, and the diffusion of 
niche innovations, see Figure 3. The transition is completed when a new regime has emerged. 
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Figure 3: Multi-level perspective on transitions 
 
Source: Geels, 2011, p. 28 
 
Building on this, Geels and Schot (2007) develop a typology of four transition 
pathways by varying the nature (i.e. extent of disruption) and timing of change dynamics 
across the levels. A transformation1 pathway combines moderate landscape pressure with 
premature niche innovations and leads to regime actors modifying the regime and thus 
changing the overall trajectory. In a de-alignment and re-alignment pathway landscape 
pressure disrupts the regime and enables niche innovations to emerge and successfully 
establish in a new regime. In a technological substitution pathway landscape pressure also 
disrupts the regime as niche innovations are already successful and hence replace the 
technology to form a new regime. In a reconfiguration pathway niche innovations are 
symbiotic to technology in an established regime and are hence integrated into the regime by 
regime actors. However, the accumulation of innovations leads to regime change (Geels & 
Schot, 2007, p. 406 ff). In addition, transition patterns have been identified as smaller units 
that describe small parts or short time spans of a transition and the dynamics on or between 
levels. Taken together they make up distinct transitions pathways. As such, patterns detail the 
                                                 
1 In this thesis transition and transformation are in general used synonymously and not distinguished in the way 
proposed here by Geels and Schot (2007).  
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mechanisms and multi-level dynamics of transitions. Patterns include for example add-on and 
hybridization as new technology is integrated into existing technology (Geels, 2005) or hype-
disappointment cycles where initial enthusiasm for a technological improvement is followed 
by a sudden loss of interest (Verbong, Geels, & Raven, 2008). The authors stress that 
mechanisms as well as patterns constitute ideal-type dynamics that may in reality overlap or 
be combined.  
Essentially, it is the interaction between the niche, regime and landscape levels as well 
as the dynamics within each of these levels that determine transition processes. The dynamics 
between niche and regime are most often studied. Since the landscape with its high degree of 
structuration is a given i.e. cannot be influenced by individual actors, it is especially the 
interaction between niche and regime, and the influence of landscape developments on both, 
that can be studied. Furthermore change is often initiated in niches and niche innovations 
provide the range of options that change can take. Dynamics emerge around the timing of 
niche innovation and the modes of penetration of an existing regime with respect to regime-
internal dynamics and landscape events, e.g., the extent of disruption that a niche innovation 
causes and the behavior of niche and regime actors in the process. Smith (2007) identifies 
various processes of translation and interaction between niche and a regime: First, a niche 
comes into existence in direct opposition to a regime hence building on regime language and 
turning it into its opposite. Second, the regime takes up criticism from the niche and adjusts, 
at least regarding language. Third, the niche adapts in a way that it better fits into a regime. 
This does not mean that it regresses from its transformative ambition or loses its substantive 
focus, but in order to realize its full potential it needs to be able to fit into regime practices, 
e.g., in the form of add-ons. Fourth, niche and regime can adapt mutually through join 
projects and collaboration. 
Another dynamic of change is that between several systems and regimes. Systems and 
regimes do not exist in isolation, but are connected through actors that stretch over more than 
one regime and may be affected by the same landscape and niche developments. Change 
dynamics can hence influence the relative position of regimes or redefine regime boundaries. 
Furthermore regimes can compete with each other, change together in a mutually beneficial 
way, reconfigure their constitution or influence dynamics in the respective other regime 
(Raven & Verbong, 2007).  
Furthermore, there are always regime-internal dynamics. Because a regime is made up 
of heterogeneous actors with diverging interests that are bound together by "semi-coherent" 
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rule sets, often establishing distinct sub-regimes, regimes are always in fluctuation, or can 
only be considered "dynamically stable" (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 406). Tensions or even 
"cracks" in regimes force them to open up and eventually change due to landscape pressures, 
internal problems or niche innovations (Geels, Kemp, Dudley, & Lyons, 2012). Furthermore, 
regimes can themselves be drivers of radical change (Bosman, Loorbach, Frantzeskaki, & 
Pistorius, 2014; Van der Vleuten & Högselius, 2012).  
It is important to note that change according to the MLP is always co-evolutionary 
(Geels, 2004). This means that the development of different elements of a system, structural 
entities, actors or levels, is interrelated and interdependent. Different elements evolve 
together and influence each other in a complex, iterative way. "There is not just one kind of 
dynamic […], but multiple dynamics which interact" (Geels, 2004, p. 909). The notion of co-
evolution rejects simple causality where an action triggers a reaction as a one-off occurrence 
and in isolation of contextual factors. This conviction is the reason why the MLP puts an 
emphasis on process, mechanism and patterns, rather than formal models with precise, 
computable outcomes (Geels, 2010) 
2.2.1.4 Contributions and criticism 
Despite its popularity, the MLP is also subject to criticism of its ontological foundations as 
well as its application. However, the criticisms point the way to expanding and improving 
this research approach. First, the MLP can tend to be structuralistic and underplay the role of 
actors and agency in transition processes. Applying structural models like the MLP's three 
levels to real life problems can feel like imposing a rigid structure that does not leave room 
for investigations of autonomous actor behavior (Smith, Voß, & Grin, 2010). However, Geels 
argues that the three levels only constitute a "stylized representation"  of the MLP and do not 
capture all of its aspects and analytical possibilities (Geels, 2011, p. 29). Indeed, the 
ontological foundations of the MLP emphasize the duality of structure and agency and hold 
that both are of equal importance for social change (Giddens, 1984). Structures only exist 
because they are continuously reproduced and enacted by individuals and social groups 
(Geels, 2011; Geels & Schot, 2007). While structures constrain the activities of actors, they 
also enable them. Actors can take creative actions and shape and change their structures from 
within. In addition, while most empirical studies using the MLP do apply the three levels, the 
MLP does not preclude the analysis of actors and the focus on agency. Especially when 
investigating niche-regime and landscape-regime dynamics a focus on actors drawing on 
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adjacent literature and principles of agency may be insightful. Indeed, it may only be possible 
to understand the important role of actors in transformation processes by investigating their 
strategic behavior and positioning with respect to their surrounding structures (Augenstein, 
2015, p. 76). Thus the development of research in the tradition of the MLP that explicitly 
deals with agency is highly encouraged (Geels, 2011). 
Second, due to the critical importance of technological niches, studies applying the 
MLP are prone to a bottom-up bias that stresses the role of niches over regime-internal 
changes and landscape effects. Investigating the struggle of niche innovations against 
established regimes is frequent especially in early empirical contributions to the literature 
(Geels, 2011). This follows the narrative of many contributions in innovation studies as well 
as environmental studies that phrase change in general and sustainability transitions in 
particular as a fight of David against Goliath (Baumol, 1988; Hajer, 2005). However, this is 
not an inherent limitation of the MLP, but rather a state of research that can and should be 
expanded. The typology of transition pathways (Geels & Schot, 2007) explained above 
(section 2.2.1.3) already suggests that transitions can be triggered by several combinations of 
landscape events and niche innovations.  
Third, the MLP seems to be more suitable to ex-post analyses of historical transitions 
than to studying current and ongoing change processes. It is comparatively easy to study 
transitions in retrospect when start and end points are known and it is clearly established how 
the dynamics have played out over time. This is why the MLP is often demonstrated with 
case studies of historical transitions, e.g., from sailing to steam ships (Geels, 2002) or from 
horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (Geels, 2005). Investigations of transitions "in the 
making" do also exist, but are less frequent. As a heuristic framework that employs a process-
based explanatory style the MLP has little predictive power (Geels, 2011). The MLP is a 
"middle range theory" (Merton, 1968, p. 39)  that builds analytical models through the 
empirical research of concrete phenomena in a specified context. It does not seek to explain 
universal concepts such as "society" or "capitalism" (Geels, 2007). While its specifications go 
beyond the mere statement of facts to relate phenomena with one another, it cannot make 
predictions. The MLP provides a perspective for looking at things and a terminology to 
describe and interpret them rather than a mathematical formula that predicts future outcomes. 
It is evident from the studies of ongoing transformations that they rarely employ the three-
level framework as is, but instead narrow the research scope and focus on smaller aspects of 
it. They investigate e.g., fixed (past) time spans, specific patterns and mechanisms of 
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transition, and do not aim to provide a full explanation of the entire transition process 
(Augenstein, 2015; Geels, 2012; Kern, 2012; Van der Vleuten & Högselius, 2012).  
2.2.2 Environmental economics  
2.2.2.1 Assumptions and core concepts 
Environmental economics studies market failures in the context of environmental problems. 
The focus on environmental innovation is a particular subset of environmental economics that 
is closely related with innovation economics. The study of the effect and effectiveness of 
environmental policy for innovation is an integral part of the research field and the literature 
has developed important insights into the effect of environmental policy instruments for 
innovation. 
The core contention in environmental economics is that innovation conducive to 
preserving the environment suffers from a double market failure (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 
2005). The first market failure is the one observed for all innovation activities (cf. section 
2.1.2). The positive externalities of knowledge spillovers mean that private firm who invest in 
an innovation cannot appropriate all the benefits. Social benefits from innovation will always 
be larger than private benefits. This causes underinvestment in such innovation compared to 
what would be optimal from a social point of view. The second market failure is specific to 
all environmental problems. Economic activity results in negative externalities for the 
environment such as pollution, the depletion of natural resources, or climate change, which 
are not sufficiently reflected in the value of the market transaction (Baumol, 1988). 
2.2.2.2 Environmental policy and innovation 
The environmental economics literature suggests that environmental policy can address this 
double market failure through public policy. A key concern in environmental economics is 
therefore to identify the best policy instrument to achieve environmental innovation. 
Researchers have classified and evaluated different types of policy instruments to this end 
(Del Río González, 2009; Horbach, 2008; Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011). In addition to the 
distinction between technology-push, demand-pull and systemic instruments in innovation 
policy, which is based on the purpose of the policy in terms of the innovation value chain 
policies, environmental policy has its own distinction of policy instruments. Environmental 
policy distinguishes types of policy instruments based on how they seek to induce pro-
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environmental behavior: market-based, through command-and-control regulation, or through 
information. A combination of the two approaches results in a matrix typology in which 
policy instruments are clustered according to their type in terms of environmental policy and 
purpose in terms of innovation policy, as depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Type-purpose instrument typology with selected examples 
 Purpose in terms of  
innovation policy:  
Type in terms of 
 environmental policy:  
Technology-push Demand-pull Systemic  
Market-based  R&D support Subsidies, feed-in tarifs, 
tradable permits, taxes 
Tax reforms, 
infrastructure provision 
Command-and-control  Patent law, intellectual 
property rights
Standards, limits, 
prohibitions
Market design, 
electricity grid access 
Information  Vocational training Labels, information 
campaigns 
Education system  
Source: Adapted from Rogge & Reichardt (2013). 
 
Just as the dichotomy between technology-push and demand-pull in innovation 
policy, environmental policy has a dichotomy between command-and-control and market-
based instruments. Command-and-control instruments refer to classical, regulatory policy 
that prescribes standards or limits for something that is environmentally harmful, monitors 
compliance and penalizes breaches. Market-based instruments seek to use market forces to 
remedy innovation or environmental problems by making the externalities part of the market 
transaction. Market-based policies geared at the adoption and diffusion of a particular 
technology are also called deployment policies (Klessmann, Held, Rathmann, & Ragwitz, 
2011). Sometimes a further distinction between price-based policies and quantity-based 
policies is made. In price-based policies the regulator sets a price and lets the market 
determine the quantity. Examples for these are environmental taxes or feed-in-tariffs for 
renewable energy. In quantity-based policies the regulator sets the quantity and lets the 
market find the adequate price. Examples are tradable permits for emissions, or quotas for 
renewable energy. There is no universal consensus on how to best classify environmental 
policy instruments for the purpose of innovation and several more categorization systems 
exist (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). In addition to the existence of such policy instruments, their 
design features have also been related to their effectiveness in influencing innovation. Most 
research has been carried out on stringency (Frondel, Horbach, & Rennings, 2007; Johnstone 
& Haščič, 2013; Martin, Muûls, & Wagner, 2011; Rogge, Schneider, & Hoffmann, 2011; T. 
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S. Schmidt, Schneider, Rogge, Schuetz, & Hoffmann, 2012), but various other factors 
including credibility and predictability have been found important (Engau & Hoffmann, 
2011; Johnstone, Haščič, & Kalamova, 2011; Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011; Vollebergh, 2007). 
The environmental economics literature today agrees in the sense that it is the total effect of a 
policy mix, rather than individual aspects that is important.  
2.2.3 Organization and management studies 
2.2.3.1 Assumptions and core concepts 
Organization and management studies share many epistemological foundations and 
influences with evolutionary economics, however, the locus of research differs. While 
evolutionary economics is interested in understanding and explaining the macro and meso 
levels of technological change through micro actors, organization and management studies 
look at the micro level exclusively and moreover add a firm-internal view to innovation 
studies. It often seeks to give practical advice to companies and managers, rather than explain 
technological and other economic change over time. Just like evolutionary economics, 
scholars in management and organization studies typically embrace bounded rationality as 
the guiding principle for individual decision-making in organizations (March and Simon 
1985). In doing so, they also acknowledge the role of routine behavior, path dependence and 
the importance of organizational learning. In the process of socio-technical change firms have 
a dual role. They are themselves actors in the innovation process and hence contribute to 
change, but they are also affected by innovation and change taking place in their business 
environment.  
Organizational scholars are particularly interested in the nature of learning on the firm 
level. Based on March (1991) two modes of learning are typically distinguished: exploitation 
and exploration. Exploitation builds on existing knowledge through "refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution"; exploration develops new 
knowledge through "search, variation, risk taking, play, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, innovation" (March, 1991, p. 71). Although there is a certain degree of trade-off 
between the two since they compete for scarce organizational resources, firms need to engage 
in both and they are mutually enabling in the long run (Farjoun, 2010; Hoppmann, Peters, 
Schneider, & Hoffmann, 2013; Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). 
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2.2.3.2 Technological change and the failure of incumbent firms 
Ample empirical studies have investigated how firms fare in the light of rapid technological 
change. This research shows that there is a marked difference between incumbent firms i.e. 
firms long established in their industry, and start-up firms, i.e. new entrants in a particular 
industry. In the light of technological change incumbent firms often fail and yield the playing 
field to start-up firms (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). This is especially 
pronounced if the change occurring is radical or discontinuous i.e. constitutes a technological 
breakthrough that punctuates a previous period of incremental change, if it is architectural 
i.e. does not primarily affect technological properties as such, but rather the way that different 
components interact with each other (Henderson & Clark, 1990), or if implementation of the 
change requires organizational adjustments on a wider scale leading to the renewal of the 
business model of the firm (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Three different explanations 
for the failure of firms in light of such change can be found: economic disincentives on part 
of the incumbent to engage with new technologies, structural reasons due to the 
embeddedness of incumbents in a certain strategic direction and value network, and 
organizational inertia as the result of resources, capabilities and cognition (C. W. Hill & 
Rothaermel, 2003).  
First, economic explanations suggest that incumbent firms face an economic 
disincentive to act because they want to protect existing revenue streams and avoid the 
cannibalization of their successful products (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Incumbents 
tend to invest in incremental innovations to their existing products in order to strengthen their 
revenue base. They avoid the technological uncertainty of more radical innovation. They also 
deliberately choose to not invest in radical innovation in order to not promote it further. 
Lacking established business, start-up firms do not face such pressures, but instead are 
incentivized to promote radical innovations as due to barriers to entry they are not able to 
compete with incumbents in their established business areas (Henderson, 1993). 
Second, structural explanations focus on commitments that incumbent firms have 
towards their suppliers, customers, investors, complementary product providers and 
communities i.e. their value network (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Network 
commitments provide for inflexibility in the light of change as the logic to serve the existing 
value network trumps the exploration of new, disruptive opportunities (Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). Incumbent firms fail when the commitments to 
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their established value network causes them to ignore small, but fast growing markets, that 
eventually overtake the dominant position (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
Third, organizational explanations analyze the failure of incumbent firms in the light 
of organizational characteristics (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). As organizations and the 
individuals within them are boundedly rational, they develop highly structured routines in 
order to take decisions and coordinate their activities (Arrow, 1962b; March & Simon, 1958; 
Nelson & Winter, 1974; Simon, 1979). These routines are what make organizations work in 
the first place as individual activities are directed towards a joint objective. Moreover, they 
define the competitive advantage of organizations. Core capabilities or core competences1 
embody the collective knowledge of an organization in terms of a combination of resources 
and skills and hence distinguish organizations in the market place. They constitute what firms 
are good at (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Incumbents struggle if they are faced with change that 
destroys the value of these competences (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). They are also more 
likely to pursue activities that build on their existing competences. This means that the 
technological exploration a firm engages in is constraint by these organizational determinants 
(Dosi, 1982). If capabilities prevent change, they can become core rigidities (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) which threaten corporate survival. Established power structures around such 
core competences may further inhibit change and aggravate this (Cyert & March, 1963).  
Related to capabilities are investigations that look at the cognition of an organization 
and of the individuals within it. Cognitive explanations start even earlier in the innovation 
process than the ones based on capabilities. Cognition influences how organizations notice, 
interpret and react to changes in their external environment (Weick, 1979). They direct and 
constrain learning efforts within organizations and thus determine which organizational 
capabilities develop in the first place (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Cognitive representations of 
decision-makers within firms shapes strategic choice (Barr, 1998) and can determine the 
technological trajectory that an organization takes. Cognitive representations are especially 
influential in early stages of innovation when economic effects cannot yet be discerned 
(Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). Cognition is manifested on the individual as well as the 
organizational level. Organizations operate with a dominant logic, i.e. a set of rules, norms 
and beliefs that prescribes what is considered right for the organization (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986). Firms can fail when the cognitive representations of their decision-makers restrict 
                                                 
1 The terms capability and competence are used synonymously in this thesis. 
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them in developing or utilizing capabilities that later turn out to be critical in a new 
environment (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Often such cognitive representations are shared in an 
industry providing for a homogenous macroculture and industry-wide barriers to change in 
that industry (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Cross-cutting economic, structural and organizational explanations, the literature on 
business models provides yet another perspective on the failure of incumbent firms. A 
business model is a multi-dimensional concept that describes how a firm creates and captures 
value. Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) define a business model as the combination of a 
firm's target market, value proposition, value chain, cost and profit function, value network, 
and competitive strategy. A successful business model shapes the dominant cognitive logic 
within a firm and constrains the firm's exploratory activities to those that fit the established 
business model. Opportunities that require a new and adjusted business model are hence 
foregone, either because they are not identified in the first place, or because they are not 
implemented. Firms fail if alternative business models turn out to be more successful. 
2.2.3.3 Strategies to promote organizational learning 
However, not all incumbents fail. Many incumbent firms do survive or even promote radical 
innovation from within their firm (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). "The picture which […] 
emerges from numerous studies of innovation in firms is one of continuous interactive 
learning" (Freeman, 1994, p. 470). Effective strategies for promoting such learning are key to 
this. Building on the exploitation/exploration distinction of March (1991), the ability to 
obtain new sources of competitive advantage despite path dependencies has also been called 
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Two of 
such dynamic capabilities are of particular importance for organizational learning: First, the 
ability to manage the balance between exploration and exploitation and engage in both 
simultaneously, called ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008, 2013; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). Second, the ability to be inspired from the business environment rather than 
internal factors, coined absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The level of 
absorptive capacity in a firm is typically associated with previous knowledge investments of 
that firm (ibid.).   
Several strategies that that firms can use to promote organizational learning have been 
identified. These strategies apply to incumbent as well as to start-up firms. In effect, some of 
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the strategies are meant to promote the entrepreneurship that is supposed to be found in start-
up firms and install it in incumbents.  
First, leadership on the strategic as well as the organizational level is important. On 
the strategic level middle and senior managers need to have the foresight to navigate their 
organizations between continuous and discontinuous change, on the organizational level they 
need to steer learning processes in such a way that firms are successful in their current 
business, but at the same time remain open to explore new opportunities (Chesbrough, 2010; 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
Second, firms benefit from having an organizational culture that promotes 
entrepreneurial attributes such as autonomous action, experimentation, knowledge sharing, 
rapid implementation, and tolerance of failure (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996).  
Third, the continuous engagement in experimentation and the implementation of new 
ideas in order to get acquainted with novelties and test them is perceived critical. This 
includes investments in basic research and the development of technical capabilities even if 
they are not directly related to current business (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Tripsas, 
1997) as well as the implementation or "effectuation" of new things, that is putting them into 
action in order to test them (Chesbrough, 2010, p. 360)   
Fourth, the organizational structure can promote organizational learning by being flat 
and non-hierarchical in order to promote the desirable entrepreneurial culture. Moreover, it 
has been shown that the organizational separation of teams or departments that work on 
something very new is beneficial (Christensen & Bower, 1996; C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 
2003). It is often easier to conduct especially exploratory activities separately from the rest of 
the organization as they may be better shielded from the dominant logic of the organization 
as well as from structural rules such as resource allocations processes or performance 
measurements (Christensen, 1997; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). This can even take the form 
of new ventures developing inside diversified firms (Burgelman, 1983) 
Fifth, systematically tapping into external knowledge through collaborations, 
knowledge exchange and methods of open innovation can constitute an important source of 
organizational learning. Business clusters have long been connected to technological and 
economic development as they enhance productivity and innovation (Porter, 1990; Porter & 
Stern, 2001). Strategic alliances between start-up and incumbent firms have also been 
suggested as they provide learning experiences for both sides and improve the performance 
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of incumbent firms (Rothaermel, 2001). Incumbent firms can use their complementary assets 
to help the commercialization and diffusion of the product suggested developed by the start-
up firms start-up idea, thereby aiding start-ups with go-to-market and becoming established 
in the market (Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 1997). However, even in strategic alliances a 
nuance of organizational inertia prevails: Incumbent firms tend to prefer these alliances that 
make use their complementary assets over alliances targeted at joint technological 
exploration (Rothaermel, 2001). More broadly the idea of open innovation, i.e. the use of 
internal and as well as external ideas in corporate innovation, as well as the development of 
internal ideas even outside of corporate boundaries, has also been suggested as an effective 
method for organizational learning (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Gassmann, Enkel, & 
Chesbrough, 2010). The open innovation literature very broadly suggests different types of 
cooperations between all kinds of actors in all stages of the innovation process (Gassmann et 
al., 2010).  
2.3 Definition of innovation for this thesis 
The introduction to some basic literature of innovation in business and economics in the 
preceding sections has shown some of the various ways of looking at innovation. When it 
comes to defining innovation it is important to be clear about the different dimensions and the 
particular stance that is chosen. Diverging interpretations are a challenge for academic 
researchers, but also practitioners as differences of understanding typically result in 
differences of measures and measurements. Especially when innovation is the dependent 
variable of academic studies and determinants of innovation are investigated, a lot of 
confusion and seemingly irreconcilable empirical results in the academic literature stem from 
ambiguity of the innovation definition used (Hauschildt & Salomo, 2011; Rennings & 
Rexhäuser, 2014). In the same vein, policy makers that stipulate "innovation" as a policy 
objective may view this ambiguity as a blessing or a curse since an assessment of policy 
effectiveness in that regard will always remain controversial if no measurable targets and 
criteria for measurement are defined. 
It follows that for this dissertation a brief discussion of various dimensions of the term 
and the development of a working definition of the concept of innovation are necessary. The 
purpose is to establish full transparency about the understanding and use of the term here. 
The qualification of the concept is utile to guide the empirical research and also point to 
limitations and areas of further study. The first aspect to clarify is the level of analysis 
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regarding innovation. On macro and meso levels (i.e. world, nation, society, system) 
innovation is often used as a synonym for technological, social, or economic change. This is 
the understanding of innovation in much of the literature on economic growth. The opposite 
end is the definition of innovation on a micro level (i.e. individuals, organizations, social 
groups) where it is understood in terms of novelties produced at that level. This is the view 
taken in the organization and management literature. In evolutionary economics and 
innovation policy both approaches may prevail. The two levels are of course linked as the 
accumulation of micro level innovation leads to change on the macro level. Making this 
distinction clear is of particular importance in this thesis. Energiewende has been defined 
above as a socio-technical transformation i.e. a process of change on a macro level. This is 
however, only the context or backdrop of the research interest. With a focus on firms and 
corporate innovation, it is the micro level of innovation carried out by organizations that is 
relevant here.  
 
Figure 4: Selected dimensions for defining innovation on a micro level 
 
 
Even on that micro level various dimensions for defining innovation exist (Hauschildt & 
Salomo, 2011; OECD & Eurostat, 2005; Swann, 2009).  
 
Figure 4 provides an overview of some of the relevant dimensions, but is not exhaustive.  
First, innovation can refer to all or only single steps of the innovation process (cf.  
Figure 2, p. 13). It can be used short for the first stage (invention), as well as the second stage 
(innovation/implementation) or the third stage (diffusion). Furthermore, innovation may be 
defined by the subject that is being renewed. In the realm of corporate innovation this 
includes products and processes, but also strategy, organization or business model of a firm. 
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The degree of novelty of an innovation may also be regarded. Lastly, innovation may be 
defined in a neutral, positivist way or with a particular sense of direction in a normative way. 
This thesis employs a broad concept of innovation that focuses on the micro level. 
This is particularly relevant for the research of companies, and is in line with the definition 
adopted by the expert commission on the Energiewende monitoring process (Löschel et al., 
2014c) and definitions employed by researchers who have posed similar research questions 
(Kemp & Pearson, 2007; Rogge, Schleich, Haussmann, Roser, & Reitze, 2011; Rogge, 
Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012; Voß et al., 2003). The definition goes as 
follows: 
 
Innovation is the intentional and targeted invention, implementation and diffusion of a 
subjectively new or improved product, process, strategy, organization or business model that 
is perceived to be relevant in the context of Energiewende.  
 
Five aspects of this deem further elaboration: intentional and targeted; invention, 
implementation and diffusion; subjectively new or improved; product, process, strategy, 
organization or business model; and perceived to be relevant in the context of Energiewende. 
First, innovation is intentional and targeted. Innovation does not happen by chance, 
but requires deliberate and purposeful action aimed at achieving a certain objective. Firms 
innovate because they seek a return (cf. section 2.1.4).  
Second, innovation refers to invention, implementation and diffusion. The innovation 
definition here is process-based and echoes the three stages of the innovation process as 
defined following Schumpeter (cf. section 2.1.1). The activities that take place as part of the 
process are emphasized over the final output. This also means that the process can be 
operationalized for empirical research with activity-based innovation indicators, as will be 
done later in the development of the conceptual framework (cf. section 5.2.1.). Such a 
process-based definition is also used by the expert commission's review of the Energiewende 
monitoring process who hold that innovation encompasses the invention as well as the 
diffusion of novelties (Löschel et al., 2014c, p. Z-21). 
Third, an innovation needs to be subjectively new or improved. The degree of novelty 
of the innovation is defined here from the perspective of the innovator i.e. something that the 
innovating firm considers new, or better. That means an innovation does not need to be new 
to other firms or the world at large to qualify here. Furthermore, since the focus of this 
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dissertation is on the innovation responses of individual firms, this definition does not infer 
the impact of any innovation outside of the boundaries of the firm. In that way it leaves open 
other degrees of novelty that are often distinguished by researchers studying industry-wide 
technological change such as continuous (evolutionary, incremental), discontinuous 
(revolutionary, radical, disruptive) or architectural (systemic) innovation (Hauschildt & 
Salomo, 2011, p. 12; Swann, 2009, p. 30). 
Fourth, the substance of the innovation may concern product, process, strategy, 
organization or business model of the firm. While the majority of the literature on innovation 
and technological change is focused on product and process innovations, other types of 
innovation are increasingly receiving attention in the literature (OECD & Eurostat, 2005; T. 
Schmidt & Rammer, 2007). Product and process are the most established and well-
investigated types of innovation. Product includes all goods and services that a firm plans to 
market. Process refers to the methods used in producing these products. Both dimensions are 
often associated with technological innovation, although there are non-technological 
possibilities of product and process innovation as well  (T. Schmidt & Rammer, 2007). 
Furthermore, at the firm level various types of non-technological, organizational innovation 
may take place. Innovation here can pertain to the strategy of the firm, various attributes of 
the organization, or extend to business model innovation if several aspects of corporate 
activities are changed simultaneously (Chesbrough, 2007, 2010).   
Fifth, the innovation is perceived to be relevant in the context of Energiewende. This 
element gives the definition of innovation a sense of direction. Only novelties that are 
intended as responses to the issue at hand are considered relevant innovations in this 
dissertation. Many researchers with similar research questions and cases have employed such 
a normative definition (Kemp & Pearson, 2007; Voß et al., 2003). If actors engage in 
innovation activities intentionally they must have a specific purpose in mind and the 
objective to develop an adequate response to a specific issue. The interpretation of both, the 
purpose and the adequacy of the response, are subjective (Cames, 2010). Since the aim of this 
dissertation is to study the innovation response of specific actors to a particular issue, it 
makes sense to leave it to the actors to decide which innovation activities are considered 
responses, and to what exactly. This normative view is also strongly emphasized in the 
Energiewende expert commission's concept of innovation. The expert commission states that 
the purpose of innovation in the context of Energiewende is to create a climate-friendly, 
secure and cost-efficient supply of energy in Germany. It even goes one stage further and 
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details where such innovation might be expected along the energy technology value chain. 
This includes energy generation technology, technology for the distribution and usage of 
electricity and heating, smart grids, as well as components and materials needed for these 
technologies and the services necessary to support and implement them (Löschel et al., 
2014c, p. Z-21). 
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3 Energiewende and its intended innovation effect 
This chapter takes a closer look at energy transitions in general and the German energy 
transition in particular. The aim is to introduce the substantive subject of this thesis and 
elaborate how Energiewende policies seek to affect innovation. 
Energiewende has become the popular term to describe the transformation of 
Germany's national energy system through a sharp reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
and a simultaneous phase-out of nuclear energy. While the term has only been widely used in 
public discourse since the decision to accelerate the phase-out of nuclear energy following 
the Fukushima accident in spring 2011 (Google Trends, 2014), its origins as well as the 
political process at its core reach back as far as the 1970s and 1980s (Jacobsson & Lauber, 
2006). The term already suggests that it is not a one-dimensional policy instrument that 
affects a singular policy area, but a transformation or transition that is substantial in scale and 
effect. Nevertheless, Energiewende is also inextricably linked to specific laws and regulations 
of German energy policy, such as e.g., the Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (EEG) that 
promotes the use of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Throughout these 
laws and other policy documents references to innovation are made. 
This chapter is structured as follow. First, as an introduction to energy transitions in 
general, the reasons behind energy transitions towards sustainability as well as international 
differences between energy transitions are explained (section 3.1). Second, the current 
discourse around Energiewende is reviewed and strands of interpretations identified and 
synthesized in order to define the understanding of Energiewende in this thesis (section 3.2). 
Third, the development of Germany's Energiewende is summarized in four phases from 1974 
to present day (section 3.3). Fourth, policies and political statements are reviewed in order to 
identify their implicitly or explicitly voiced intention to foster innovation (section 3.4). 
3.1 Fossil energy, environmental impacts and energy transitions 
In all major economies today the system of the supply and consumption of energy is 
constructed around fossil fuels. Since the industrialization of agricultural societies in the 18th 
and 19th centuries the global energy consumption has risen tremendously and fossil sources 
have come to its supply at a share of roughly 80% today (cf. Figure 5). This means electricity 
is generated from coal, gas or oil, buildings are heated and cooled using oil and gas, and 
planes, vehicles and vessels run on combustion engines fuelled by oil derivatives.  
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Figure 5: Global final energy consumption 1800-2010 (schematic) 
 
Source: Own schematic representation based on OECD/IEA (2015) and Worldwatch Institute (2015) 
 
However, an energy system based on fossil sources comes at high environmental 
costs. Environmental consequences have developed simultaneously with fossil energy 
consumption. Environmental concerns started in the 1970s and 1980s when they revolved 
especially around local air and ground pollution. The emission of smoke, dust, carbon black 
and harmful and hazardous substances into the air and ground caused environmental 
problems such as smog, acid rain and ground water decontamination. Since the 1990s the 
focus of environmental concerns has increasingly shifted from a local to a global level to 
issues such as the depletion of the ozone layer in the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect, 
global warming and climate change.  
Anthropogenic climate change due the greenhouse effect is the major environmental 
concern today. As a consequence of the combustion of fossil fuels certain gases such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and ozone are released. A high concentration of these so-
called greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere can lead to an increase in global 
temperatures. The greenhouse effect was first described in the 19th century, is systematically 
being investigated since the 1980s, and has been subject to fierce scientific and political 
debate.  It is the scientific consensus today that this greenhouse effect as a consequence of 
human action exists and that causes the climate of the earth to change (Cook et al., 2013; 
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Liverman, 2007; Oreskes, 2004). While fossil fuels are not the only anthropogenic sources of 
GHG, deforestation and livestock play a role as well, they contribute the largest share by far. 
About ~75% of globally emitted GHG in 2010 originated from fossil fuels (IPCC, 2014, p. 
Working Group III). A higher global temperature has a profound impact on the climate of the 
earth in terms of melting glaciers and polar ice, rising sea levels, and frequent extreme 
weather conditions (Hoegh-Guldberg & Bruno, 2010; McCarty, 2001). These climatic 
changes in turn affect the livelihood of billions of people, exacerbate poverty, inequality and 
hunger especially in developing countries, and cause mass migration and geopolitical 
consequences (Reuveny, 2007). The economic repercussions of these changes are a 
significant reduction in global prosperity and welfare. The 2006 Stern Review, an assessment 
of climate change consequences by the British economist Nicolas Stern, found that 5% of the 
global gross domestic product (GDP) per year is at risk due to climate change (N. H. Stern, 
2006). 
The realization that local economic activities have global environmental consequences 
that will result in real economic costs has triggered international efforts to combat climate 
change.  Environmental pollution was one of the main risk factors to the future development 
of the world and its inhabitants cited by the 1972 Club of Rome report The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972), a report that is thought to have laid the 
foundation for the global discourse on sustainability that unfolded in subsequent decades 
(Mebratu, 1998). In 1988 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) installed the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to review the scientific evidence that 
climate change is taking place and is indeed anthropogenic. In 1992 the UN adopted the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that has the 
prevention and mitigation of consequences of anthropogenic climate change as its core 
objective. Annual conferences of the signature parties (COP) are held to discuss international 
measures towards this objective. A milestone was the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 and 
effective in 2005, that prescribed target reductions for the GHG emissions of developed 
countries to be realized in the period 2008 to 2012. An extension of the Kyoto Protocol until 
2020 was agreed in Doha in 2012 and a Kyoto succession treaty at the 2015 Paris COP 
(Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). 
As a consequence of these binding international targets and national discourses on 
environmental and climate protection, countries around the globe are devising policy 
strategies to combat climate change. As energy is the prime anthropogenic cause of climate 
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change, such climate policies typically combine energy policy with environmental policy 
(Giddens, 2009). This means, however, that in addition to the environmental aspect, recurrent 
issues of energy policy such as security of supply, safety, and affordability of energy are 
relevant in policy-making. Taking into account all of these factors, governments are devising 
visions, strategies and plans for their energy systems that often divert significantly from the 
status quo. Such energy transitions, i.e. shifts in the nature of how energy is supplied and 
utilized, are under way in many countries (Araújo, 2014). 
Despite the environmental consequences, fossil fuels remain one of the options for 
energy supply. As the standard energy source globally they set the benchmark for costs, 
security of supply, and safety, that alternative energy sources need to compete against. 
Security of supply may become a concern for fossil fuels in the long run since they are 
exhaustible and will be depleted at some point. While this is a minor risk for coal as resources 
are abundant, an end to the cost-efficient supply of oil may be in sight in the medium to long 
term and the threat of it is already imminent in occasional oil price spikes (Hallock, Wu, Hall, 
& Jefferson, 2014). It is the same case for gas, however, cost reductions achieved in the 
production of unconventional gas in recent years, large untapped natural gas resources in the 
Middle East, and the ability to liquefy natural gas (LNG) and transport it at comparably low 
costs have moved this concern to the more distant future (Stevens, 2012). Also, there are risks 
to the supply of fossil fuels for geopolitical reasons. Much of the global reserves of oil, gas 
and coal are in politically instable countries from where supply may not always be secure, or 
desirable (Correlje & Van der Linde, 2006).  
In addition to fossil fuels, energy from nuclear sources can constitute a pillar of an 
energy supply strategy. The technological progress achieved in the civilian use of nuclear 
energy for electricity generation in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to provide a viable 
alternative to fossil fuels for a long time because it was non-emitting and comparatively 
cheap (Weinberg, 1972). However, following the nuclear incidents in Chernobyl 1986 and 
Fukushima-Daichi 2011, as well as several smaller incidents and recurring failures, this has 
been called into question. First, uranium supply is by no means secure and is indeed subject 
to similar geopolitical risks as fossil fuels. Second, and more importantly, the safety risks for 
humans and the environment and with them the potential costs of nuclear energy are possibly 
infinite. Given that nuclear power plants only operate under government guarantees as 
insurance policies for nuclear power plants are not available on the private market, the true 
costs of nuclear energy may often be understated (Krewitt, 2007).  However, nuclear strategy 
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still varies massively across countries and nuclear energy has experienced a resurgence 
especially against the background of the environmental concerns regarding fossil energy 
sources (Nuttall, 2004).   
Besides fossil and nuclear, governments have turned to a third source of energy 
supply, energy from renewables. Renewable energy sources (RES) are commonly defined as 
sources of energy supply that are inexhaustible in a human span of time and do not contribute 
to net GHG emissions. RES encompass solar irradiation, wind, water, biomass, and 
geothermal energy (Hennicke & Fischedick, 2007). While the physics behind RES and the 
basic technologies for tapping into their potential have been known since pre-industrial times, 
RES were only re-discovered as a solution for energy supply in the 1980s and today make up 
a tiny, but visible part of the global energy consumption mix of about 1% (cf. Figure 5). Most 
national governments now regard RES as a cornerstone of their energy policy in the light of 
climate change (Giddens, 2009).  
In addition to changing the source of energy supply, climate change policies also 
involve several other measures to decrease the environmental burden of the energy system. 
There are many efforts to find safe and cost-efficient ways to decarbonizes fossil fuel, usually 
by capturing CO2 emissions before they are released into the atmosphere and storing them 
underground (Viebahn et al., 2007). Furthermore, the reduction of absolute levels of energy 
consumption through increasing the energy efficiency of all products that use energy is also 
critical (Fischedick & Thomas, 2013; Hennicke & Fischedick, 2007). The challenge is to 
decouple energy consumption from economic growth, as they have been closely related since 
the beginning of industrialization (D. I. Stern, 1993). 
Governments around the world diverge significantly in how they assess the different 
sources of energy and how they prioritize the individual objectives of climate policy. 
Consequently, energy transitions take on a variety of forms (Araújo, 2014). 
While the United States (US) are at the forefront of developments in renewable 
energy, they also place great importance on the development of unconventional gas and oil 
produced with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Given the high levels of energy 
consumption in commercial as well as private use, security of supply and affordability have 
long been at the heart of the energy policy discussion in the US. As domestic oil and gas 
reserves are depleting, the US has funded the exploration of these unconventional production 
methods. Production costs for unconventional gas and oil have tumbled throughout the 2000s, 
a development that enabled the US to cut oil imports and start exporting gas, shaking up both 
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markets globally (Araújo, 2014). However, the US has been more hesitant than other 
developed countries to embrace clear targets and strategies against climate change. In fact, it 
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which almost caused the international climate effort to 
fail, and is yet to set long term targets for emission reductions. Nevertheless the US has made 
efforts to cut energy consumption and increase the deployment of renewables. RES support 
schemes are in place in all states (Laird & Stefes, 2009; Nemet, 2009; Taylor, 2008) and on a 
federal level, the Obama administration provided $ 70 million in funds for a modernization of 
the energy system.   
The multilateral energy policy of the European Union (EU) is especially targeted at 
climate issues. The EU installed the worldwide largest cap-and-trade system for CO2 
emissions in 2005. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) defines the total amount of 
CO2 that may be emitted by its members in a multi-year period, structures these emissions 
into emission permits and allows members to trade these permits so that members are 
incentivized to emit less than they are entitled to and profit from selling their permit instead1. 
The EU also sets targets for its member states regarding GHG emissions, energy consumption 
and the deployment of RES. Following the first set of such targets for 2020, another set of 
targets for 2030 was adopted in 2014 (European Commission, 2014a). Moreover, the EU 
regulations and directives have the reduction of energy consumption as their objective 
(European Commission, 2014b). However, albeit the EU it seems that the EU is an active and 
strong actor in energy policy, its domain of influence only extends over few of the areas that 
energy policy consists of. Overall energy policy remains a predominantly national policy 
domain even in EU member states and consequently there are large divergences between 
member states (Ide, in press). 
In the United Kingdom (UK) the mitigation of climate change is the most important 
objective of energy policy and nuclear energy is considered a key pillar of this. While also 
promoting energy efficiency and renewables, nuclear energy remains a strategic cornerstone 
in order to reach the CO2 emission reduction targets defined in 2007. Concerned with security 
of supply and affordability of energy, the UK is one of the few countries globally where the 
government has decided to support new nuclear power projects such as the Hinkley Point 
plant (The Economist, 2016a). Renewable energy was not on the political agenda until the 
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion of the EU ETS and its performance as well as cap-and-trade systems in general is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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mid 1990s and never received the broad political support it got in other countries (Lipp, 
2007). 
In Denmark, enthusiasm for renewable energy, especially wind power, started already 
in the 1970s and the installation of wind power capacity surged in the 1990s due to political 
support and a well-functioning subsidy system. Consequently Danish firms are leading 
players in the global wind industry (J. I. Lewis & Wiser, 2007) and wind energy contributes 
~40% to the domestic electricity mix (Energinet.dk, 2016). With domestic gas resources in 
the North Sea, fossil fuels still plays a role in the domestic energy mix today. In addition 
electricity is imported from European neighbors. However, the government has installed a 
long term energy strategy that previews a complete phase-out of fossil fuel sources until 2050 
(Danish Government, 2011).  
Germany has taken a somewhat unique path in comparison to its European and 
international peers. In Germany, opposition to nuclear energy as well as a focus on 
renewables is much more pronounced than in other countries. The dual objective to get to 
zero GHG emissions without the use of nuclear energy sources is the defining characteristic 
of the German Energiewende (Buchan, 2012).  The following sections explain the German 
energy transition and the concomitant change process. 
3.2 Definition of Energiewende for this thesis 
Albeit being used extensively in recent academic literature and public discourse, the term 
Energiewende is not unambiguously defined. While generally speaking it has come to be 
understood as a change of Germany's energy system associated with a reduction of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and a phase-out of nuclear energy there are several 
underlying nuances of definition. First, many contributions frame Energiewende in terms of a 
political strategy focusing on targets set by the German government. These authors generally 
emphasize that Energiewende came into existence in 2011 following the Fukushima nuclear 
incident and is defined by the double objective to cut GHG emissions and nuclear energy 
(Buchan, 2012; The Economist, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Second, Energiewende can be regarded 
as a process of political and socio-technical change. Many academic publications take this 
perspective on Energiewende and analyze the evolution of Germany's energy system since 
the 1970s. While political initiative and action is embedded in the accounts of systemic 
change, it is the system and the change itself that is studied and that defines Energiewende, 
rather than a deliberate political agenda.(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Lauber & Mez, 2004; 
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Maubach, 2014; Strunz, 2014). Third, Energiewende can be viewed through its particular 
policies. Energiewende is often used synonymously for laws and regulations of German 
energy policy, especially the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, 
EEG) (Böhringer et al., 2014; Frondel et al., 2010). Drawing on these works, the definition 
employed in this thesis is as follows:  
 
Energiewende is the political course of action that drives a socio-technical 
transformation of the German energy system in an effort to make it greenhouse gas emissions 
and nuclear free. 
 
This definition contains four key aspects which will now be explained in turn: political course 
of action; socio-technical transformation; German energy system; and greenhouse gas 
emissions and nuclear free. First, Energiewende is a political course of action. Clearly, the 
direction as well as the rate of change seen in the German energy system is to a large extent 
politically-induced (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014). In this way 
Energiewende policy is a combination of environmental policy, energy policy and innovation 
policy. There is a strong political drive and much of the change already envisaged e.g., the 
surge in electricity from renewable sources is hard to imagine without the respective 
deployment policies (Böhringer et al., 2014; Gawel et al., 2014). This stands in contrast to 
changes in other socio-technical systems, e.g., in information and communications, where 
technology evolved in the absence of a political agenda and regulation was only sought after 
major technological change had occurred (Ansari & Garud, 2009). The early political 
involvement in the change of the energy system may be due to the fact that energy has always 
been heavily regulated because of security of supply issues and the tendency to natural 
monopoly. Introducing any change to that system without corresponding changes to 
regulation seems impossible. Furthermore, the notion course of action also introduces a 
process element. Energiewende is not one policy or one set of policies at a single point in 
time. Rather, it is a dynamic mix of policy instruments that results from a distinct policy 
process. The elements of the policy mix cannot be fully understood without looking at the 
corresponding policy process (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Rogge & Reichardt, 2013; Sühlsen 
& Hisschemöller, 2014).  
Second, Energiewende is a socio-technical transformation. Transformation captures 
that the changes expected in the energy system are far-reaching and concern all system 
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elements as well as the linkages between them. There is a common understanding that 
Energiewende – as the term suggests – constitutes a significant departure from the previous 
status quo in Germany's energy system and energy policy. Interpretation of the German term 
in English language range from "shift" (Strunz, 2014) over "transformation" (Jacobsson & 
Lauber, 2006) to "revolution" (Buchan, 2012; The Economist, 2014a). Increasingly though, 
"energy transition" seems to have become the term most frequently employed (Araújo, 2014; 
Gawel et al., 2014; Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014; The Economist, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). 
The terms transition and transformation will – unless otherwise specified – be used 
synonymously in this thesis. In addition to this the term socio-technical transformation 
emphasizes that the change encompasses technological as well as social aspects and 
acknowledges the intertwinedness between technology and sociology. Within a system, 
changes to a technology, or physical elements, usually correspond with changes to the way 
that such technology is being used, or social elements (Geels, 2004). 
Third, it is the German energy system which is being transformed. The energy system 
is the combination of actors (individuals, organizations, social groups), physical elements 
(technology, infrastructure) and non-physical elements (rules, norms, knowledge), which 
together determine the way energy is supplied and utilized. It is hence defined as a socio-
technical system where material artifacts are erected by actors guided by formal and informal 
institutions in an effort to fulfill a certain societal function (Geels, 2004; Malerba, 2002). In 
Germany there is a strong tendency to only focus on electricity when talking about the energy 
system and deprioritizing energy used in form of fuels or heat. Indeed even Energiewende 
politics has a bias towards electricity (Rennings & Rexhäuser, 2014). However, in line with 
the public and academic discourse, this thesis will mainly stick to the association of energy 
with electricity and discuss other forms only when they are adjacent. The energy system is 
defined specifically for Germany. This limitation to a specific polity and geography makes 
sense when looking at energy systems since national energy systems are despite certain links 
rater separate from one another. While energy transitions towards sustainability are taking 
place in several countries, they differ significantly in terms of targets, priorities and speeds 
(Araújo, 2014). Even in the European Union energy supply remains a national affair despite 
ongoing efforts to integrate systems and markets and harmonize corresponding regulation. 
Competences regarding target energy mixes, electricity market design and regulatory 
oversight of power plants and infrastructure are firmly vested on the national level (Kitzing, 
Mitchell, & Morthorst, 2012).   
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Fourth, Energiewende takes place in an effort to make the energy system GHG 
emissions and nuclear free. There is no doubt that Energiewende aims at an energy system 
that is more sustainable, and in Germany sustainability in that respect is defined as an energy 
system with zero nuclear energy and close-to-zero GHG emissions. The term Energiewende 
only came into popular use after this dual objective was installed when, in the aftermath of 
the Fukushima incident, nuclear energy was unanimously repudiated (Buchan, 2012). This 
means Energiewende has a strong sense of direction, or normative attribute, to it. Not every 
change of the energy system and not every novelty will be associated with Energiewende, 
only change that promotes the dual objective is counted in that way.  
This definition still leaves open a temporal specification of Energiewende as well as 
concrete elements and properties needed for empirical research. Both will be addressed later 
in this thesis in the development of the conceptual framework for empirical enquiry (cf. 
chapter 5). 
3.3 A brief history of German Energiewende since 1974 
Although the term Energiewende has only been used in popular discourse since 2011, 
Germany's energy transition looks back at a history of more than 40 years (Gawel et al., 
2014; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Lauber & Mez, 2004; Maubach, 2014; Strunz, 2014).  
Four phases can be distinguished: First, a formative period between 1974 and 1990 
where different sources of energy were contemplated, knowledge was created and actors 
promoting particular energy sources emerged. Second, a phase between 1986 and 1997 where 
nuclear energy was contested and renewable energy gained popularity as an alternative to 
both fossil fuels and nuclear, but stayed in a niche position. Third, a high-intensity phase with 
pushes and push-backs for energy policy between 1998 and 2010 where the climate change 
discussion intensified, bold political decisions were taken and reversed and changes to the 
energy system surfaced. Fourth, the current phase where Energiewende has become a 
mainstream term and the dual objective of zero GHG emissions and zero nuclear energy is 
widely accepted, but the implementation and path towards this objective is still emerging and 
critical voices remain strong.  
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3.3.1 1974–1990: Formation of scientific and societal vision 
Between 1974 and 1990 the roots of the German energy transition developed from the need 
to seek alternative energy sources to oil and the vision of a clean energy future promoted by a 
rising ecological movement.  
The starting date of the German energy transition is usually set in 1974 when in a 
response to the oil crisis the German government started to intensify its search for alternatives 
to oil to fulfill the energy demand of its growing economy. The Energy Research Program of 
the German federal government (Energieforschungsprogramm) devised in 1974 pooled 
publically funded research efforts in energy technologies. Given that security of supply was 
the focus of energy policy in the mid-1970s and that environmental concerns were still in 
their infancy, funds of the program were especially given to research in coal and nuclear 
(Lauber & Mez, 2004). In addition to research, also the deployment of coal as a fuel for 
electricity generation was subsidized. For example, a special tax levied on the electricity bills 
of retail consumers since 1975, the so-called Coal Penny (Kohlepfennig), was given to 
incumbent electricity suppliers in order to incentivize them to use hard coal mined in 
Germany to as fuel for their power plants (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006).   
 At the same time, however, a vocal societal that opposed the construction of nuclear 
power plants movement emerged. Green grassroots groups sprung up in the 1970s locally in 
Germany wherever nuclear plants were supposed to be constructed and created nationwide 
political controversies around nuclear energy. In addition, there was also rising concern about 
the side-effects of the use of fossil fuels. While the greenhouse gas effect and climate change 
were not high on the agenda yet, local phenomena such as smog and acid rain spurred 
opposition to oil and coal. One of these groups, the anti-nuclear non-profit organization Öko-
Institut was the first to coin the term Energiewende in a 1980 publication in which it mapped 
out its vision for a clean energy future without nuclear energy and fossil fuels (Bossel, 
Krause, & Müller-Reissmann, 1980). 
Research into renewable energy technology and energy efficiency was introduced to 
the research program largely as a response to these societal demands. Many of the research 
projects were only directed at basic research, without the intention to develop technology to 
such an extent that it is suitable for a wider market launch. Large demonstrations such as the 
wind turbine GroWiAn were allegedly only funded to show that wind energy does not work. 
Overall throughout the 1970s and 1980s public funding for renewables was marginal 
compared to conventional energy technologies (cf. Figure 6). Nevertheless, universities, 
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institutes and firms were able to carry out research, development and demonstration programs 
regarding the use of wind and solar energy and lay the foundations for renewable energy 
technology. Moreover, while the ruling political coalitions and business actors remained 
firmly united behind coal and nuclear, a niche of players in the renewables field began to 
form and develop into a powerful advocacy coalition for renewable energy in later years 
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006).  
 
Figure 6: German federal government energy research expenditures 1974-2014 
 
 
Source: 1974-1990 data from Diekmann & Horn (2007), 1991-2014 data from BMWi  
 
3.3.2 1986–1997: Chernobyl, political initiatives and societal mainstreaming 
Between 1986 and 1997 the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the emerging discourse on 
climate change triggered first political initiatives to support renewable energy beyond 
research funding. The nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl in 1986 that was accompanied by a 
radioactive cloud that contaminated the soil in parts of central Europe exacerbated the 
German skepticism regarding nuclear power. Public opinion, which had been tied throughout 
most of the 1970s and 1980s, turned against nuclear (Lauber & Mez, 2004). The social 
democratic party (SPD) was the first large German party that vowed to phase-out nuclear 
power. In addition, a report published in 1986 on impending climatic change due to 
greenhouse gas emissions and its dramatic consequences put the topic on the political agenda 
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and increased the sense of urgency to push for a market introduction of renewable energy. 
While the Christian Democratic (CDU) government remained reluctant, parliamentary 
motions led to several market formation programs and eventually the adoption of the Feed-in 
Law (Stromeinspeisegesetz, StrEG), which required electricity suppliers to connect 
renewables capacity to the grid and buy electricity generated from RES at a rate of 90% of 
the electricity retail price for wind and solar. This provided a great investment incentive for 
wind energy, with installations increasing significantly in subsequent years and dynamic 
industry developing (J. I. Lewis & Wiser, 2007). For solar power, however, the feed-in-tariff 
was still too low to promote investment since solar technology remained significantly more 
expensive than wind (Lauber & Mez, 2004). Installation of solar technology remained 
confined to special subsidized programs such as the 1989 1,000 Roofs Program, but faded 
again afterwards. Throughout the 1990s the most effective support for solar energy came 
from initiatives on the level of German states (Länder) and municipalities who ran market 
introduction programs through generous feed-in laws and subsidizing the installation of solar 
cells on public buildings. Although they remained limited in scale, these initiatives triggered 
the development of an infant solar industry with start-ups firms as well as some energy 
technology incumbents. On all political levels and across all parties the support for renewable 
energy increased steadily throughout the 1990s. The Kohlepfenning hard coal subsidy was 
abolished in 1995 after a Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruling that 
condemned it as unlawful cross-subsidization of an industry not of general public interest 
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). 
3.3.3 1998–2010: Political push and push-backs 
Between 1998 and 2010 significant changes took place with the liberalization of the 
electricity markets, the introduction of a powerful feed-in tariff through the German 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG), the first nuclear 
phase-out decision, and the subsequent fierce political debate about benefits, costs and pace 
of the German energy transition. 
The German energy industry had until 1998 mainly been regulated by the 1935 
Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) that put it under public oversight, 
granted regional monopolies and exempted firms from the competition laws valid in other 
industries. The EnWG was overhauled in 1997 backed by the EU initiative to liberalize 
electricity markets across the European Union. The amended EnWG that entered force in 
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April 1998 introduced competition by abolishing monopolies, permitting third parties access 
to the electricity network and granting consumers free choice of their electricity supplier. 
After some hesitation large electricity incumbents generally welcomed the reform as it 
enabled them to pursue expansionist strategies (Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015; Lauber & Mez, 
2004). Liberalization was taken another step further in 2005 when in another amendment to 
the EnWG large electricity suppliers were mandated to carve out transmission grid networks, 
i.e. those electricity grids that transport electricity over large distances through high voltage 
lines, from their firms and organized as independent entities. This "unbundling" of the 
electricity supply value chain was supposed to limit the impact of large firms by taking key 
infrastructure assets away from them. Mirroring the regional structures of their previous 
parent companies, four transmission system operators (TSOs) emerged from this process. 
Distribution grid networks, however, i.e. low voltage lines that distribute electricity from 
transmission lines to consumers, were not part of the reform and remained in the hands of 
their previous owners. 
In 1998, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party were elected to replace the 
Christian Democratic (CDU) and Liberal (FDP) federal government. The new red-green 
coalition made energy policy a priority for their first term in office. Immediately after being 
elected they introduced a 1,000,000 Roofs Program for the installation of solar cells. 
Furthermore, they fundamentally reformed the Feed-In Law in an effort to remove all 
remaining barriers to the widespread adoption of renewable energy. The Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) passed in 2000 provided a comprehensive 
and far-reaching initiative to promote the installation of RES generation capacity. In contrast 
to the StrEG feed-in tariff that had been linked to the electricity price and was therefore 
subject to fluctuations, the EEG guaranteed investors fixed return rates for RES electricity fed 
into the grid. Grid operators were mandated to grant RES electricity preferential grid access 
and take on all RES electricity generated.  Moreover, feed-in rates differed by RES 
technology depending on the cost difference to electricity from conventional sources. This 
was especially important for the promotion of solar energy. Whereas the feed-in rate for wind 
energy turned out to be only about 10% higher as the average rates received under the StrEG, 
solar energy benefited from a more than five-fold increase in return. Also, rates were fixed 
for a 20 year period providing investors with a maximum amount of security (Bürer & 
Wüstenhagen, 2009). To reflect anticipated reductions in technology costs, the fixed rates 
were set to decline for new installations every year. In addition, a new financing mechanism, 
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the EEG surcharge (EEG Umlage), was introduced in which the costs incurred for the feed-
in-tariffs were redistributed as an additional levy on the electricity bills of residential, 
commercial and industrial electricity consumers in all of Germany. The EEG Umlage follows 
the polluter pays principle, which holds that who consumes more, pays more. This constituted 
a departure from the financing mechanism of the StrEG where feed-in-tariffs had been 
financed by electricity consumers locally, which imposed higher burdens on consumers in 
areas with a high RES production volume. Targets to increase the share of RES-E in the 
German electricity mix to 12.5% in 2010, 20% in 2020 and 50% in 2050 were set (Lauber & 
Mez, 2004).  
Based on the longstanding opposition to nuclear power that united the two coalition 
partners they made putting an end to it a priority in their energy policy that they pursued in 
parallel to promoting RES. Negotiations between the federal government and the four 
national electricity suppliers as owners of the German nuclear power plants reached an 
agreement in 2000, that was signed in 2001. The core provision of the consensus, which 
entered into legal force in the 2002 amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act (Atomgesetz), was 
the agreement to fixed remaining nuclear electricity production volumes (Reststrommengen) 
for each of the four electricity suppliers and an expiration of the operating licenses of nuclear 
power plants as soon as these electricity volumes had been produced, which was expected to 
be the case in 2022. There was hence no fixed date, but fixed production volumes that set the 
end of nuclear energy.  
In addition, the coalition government sought a greening of the tax system, that is the 
abolishment of subsidies for environmentally-harmful practices and the installation of taxes 
to reflect the external costs of energy consumption in the price paid for energy. As part of this 
effort, a tax on electricity consumption was introduced in 1999 and taxes on fuels from 
mineral oils, that is gasoline, diesel and natural gas, raised step-wise until 2003 (Lauber & 
Mez, 2004). While the official name of these efforts was First Step Towards An Ecological 
Tax Reform Act (Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform), the reforms quickly 
adopted the name Eco-Tax with a strong negative connotation in popular discourse. In other 
political initiatives, the deployment of combined heat and power (CHP) technology for 
electricity and heat generation was strengthened in the 2002 Combined Heat and Power Act 
(Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz, KWKG) and the reduction of energy consumption and 
increase in energy efficiency was supported in the 2002 Energy Savings Decree 
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(Energieeinsparverordnung, EnEV), which sets standards, limits and reporting guidelines for 
the energy use of new and renovated commercial and residential buildings. 
The strong push towards a different energy system initiated by the Red-Green 
coalition ensued a "battle" (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006, p. 16) between political parties, 
political institutions, business actors and civil society that enfolded throughout the 2000s.The 
Federation of German Industry (Bund der Deutschen Industrie, BDI) as well as the German 
Association of Energy and Water Industries (Bund der Elektrizitäts- und Wasserwirtschaft, 
BDEW) repeatedly criticized the EEG and the ecological taxes for raising energy prices and 
hence putting an unfair burden on society and damaging the competitiveness of the Germany 
economy. In addition divergences occurred between federal ministries as well as between and 
within political parties. On the other hand, the emerging renewables industry became a 
political influence in its own right (Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014).  
The new Grand Coalition government that replaced the Red-Green coalition in 2005 
was, tainted by the conservative influence of the CDU and the worries regarding employment 
in extractive and manufacturing industries of the SPD, much less enthusiastic of the energy 
transition than its predecessor. However, with the trajectory already started, one party of the 
old coalition also being part of the new one, and international and EU pressure to support 
initiatives for mitigating climate change mounting, previous legislations were not revoked. In 
2007, the government outlined its energy and climate policy in the so-called Meseberg 
Decisions (Meseberger Beschlüsse) that described an Integrated Energy and Climate Program 
(Integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm, IEKP). The IEKP set out objectives and 
measures for 29 topics encompassing i.a. renewable energy, clean conventional energy, smart 
energy and energy management, biofuels, and transport. 
Several policy initiatives followed this program. After changes to the EEG in 2003 
and 2004 that had already lowered tariff rates, it was amended again in 2008/2009. A 30% 
target share for RES-E in the electricity mix in 2020 was adopted, an automatic reduction of 
tariff rates depending on growth in the deployment of solar energy introduced, and regulatory 
details were adjusted. In addition, the Renewable Energy Heating Act (Erneuerbare Energien 
Wärme Gesetz, EEWärmeG) was passed setting the target to achieve 14% renewable share in 
the provision of heat energy by 2020, mandating certain shares of energy from RES for 
heating and cooling in new buildings, and installing a fund (Marktanreizprogramm, MAP) to 
subsidize the modernization of buildings involving RES. A phase-out of subsidized hard coal 
mining was finally decided in 2007. 
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Meanwhile, the importance of renewable energy in Germany grew enormously. RES-
E capacity installed almost quadrupled between 2000 and 2010 from ~17 GW to about ~63 
GW. Due to the technology-differentiated feed-in tariffs of the EEG, solar energy saw an 
especially drastic increase from less than 1 GW installed capacity in 2000 to ~11 GW 
installed capacity in 2009 (cf. Figure 7). In 2010 RES-E contributed ~17% to the German 
electricity mix, almost a tripling from the ~6% in 2000 (cf. Figure 8). Concomitant to this 
development, a shift in the geographical distribution of generation capacity in Germany 
occurred. Generation capacity moved from the German South to the North, given the wind 
resources on the shores of the North Sea and Baltic Sea. In addition, decentralization took 
place as generation capacity shifted from a few large power plants with high energy-density 
in their output to many, small locations producing relatively small amounts of electricity. The 
rise in the RES-E share also brought more volatility into the electricity supply. As wind and 
solar irradiation is not constant, the previously steady electricity production became subject 
to fluctuations of supply depending on weather conditions. 
 
Figure 7: German cumulative installed RES-E capacity 2000 - 2014 
 
Source: Own graphic with data from IRENA (2015) 
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Figure 8: Share of RES-E in the German electricity mix 1990 - 2014 
 
Source: Own graphic with data from BMWi (2015c) 
 
As a consequence of these developments the electricity grid network came 
increasingly under pressure, forcing politicians to make plans for its expansion and upgrade. 
An EnWG amendment in 2006 obliged the TSOs to ensure grid connection for all offshore 
wind power capacity by the time that construction of the offshore wind power plant was 
completed. In 2009, the Energy Grid Expansion Act (Energieleitungsausbaugesetz, EnLAG) 
permitted a number of urgent transmission grid expansion projects and laid down 
mechanisms to govern their speedy implementation.  
In 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Coalition that had come into power in the previous 
year outlined its vision for a clean, secure and affordable future energy system in its Energy 
Concept (Energiekonzept). Given that none of the coalition parties was responsible for the 
nuclear phase-out decision in 2000 and holding that nuclear energy as a non-GHG-emitting 
fuel constituted an important interim source of energy to ease the transition into a renewable 
future, a key element of the Energy Concept was the pronounced deceleration of the nuclear-
phase out. Nuclear energy was given a "bridging role" until renewable energy can by itself, 
reliably satisfy the electricity demand. The permissible electricity generation volumes for 
nuclear power plants (Reststrommengen) were increased in such a way that the expected  the 
operating times of nuclear power plants were extended by 12 years on average, postponing 
the phase-out to 2036 from previously 2022 (Buchan, 2012). In return for the extensions to 
the life span and to appease critical voices from the political opposition, the German Länder, 
and civil society, a Nuclear Fuel Tax (Kernbrennstoffsteuer) was installed, the returns of 
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which were supposed to be used for future nuclear decommissioning. In addition, the 
operators of nuclear power plants agreed to contribute payments to an Energy and Climate 
Fund (Energie- und Klimafonds, EKFG) for the promotion of research and development for a 
new energy system.  
The Energy Concept also stipulates ambitious long term objectives and a roadmap for 
the reduction of GHG emissions, the increase of RES deployment and the increase of energy 
efficiency. Targets go beyond those of other European states and beyond what is required 
under EU or international obligations (Buchan, 2012, p. 2). Regarding GHG emissions, the 
target is a reduction of GHG emissions by 40% by 2020, 55% by 2030, 70% by 2040 and 80-
95% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. Regarding energy from RES, the targets are an 18% 
share of gross final energy consumption by 2020, 30% by 2030, 45% by 2040, and 60% by 
2050. Regarding electricity from RES, the targets are a 35% share of gross electricity 
consumption by 2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050. Regarding energy 
efficiency, the targets are a 20% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2020 and a 
50% reduction by 2050, compared to 2008 levels. Gross electricity consumption is supposed 
to decrease by 10% by 2020 and 50% by 2050, compared to 2008 levels. The target for final 
energy consumption in transport is a reduction of 10% by 2020 and 40% by 2050. In 
addition, final energy productivity is supposed to grow by 2.1% per year and the 
modernization rate of the building stock is supposed to increase to 2%, with no date for target 
achievement set. An overview of all quantitative targets of the Energy Concept can be found 
in Table 3 below. 
  
Table 3: Targets of the 2010 Energy Concept 
Area  Indicator  N. d. 2020 2030  2040  2050 
GHG 
emissions  Reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990 in % 
 -40 % -55 %  -70 %  -80 -  
-95 % 
Renewable 
Energy Share of RES in gross final energy consumption in % 
 18% 30%  45%  60% 
Share of RES in gross electricity consumption in %  35% 50%  65%  80% 
Energy 
Efficiency Primary energy consumption compared to 2008 in % 
 -20%   -50% 
Final energy productivity growth per year in % 2.1% 
  
   
Gross electricity consumption compared to 2008 in %  -10%   -25% 
Modernization rate building stock per year in % 2%     
Final energy consumption in transport compared with 
2005 in %  
 -10%   -40% 
Source: Bundesregierung (2010) 
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3.3.4 2011–present:  Accelerated Energiewende 
Six months after the publication of the Energy Concept, in March 2011, a series of nuclear 
accidents and meltdowns occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan as 
a result of damages caused by an earthquake and a tsunami. In Germany, the event stirred up 
memories of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and reignited opposition against nuclear 
power. Only days after the event the federal government ordered a moratorium for nuclear 
energy (Atommoratorium) which meant that during a three months period a safety check for 
all German nuclear power plants was carried out, and eight particularly old and vulnerable 
plants were shut down. In the same document the government first used the term 
Energiewende to refer to the transition towards an RES-based energy system, a development 
it vowed to accelerate (Bundesregierung, 2011a). An ethics commission was installed to 
make recommendations for the future of nuclear energy in Germany. In its conclusions, 
published in May 2011, the commission recommended the phase-out of nuclear energy 
within a decade (Töpfer et al., 2011). In concomitant changes to the Nuclear Energy Act in 
June 2011, the extension of the life span of nuclear power plants was officially revoked. The 
eight plants shut down in March were permanently decommissioned and the working life of 
the remaining plants limited to 2022, irrespective of the remaining electricity production 
volumes granted previously. This decision put an end to four decades of fierce political and 
societal debates about nuclear energy in Germany (Kohler, 2011). An energy system based 
on renewable energy and without nuclear became the consensus and no societal group 
fundamentally challenged it anymore (Maubach, 2014, p. 24).  
Critically, despite the u-turn regarding nuclear power, the federal government 
maintained the ambitious climate policy targets of the Energy Concept. Outlining its strategy 
regarding energy policy in June 2011, the federal government pledged that renewable energy 
will be the core pillar of the German energy system and that RES deployment targets as well 
as the targets pertaining to the reductions of GHG emissions and energy consumption remain 
valid (Bundesregierung, 2011b). While conceding that fundamental restructuring of the 
energy system is still required, the federal government promised to remove all remaining 
barriers, especially regarding grid expansion, and implement Energiewende in a cost-efficient 
and market-friendly manner. It admitted, however, that the plan constituted a "squaring of the 
circle" in energy economics (Bundesregierung, 2011b). Buchan (2012) argues that 
maintaining the targets of the Energy Concept constituted the true noteworthy aspect of the 
German energy policy decisions after Fukushima. It was no return to the energy policy status 
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quo of the 2000s, because the targets of the Energy Concept and the ambition to achieve them 
created a radically new situation (2012, p. 3). Strunz (2014) seconds this analysis and holds 
that the political decisions in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident sealed the shift 
from a fossil-nuclear to an RES-based German energy system (Strunz, 2014, p. 157). Many 
observers, however, expressed concerns regarding their feasibility. The Economist positively 
notes the ambition of Germany's Energiewende and its potential to be a lighthouse for energy 
transition in industrial economies, but also calls it a Energiewende "risky" endeavor that is 
"more a marketing slogan than a coherent policy" and comprises a "set of timetables for 
different goals" rather than a consistent implementation plan (The Economist, 2014a, 2014b). 
Clearly, as the end of nuclear energy was moved forward, issues connected to the 
change of the energy system became more urgent. One aspect was the expansion of the 
electricity grids, especially the transmission system. In 2011, the Grid Expansion 
Acceleration Act (Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz, NABEG) was passed to facilitate the 
planning and approval of grid expansion projects. In 2013, the Grid Development Plan 
(Netzentwicklungsplan, NEP) built on the 2009 EnLAG to list and prioritize those grid 
expansion projects essential to maintain grid stability. The implementation of these projects 
was later mandated by the Federal Requirements Plan Act (Bundesbedarfsplangesetz 2013, 
2015). In addition, also energy consumption and energy efficiency were targeted again. In 
2014, the National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (Nationaler Aktionsplan 
Energieeffizienz, NAPE) stipulated energy efficiency in buildings, energy efficiency business 
models and responsibility for energy efficiency as three action fields in the area. Fifteen 
measures targeting information provision, financial support and championing were designed 
to implement these (BMWi, 2016a).  
The EEG was revised again in 2012, 2014 and 2016/2017. The 2012 amendment 
contained significant changes to the rate of the feed-in tariffs, especially a tariff reduction for 
solar energy as the market had overheated, and paved the way for a replacement of the feed-
in-tariff system with the introduction of direct marketing (Direktvermarktung) for RES-E. 
Under the direct marketing mechanism, owners of RES-E generation capacity could opt to 
sell their electricity on the wholesale market instead of receiving a fixed feed-in tariff. They 
were incentivized to do so by a market premium (Marktprämie), a payment that compensates 
for the difference between the average return realized for selling electricity on wholesale 
markets and the applicable feed-in tariff. The tariff rate is hence not paid in full to producers 
of RES-E, but just as a difference to electricity wholesale prices. In addition, a management 
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premium (Managementprämie) compensates for the transaction costs incurred through direct 
marketing and a flexibility premium (Flexibilitätsprämie), only applicable to owners of 
biogas power plants compensates them for the flexibility of generation they offer. The so-
called Green Power Privilege (Grünstromprivileg), an exemption from the EEG financing 
mechanism (EEG Umlage) granted to electricity suppliers with at least 50% of their 
electricity from renewables, was also introduced in 2012, but abolished again in a subsequent 
amendment.  
The 2014 and 2016/2017 EEG amendments fundamentally changed the course of 
RES-E support through an increasing emphasis on market-based RES-E promotion. The 2014 
EEG amendment defined deployment corridors (Ausbaukorridor) for each RES-E technology 
that specify the extent to which RES-E capacity will be added in the future. It also moved 
away from the direct pay-out of feed-in tariffs by making direct marketing mandatory for new 
installations. Following this trajectory, the 2016/2017 EEG amendment that entered into 
force in January 2017 introduced another fundamental change. It abolished the fixed 
regulator-set feed-in tariffs for installations greater than 750 KW altogether, and replaced it 
with a system of tenders and auctions. For each new installation the tariff rate as upper limit 
for the market premium is not set by regulators in advance, but determined through auctions. 
Prospective investors of RES-E capacity participate in an auction by submitting single sealed 
bids for the market premium that they require to install a certain amount of RES-E capacity at 
a certain site.  Bids are accepted from low to high until capacity has been added in line with 
the plans of the deployment corridors. This constitutes a far-reaching and much debated 
change to RES-E promotion in Germany as it leaves the subsidy rate up to market 
mechanisms and thus departs from the system of government-set feed-in tariffs that had 
constituted the cornerstone of RES-E promotion since the StrEG (BEE e.V., 2016b; 
Fürstenwerth, Praetorius, & Redl, 2014; Luhmann, Fischedick, & Schindele, 2014; WWF, 
2016). 
Germany's ambition for an energy transition based on renewable energy, with zero 
GHG emissions and zero nuclear energy hence remains unchanged. Currently the 
Energiewende legislative framework on the national level is made up of the strategy 
contained in the Energy Concept, more than 20 legal acts in the areas of energy generation, 
consumption, transmission and distribution, and storage and more than 30 ordinances 
regulating the implementation of these acts (BMWi, 2014d, 2016c). In addition to the 
previously mentioned topics, a few issues feature in the recent political debate. A reform to 
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the electricity market design has been investigated in policy proposals and consultation 
procedures since 2014 and was finally decided in summer 2016. The key question was if the 
wholesale electricity price should also compensate for the provision of capacity instead of 
"energy only" in order to incentivize adequate investments in generation capacity (BMWi, 
2014b). In addition, a harmonization of European energy policy is always on the agenda, 
specifically also finding a solution for the Europe-wide promotion of RES. Also, taking steps 
towards a closer integration of the three energy forms electricity, heating and transport 
(Sektorkopplung) is in focus.  
Recently, there have been serious doubts that the 2020 targets of the Energy Concept 
will be met. The deployment of renewable energy in electricity seems to be on track, 
however, all other areas are lagging beyond what is required to meet the targets. The shares 
of RES in heating and transport are virtually stagnating. Primary energy consumption is 
falling, but a doubling of the pace of recent years would be needed to achieve the 2020 target 
of a 20% reduction. The reduction of gross electricity consumption may be on track, 
however, it is unclear whether it will continue at the current rate. In transport, final energy 
consumption seems to be rising. Final energy productivity growth would need to double until 
2020 in order to, on average, reach the annual target rate since 1990. To achieve the 2020 
GHG emission reduction targets, the annual rate of reductions would even need to triple from 
the current rate. Overall, there is significant risk to target achievement (Löschel, Erdmann, 
Staiß, & Ziesing, 2015). And even beyond the immediate Energy Concept, there is also fear 
that the broader targets of a secure, affordable and environmentally-friendly energy system 
may be missed (The Economist, 2016b). Apparently, the energy system is not changing, or 
not changing fast enough.  
3.4 Innovation effect intended by politics 
Throughout the course of the German energy transition policy makers have made statements 
to the importance of innovation for the transition process. Besides the immediate targets of 
the Energiewende strategy and the individual policies, Energiewende is supposed to foster 
innovation.  Implicitly or explicitly, innovation is an objective of several of the policies 
reviewed in the previous section. However, the innovation target remains very vague. It has 
not been defined in clear terms, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. 
On the strategic level, the 2010 Energy Concept is very vocal on innovation as an 
objective of Energiewende as well as a means to achieve the energy transition anticipated. It 
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holds that, "to make the transition to the age of renewable energy, it will be necessary to 
thoroughly modernize the energy sector. Innovation is key to the structural changes that are 
necessary to achieve a sustainable energy supply. Aside from basic research this primarily 
means using applied science funding to pave the way for both renewable energies and 
efficient technologies to achieve market penetration." (Bundesregierung, 2010, p. 26). 
Innovation is supposed to be achieved through market-oriented policies that ensure 
competition between firms in the energy industry and other relevant sectors, as well as 
specific funding for research and development (BMWi, 2012a; Bundesregierung, 2010). 
According to the Energy Concept, innovation policy is hence an integral part of 
Energiewende (Bundesregierung, 2010, p. 7). Going forward beyond 2011, innovation is 
especially sought in the following five areas: renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy 
storage and grid technology, integration of RES into the energy supply system, integration of 
different energy technologies (Bundesregierung, 2010, p. 33).  
Moreover, policy instruments that directly support research & development state 
innovation as a target. The Sixth Energy Research Programme of the federal government 
(Energieforschungsprogramm) holds that new ideas and technological progress are 
instrumental to use natural resources to their fullest potential. "Innovation and new 
technologies will pave the way for a new age of renewable energy " (BMWi, 2011, p. 3). The 
funds of the Energy and Climate Fund (Energie- und Klimafonds, EKFG) are specifically 
directed at supporting research and innovation in energy technologies.  
In other policy instruments innovation is a secondary objective that is supposed to 
come from a dynamic, i.e. indirect, effect of that policy instrument. Although not mentioning 
the term innovation in the law as such, the EEG is clearly geared towards it. By incentivizing 
the deployment of RES-E technology it aims to contribute to the widespread adoption and 
diffusion of such technology (Böhringer et al., 2014). The increased production volumes of 
such diffusion will result in economies of scale and learning that will then reduce the costs of 
producing and acquiring such RES technology. The same holds for the EEWärmeG with 
respect to RES technology in heating and cooling and the KWKG with respect to combined 
heat and power (Hennicke & Fischedick, 2007). 
In addition to innovation in the sense of technological progress, the role of non-
technological innovation is also explicitly recognized. For example, the development of 
business models with respect to energy efficiency is one objective of the National Action 
Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPE) (BMWi, 2014e, p. 29). 
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As to why innovation is important, three objectives are recurrently mentioned 
(BMWi, 2011, 2012a, 2014f; Bundesregierung, 2010).  
 First, innovation lowers the costs of implementing the energy transition by 
increasing the performance or reducing the costs to provide technological and 
non-technological solutions.  
 Second, innovation develops solutions for current obstacles to the energy 
transition, which need to be overcome in order to be able to sustain an energy 
system with 100% renewable energy.  
 Third, innovation secures competitiveness for German companies either in 
terms of global market shares in the energy and environmental sectors, or 
through low costs of energy as a production factor, especially in energy 
intensive industries.  
Although innovation is hence clearly critical to making the German energy transition 
work and policy makers formulate innovation as an objective of the Energiewende strategy as 
well as its policy instruments, there are no concrete targets defined. This makes it hard to 
measure the success of Energiewende policies with respect to innovation (Löschel et al., 
2014c). The following chapter will review the current state of research and evaluations of an 
innovation effect of Energiewende policies.  
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4 Current state of research regarding an innovation effect 
This chapter reviews evaluations of the innovation effect of Energiewende in an effort 
summarize the current state of knowledge regarding the innovation effect and point out 
research gaps and controversies. 
There is a controversial debate with mixed empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
Energiewende on corporate innovation. This is not a surprise; with a construct as complex as 
Energiewende that has evolved over time and has the potential to affect every sector of the 
German economy, the assessment of the innovation effect is a challenge to say the least. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, findings regarding innovation from the 
official monitoring Energiewende monitoring process installed by the federal government are 
studied (section 4.1). Second, independent academic research on an innovation effect of the 
energy transition is reviewed (section 4.2), distinguishing between innovation related to the 
use of renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E) (section 4.2.1) and 
innovation beyond RES-E (4.2.2). Building on these reviews, three research gaps as well as 
three controversies prevailing in the current literature are pointed out (section 4.3). 
4.1 Official Energiewende monitoring process 
The German federal government assesses innovation as one criterion in the "Energy of the 
future" monitoring process on the progress of Energiewende. The monitoring process was set 
up in fall 2011 to review the progress towards achieving the objectives and targets set by the 
2010 Energy Concept and the 2011 nuclear phase-out decisions (BMWi, 2012b). Monitoring 
reports are compiled by the Federal Ministry for the Economy and Energy (BMWi) annually 
and reviewed by an independent commission of academic experts. The report and the expert 
statement are published in the last quarter of each year reporting on developments in the 
preceding year. Every three years the monitoring report is published as part of a larger, more 
comprehensive progress report that covers past developments as well as future perspectives. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the reports published as part of the Energiewende 
monitoring process at the time of writing. 
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Table 4: Reports of the Energiewende monitoring process 
Reporting year  Monitoring report  Published  
2011  First monitoring report  "Energy of the future"  and expert commission 
statement Dec. 2012  
2012  Second monitoring report  "Energy of the future" and expert commission 
statement Apr. 2014  
2013  First progress report "Energiewende" incl. third monitoring report and expert 
commission statement  Dec. 2014  
2014  Fourth monitoring report "Energy of the future" and expert commission 
statement  Nov. 2015  
 
Source: Adapted from BMWi (2016b) 
 
The BMWi's monitoring reports have dedicated chapters or sections on innovation 
where they consider aspects in relation to federal government funding for research and 
development (R&D), federal grant and loan programs for the deployment of new technology, 
patent applications, and industry and export initiatives. Although part of the larger innovation 
process in the Schumpeterian sense (cf. section 2.1.1,  
Figure 2), diffusion is not explicitly addressed in the innovation section, but implicitly 
included in the sections reporting on renewable energy, energy-efficiency, heating, transport, 
power plants, and electricity grid infrastructure. 
 
The various monitoring reports suggest that a diffusion of innovations regarding renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and the grid infrastructure has taken place as a result of 
Energiewende policies. Table 5 provides an overview of the most important figures from the 
2014 monitoring report that indicate a diffusion of socio-technical novelties relevant to 
Energiewende in renewable energy, energy efficiency and grid infrastructure.  
For renewable energy, the report notes the rise of renewable energy sources (RES) as 
a share of gross final energy consumption to 13.5% in 2014, a positive development. Looking 
at the different formsof energy individually, the share of RES in electricity consumption is 
27.4%, on course to meet the 2020 target of 35%. Progress is also reported regarding the 
rising shares of RES in heating (12%) and transport (5.6%), both areas, which have tended to 
lag behind electricity (BMWi, 2015b, p. 13). These suggest that the deployment of RES on 
the energy supply side is picking up, a development that is attributed to the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (EEG) for electricity, and the Renewable Energy Sources Heating Act 
(EEWärmeG), investment subsidies, and subsidized loan programs and other incentive 
programs to the deployment of RES technology for heating (BMWi, 2014c, p. 84).  
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Regarding energy efficiency, the report states that in 2014 total primary energy 
consumption has declined to its lowest level since 1990 and stands at -8.7% compared to 
2008 level. The 2020 target is -20% compared to 2008. This figure alone does not indicate 
innovation as the reduction could be due to less economic activity. However, the concurrent 
rise in final energy productivity by 1.6% annually from 2008 to 2014 suggests that at least 
part of the decrease in consumption is due to more efficient ways of energy usage, i.e. 
innovation (BMWi, 2015b, p. 23). The report attributes this to the positive effect of the 
National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (Nationaler Aktionsplan Energieeffizienz, NAPE) 
(BMWi, 2015b, p. 24, 26f). Differences surface, however, when looking at the individual 
forms of energy consumption. The increase in the productivity of electricity is larger than the 
overall increase in the productivity of energy, suggesting that electricity is leading the pack. 
The report suggests that this is a positive effect of the European Union directives on 
Ecodesign and Energy Labelling1 (BMWi, 2015b, p. 28). The heat consumption as well as the 
primary energy consumption of buildings has decreased in 2014 compared to 2008, -12.4% 
and -14.8%, respectively. However, this is to a large extent a reflection of the mild weather 
conditions prevailing in 2014. In transport, final energy consumption is more or less constant 
at a marginal increase of 1.7% compared to the 2008 base year implying a very slow 
diffusion of energy-efficient technologies (BMWi, 2015b, pp. 33, 41). A final indicator of 
diffusion is the amount of conventional electricity generation capacity under construction, at 
least if one assumes that new, more energy-efficient conventional power plants replace older, 
less energy-efficient ones. This might be the case e.g., if the new plants use combined heat 
and power (CHP) systems or constitute pumped hydro plants that increase the storage 
capacity for electricity. However, conventional capacity under construction is down 57.9% 
compared to 2008 (BMWi, 2015b, p. 64), a reflection of the significantly reduced investment 
returns from conventional power plants (Sensfuß, Ragwitz, & Genoese, 2008).  
Lastly, the annual investments into the expansion of the grid infrastructure have 
moved upwards since 2008 with a slight increase of the investments of distribution system 
operators (DSOs) by 11.1% compared to 2008, and a significant increase of the investments 
of transmission system operators (TSOs) by 77.9% compared to 2008 (BMWi, 2015b, p. 84). 
This may suggest that the grid infrastructure is being modernized at a higher rate and with it 
new technology is adopted in the grid network. However, the monitoring report admits that 
                                                 
1 Directive 2009/125/EC of 21 October 2009 for Ecodesign, Directive 2010/30/EU of 19 May 2010 for Energy 
Labelling  
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transmission grid expansion is lagging behind the path what was anticipated by the 2009 
Energy Grid Expansion Act (Energieleitungsausbaugesetz, EnLAG) (BMWi, 2015b, p. 79). 
 
Table 5: Energiewende monitoring report 2014 indicators for diffusion 
Area  Indicator 2014  2020 target 
Renewable 
Energy Share of RES in gross final energy consumption in % 13.5%  18% Share of RES in gross electricity consumption in % 27.4%  >35% 
Share of RES in heating in % 12.4%  14% 
Share of RES in transport in % 5.6%  not defined 
Energy 
Efficiency Primary energy consumption compared to 2008 in % -8.7%  -20% Final energy productivity growth per year in % 1.6%  2.1%1 
Gross electricity consumption compared to 2008 in % -4.6%  -10% 
Final electricity productivity growth per year in % 3.3%  not defined 
Primary energy consumption in buildings compared to 2008 in % -14.8%  not defined2 
Heat consumption in buildings compared to 2008 in % -12.4%  -20% 
Final energy consumption in transport compared with 2005 in % 1.7%  -10% 
Conventional electricity generation capacity under construction 
compared with 2008 in %  -57.9%  not defined 
Grid 
infrastructure Growth of investments by DSOs compared to 2008 in % 11.1%  
 
Growth of investments by TSOs compared to 2008 in % 77.9%   
 
1. Growth target per year from 2008 to 2050 2. 2050 target -80%  
Source: Adapted from BMWi (2015b) 
 
Regarding invention and innovation in the dedicated innovation sections, the official 
government reports primarily describe the innovation support mechanisms that have been 
installed by the federal government such as research programs with subsidies or grants, loan 
programs and communication and exchange platforms. The evaluation of the innovation 
effect is not consistent throughout the reports as indicators change from one reporting year to 
the next. The main focus is on the development of federal R&D expenditures for energy 
research, which is presented in every report, and indicates that these have been rising since 
2008, as shown in Figure 9. Patent applications, which are reviewed through various patent 
indicators in the reporting years 2011, 2012, and 2013, also exhibit a positive tendency. For 
example, international energy technology patent applications filed by German entities have 
risen considerably since 2003, with an especially strong increase in energy storage patents 
since 2009, as depicted in Figure 10. The authors of the report interpret this as a sign that the 
federal government efforts have spurred innovation across a variety of energy technologies 
(BMWi, 2014c, p. 83f). Furthermore, another manifestation of innovation activities is seen in 
the increasing number of new companies in the energy sector. According to the 2014 
progress report, the number of new companies founded in the energy sector tripled between 
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2003 and 2010 indicating increasing dynamics through the changes to the industry structure 
and the novelties that these firms develop and bring to the market (BMWi, 2014c, p. 84f).  
 
Figure 9: Expenditures of the Energy Research Program 2008-2014 
 
Source: BMWi (2015a) 
 
Figure 10: German international patent applications across different energy technology areas 2003-2011 
 
Source: BMWi (2014a) 
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The expert commission that evaluates the official monitoring reports attributes great 
importance to the innovation effect of Energiewende in its statements. Regarding diffusion, 
the statements take account of the positive tendency that is depicted in the monitoring reports 
for RES, energy efficiency and grid infrastructure. However, especially the most recent 
statement for the year 2014 is highly skeptical of the alleged progress and expresses severe 
concerns regarding the possibility to achieve 2020 targets in many areas. The commission 
holds that in RES-E Germany is on track to meet 2020 targets thanks to the EEG, but is 
critical regarding the progress of RES in heating and transport. Despite the small 
improvements it claims that progress is largely stagnating and calls on the federal 
government to intervene to ensure target achievement (Löschel et al., 2015, p. 23ff). It is also 
highly critical of the alleged progress regarding energy efficiency. It challenges the 
monitoring report's positive statements regarding the decline in overall energy consumption 
and merely acknowledges a positive development in electricity and heating. Moreover, it 
holds that improvements regarding energy efficiency are not on track to meet 2020 targets. 
For example, to meet 2020 targets final energy productivity would need to improve by 3% 
annually from 2015 on, instead of the 1.6% annual improvement reported in the 2014 
monitoring report for the period 2008 to 2014 (Löschel et al., 2015, p. 40). Also regarding 
grid infrastructure, the experts warn that the grid expansion that has taken place to date is still 
falling short of what is required for a successful energy transition and urge on action in this 
area (Löschel et al., 2015, p. 75). 
Regarding innovation besides diffusion, the experts propose several instruments and 
indicators for a holistic assessment that goes beyond the monitoring reports' review of public 
R&D expenditures and patents. Holding that innovation is a multi-faceted phenomenon that 
cannot be captured in a single indicator it proposes a set of six indicators to measure the 
innovation activity induced by Energiewende. The indicators are relative measures that 
evaluate federal research expenditures, patent applications and venture capital volumes 
relevant to Energiewende in relation to the respective data not relevant to Energiewende1. 
Figure 11 shows the development of the six indicators from 2008 to 2012 as presented by the 
                                                 
1 The six indicators are: percentage of federal R&D expenditure spent on the 6th Energy Research Programme, 
percentage of federal R&D expenditure spent on renewables, percentage of federal R&D expenditure spent on 
energy efficiency, percentage of total patents related to energy efficiency, percentage of total patents related to 
renewables, and percentage of early venture capital related to energy/environment (Löschel, Erdmann, Staiß, & 
Ziesing, 2014a, p. 24). 
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expert commission (Löschel et al., 2014c, p. 24). Since 2006 the relative importance of 
energy research, as well as the importance of renewables and energy efficiency in terms of 
R&D expenditures and patents has increased. Venture capital in the areas of energy and 
environment spiked in relative importance in 2009 but subsequently decreased again, while 
staying significantly above 2006 levels (Löschel et al., 2014c, p. 186f). While these indicators 
show a positive tendency for Energiewende related innovation, the impact of Energiewende 
policies on these, however, is not explicitly investigated.  
 
Figure 11: Energiewende monitoring expert commission's innovation indicators 2006-2012 
 
Source: Löschel et al. (2014a, p. 24). 
 
To address this shortcoming a number of qualitative statements are made regarding 
the innovation effect of Energiewende policies. First, the expert commission claims that 
Energiewende has triggered dynamics that have increased innovation activity, albeit with 
"heterogenous transmission mechanisms" (Löschel, Erdmann, Staiß, & Ziesing, 2014b, p. Z-
21). One such dynamic was set off by the EEG as the market growth in renewable energy 
attracted private investments into the technological development of RES technology 
(Löschel, Erdmann, Staiß, & Ziesing, 2012, p. 111f). Technological progress together with 
rising production capacity resulted in economies of scale and learning and therefore large 
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cost reductions for RES. In photovoltaic (PV), for example, the experts estimate that costs per 
installed capacity would be ~30% higher today without the EEG mechanism. In a rough cost-
benefit-assessment the experts also stipulate that the global cost reductions in 2012 exceeded 
the costs of the EEG in the same year about 5 times (Löschel et al., 2014b, p. 170). The 
expert commission notes that it would be worthwhile to investigate innovation activities on 
the firm level instead of using aggregate figures, but regrets that data for such enquiries is not 
available at present (Löschel et al., 2014c, p. 190). 
4.2 Academic research on the innovation effect of Energiewende 
Besides the official monitoring process an investigation of the innovation effect of 
Energiewende also takes place through academic publications. By far the largest number of 
contributions to the topic is concerned with innovation regarding electricity from renewable 
energy sources (RES-E). In addition, also innovation in RES heating and transport (RES-H 
and RES-T, respectively), energy efficiency, grid infrastructure and organizational topics is 
examined. There are few empirical studies that investigate the effect of Energiewende or 
German energy policy on innovation in particular. However, a large number of studies 
touches upon the topic or is relevant to it, as presented below. The literature review in the 
following sections is therefore not exhaustive, but highlights key contributions, interesting 
findings and important debates in terms of empirical investigations and reviews thereof. An 
overview and comparison of the publications presented as part of the literature review can be 
found in Table 6.  
4.2.1 Innovation in RES-E 
When discussing the innovation effect of Energiewende, the focus is most of the time 
exclusively on innovation around electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Studies 
investigate the effect of single policies, such as the EEG, or policy mixes combining various 
policy instruments. One can distinguish between studies on the impact on the diffusion of 
technology for RES-E and studies regarding the lateral effect on further technological 
development i.e. invention and implementation of RES-E technology. 
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4.2.1.1 Diffusion 
Regarding the diffusion of RES-E, there is a broad consensus that the German feed-in-tariffs 
(FITs) for RES-E, installed by the 1990 StrEG and then especially the 2000 EEG, have 
driven the wide spread of RES-E generation technology. Germany is among the top countries 
in Europe when it comes to the deployment of wind onshore, solar PV, and biomass 
technology for electricity generation. The fact that it is political intervention that has caused 
the rise of RES-E is so universally accepted that just for Germany hardly any studies exist. In 
fact, many publications label RES-E installations as "politically-induced market growth" 
when they investigate the consequences of such deployment on other factors (Böhringer et 
al., 2014; Cantner, Graf, Herrmann, & Kalthaus, 2014; Hoppmann et al., 2013; Nemet, 2009; 
Wangler, 2012). Studies that investigate the effect of policies on the diffusion of RES-E 
technology usually do so across countries. The overwhelming result is that diffusion took 
place and German deployment policies, especially the StrEG and EEG, were instrumental in 
driving this diffusion.  
Comparing policy strategies for the promotion of RES-E deployment across European 
countries, Held, Ragwitz, & Haas (2006) and Haas et al. (2011b) find that Germany's feed-in 
tariffs for RES-E (FITs) are among the most effective in terms of incentivizing the diffusion 
of RES-E technology. They develop an effectiveness indicator by calculating the change of 
RES-E electricity generation between two points in time in relation to the natural generation 
potential in the absence of a support mechanism. The effectiveness indicator for Germany 
between 1990 and 2005 is given at 9%, the second highest following Spain. They argue that 
this is the case because fixed technology-specific FITs provide investors with high 
investment security and a low administrative burden. They furthermore hold that RES-E 
deployment was achieved in an economically efficient way at the lowest possible cost to 
society as the generation output is comparatively high given the moderate support level of 
Germany's FIT. This result is upheld by subsequent updates to the study and official 
European Commission progress reports using the same indicator (Klessmann et al., 2011).  
Using panel data from 26 European countries, Jenner, Groba, & Indvik (2013) 
investigate the effect of FIT tariff strength on annual RES-E capacity additions. Interestingly 
they find that the FIT interacts with other variables in determining the growth of RES-E 
capacity. It is not the absolute rate of the FIT or the installation of an FIT as such that predicts 
capacity additions, but rather the return that investors can expect on their RES-E investment, 
which they capture in a self-developed indicator that combines FIT rate, electricity price, and 
77  
 
electricity production costs. This indicates that it is not an FIT as a policy by itself, but rather 
its design and the incentive this constitutes for the investor that creates success in terms of 
RES-E deployment. Several publications also find that the strength of FITs lies in their ability 
to provide attractive returns and risk reduction to investors (Bürer & Wüstenhagen, 2009; 
Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006).  
4.2.1.2 Invention and innovation 
In contrast to diffusion where the political impact is largely clear, a much stronger debate on 
the innovation effect of Energiewende policies on RES-E arises when it comes to the earlier 
stages of the innovation process i.e. the invention, development and implementation of 
novelties.  
Wangler (2010, 2012) studies the effect of policy-induced growth of installed RES 
capacity on the number of patent applications in PV, wind, biomass, hydro, and geothermal in 
Germany between 1990 and 2005. They find a significant positive relationship between such 
market growth, as well as public R&D expenditures, and the number of patents filed across 
the five technologies PV, wind, biomass, hydro and geothermal. However, they also find 
significant differences between the technologies. The overall positive effect is only due to a 
large positive effect in wind. Nevertheless, they overall conclude that both the EEG as well as 
the StrEG had a positive effect on innovation.  
Building on Wangler's work, Böhringer et al. (2014) investigate the correlation 
between the EEG and StrEG feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and patent applications in two different 
models across the same five RES-E technologies. In the first model, using the FIT rate i.e. € 
compensation per kilowatt hour of RES-E fed into the grid as an independent variable, they 
do not find a significant, positive relationship to patent applications in 2000 to 2009. In the 
second model, using installed capacity as an independent variable, they obtain somewhat 
different results. They find a positive, significant effect across all RES technologies over the 
combined StrEG and EEG periods from 1990 to 2009, as well as the EEG period 2000 to 
2009 by itself. Similar to the findings of Wangler (2010, 2012), however, distinguishing by 
RES-E technology results in mixed effects. A significant positive effect exists only for wind, 
the effect is insignificant for PV and geothermal, and even negative for biomass and hydro. 
They conclude that there is insufficient evidence for a positive innovation effect of the EEG. 
They argue that strong policy-induced market growth may incentivize shift of resources from 
risky exploratory research to activities that exploit mature technologies, raise market barriers 
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for new entrants and lock-in established technologies (Böhringer et al., 2014, p. 11). The 
authors conclude that there is insufficient evidence. 
Another study has attempted to grasp the effect of the German promotion of RES-E 
on innovation by comparing Germany's share of RES patents and R&D expenses relative to 
other countries. Bointner (2014) studies Germany's share of the global renewable energy 
knowledge stock defined as cumulative public R&D expenditures and patents until 2012 in 
comparison to other countries. They find that Germany is leading in terms of RES patents per 
GDP, and middle range in terms of public R&D expenditure for RES per GDP. While they do 
not empirically test the relationship of these shares to a policy measures they regard these 
findings as an effect of German energy policy overall.  
Looking beyond only the EEG, Breitschopf (2015) investigates the relationship 
between a policy mix represented through a number of variables incl. the financial 
attractiveness of the EEG, RES deployment targets, public R&D spent, and investment 
support, on market formation and technological competitiveness expressed through patent 
applications from the 1980s to 2010. She finds that patents are directly influenced by the 
financial attractiveness as well as public R&D spent. Furthermore, financial attractiveness 
drives market formation, which moreover positively influences the patent count. She hence 
presents a positive picture of the innovation effect of FITs with a direct and an indirect 
dynamic. 
Also Reichardt and Rogge (2015) are interested in the innovation effect of a policy 
mix rather than individual policies. The authors examine the effect of the energy policy mix 
on RD&D in offshore wind technology through a series of qualitative case studies. 
Comparing various elements of the policy mix they find that policy strategy i.e. the 
articulated vision and long term targets regarding the deployment of offshore wind, and 
policy instruments consistently implementing that strategy have a positive effect on RD&D.  
The studies reviewed so far have explicitly focused on Germany, or have compared 
Germany with other countries. In addition, a number of influential studies have investigated 
the effect of policy instruments on patents at an aggregate level across countries (including 
Germany) and derived general conclusions regarding their effectiveness that also contain an 
evaluation of German policies to some extent (Dechezleprêtre & Glachant, 2014; Emodi, 
Shagdarsuren, & Tiky, 2015; Johnstone, Haščič, & Popp, 2010; Peters, Schneider, 
Griesshaber, & Hoffmann, 2012; Walz, Schleich, & Ragwitz, 2011). All studies generally 
confirm that public policy is crucial for innovation in RES-E. However, most studies find 
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significant differences in effectiveness across policy instruments and RES-E technologies, 
ranging from significant positive to significant negative effects. There is unanimity regarding 
the positive effect of policy-induced market growth i.e. RES-E generation, or the installation 
of RES-E generation capacity, on patents (Dechezleprêtre & Glachant, 2014; Emodi et al., 
2015; Johnstone et al., 2010; Walz et al., 2011). However, regarding a direct effect of the FIT 
rate on patents findings vary. Johnstone et al. (2010) find a positive effect only on patents in 
solar, whereas Emodi et al. (2015) do not find an effect at all. In contrast, technology-specific 
public R&D is widely identified as a positive driver of patenting (Johnstone et al., 2010; 
Peters et al., 2012; Walz et al., 2011), except by Emodi et al. (2015). Also RES-E deployment 
targets are generally found to have a positive effect (Johnstone et al., 2010; Walz et al., 
2011).     
Reviewing the results of several of these publications on the effect of the EEG on 
patents, the expert commission for research and innovation installed by the German federal 
government (EFI) concludes that the German EEG did not increase innovation activities 
(EFI, 2014).  The commission argues that studies with a focus on Germany such as Wangler 
(2012) and Böhringer (2014) do not find sufficient evidence for a positive impact of the EEG 
on patent applications across RES technologies. Moreover, the positive effects observed in 
international comparisons such as Johnstone et al. (2010), Walz et al. (2011), Peters et al. 
(2012), and Dechezleprêtre & Glachant (2013) are aggregate effects across countries with 
observation periods often not coinciding with the duration of the EEG, which was only 
installed in 2000. The EFI follows Böhringer's (2014) line of reasoning to hold that as a flat 
subsidy that is levied irrespective of the costs of the underlying technology it does not 
provide sufficient incentives for technology providers to invest in risky technological 
exploration. Indeed it could have an opposite effect and lead to declining investment in R&D 
if technology providers exploit the current market opportunities through investments in 
production capacity instead. Frondel et al. (2010) make a similar argument. They maintain 
that the technology-specific FIT rates of the EEG prevent a do price competition between 
RES technologies and that the declining FIT rates over time that are inherent in the EEG 
incentivize early adoption of premature technology over technological improvement. 
This view is contested by Ragwitz et al. (2014), a group of 17 researchers around the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation research (ISI), which released an expert 
statement on the innovation effect of the EEG. The statement contends that the EEG had a 
positive effect on innovation activity, but an effect that due to its breadth cannot be 
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adequately captured by looking only at patents. According to the group, innovations are a 
result of several influencing factors and an analysis of the innovation effect of the EEG needs 
to be embedded in its context in order to be meaningful. Five arguments for a positive 
innovation effect of the EEG are advanced: 
1. Besides the fact that patents in RES technology have been rising since the 
2000s, patents are only an indicator for a certain part of technological 
innovation, namely technological invention. On the one hand, many 
innovations, especially non-technological ones, are not patented, on the other 
hand, even if patented not all inventions are commercialized and widely 
adopted.  
2. The demand for RES technology created through the EEG has contributed to 
technological development as well as learning and scale effects that have 
decreased the costs and increased the performance of RES technology.  
3. Through the increased demand for RES technology, demand has also 
increased for complementary technology and other elements of the energy 
system that are affected by the rise of electricity generation from RES, such as 
electricity grids and energy storage, and in turn positively influenced 
innovation there.  
4. The EEG has also brought about organizational and institutional novelties e.g., 
regarding the financing of electricity generation capacity and the enablement 
of small actors within the energy system.  
5. Fifth, the EEG has created innovation outside Germany through technological 
spillover in international value chains and networks as well as the imitation of 
EEG-type policies in other countries. 
With a similar line of argumentation, two other researchers, Rennings & Rexhäuser 
(2014), criticize the EFI's sole focus on patents as indicators of an innovation effect. They 
argue that first, not all innovations are patented and second, that patents only indicate the 
invention stage of the innovation whereas for the success of the Germany energy transition, 
the commercialization of innovations and their diffusion are equally important.  
Looking at the effect of RES-E deployment for the energy system as a whole, Strunz 
(2014) argues that the German energy transition constitutes a socio-technical regime shift 
from a "fossil-nuclear to a RES-based regime" (Strunz, 2014, p. 157). Using the conceptual 
framework of the "resilience" (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004) of a system i.e. 
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the "capacity of a system to absorb disturbances" (Strunz, 2014, p. 151) he argues that the 
fossil-nuclear energy system lost its resilience in Germany when the environmental 
movement succeeded in gaining political support and breaking-up the ties between 
proponents of the fossil-nuclear system and political decision-makers. The Fukushima 
accident in 2011 then initiated the regime shift by causing an "exogenous disturbance" 
(Strunz, 2014, p. 154) that the fossil-nuclear system could not compensate for anymore. The 
future pathway for Energiewende now is to create resilience in an RES-based energy system.  
  Regarding the innovation effect of the 2011 post-Fukushima political decisions and 
the popular adoption of the term Energiewende, Rennings & Rexhäuser (2014) allege that 
due to a time delay in firm-level innovation surveys, one needs to wait until relevant firm 
level data on innovation activity becomes available. 
 
Table 6: Selected empirical investigations and literature reviews regarding an innovation effect of Energiewende 
policies 
Area  Author, Year Energiewende indicator Innovation 
indicator 
Research design 
RES-E 
diffusion  Held, Ragwitz, & Haas (2006)  • FIT • RES-E generation • Comparative country case studies with a quantitative indicator 
• EU 15 countries, 1998-2005 
• Wind onshore 
 Haas et al. (2011)  • FIT • RES-E generation • Comparative country case studies 
• EU 7 countries, 2003-2008 
• I.a. wind, solar PV, biomass, geothermal 
 Jenner, Groba, 
& Indvik (2013) 
• FIT • RES-E capacity 
installed 
• Econometric cross-country study  
• EU 26 countries, 1990-2006 
• Wind onshore, solar PV 
RES-E 
invention  
and 
innovation  
Wangler  (2010, 
2012)  • RES-E capacity installed • Patents • Econometric single country study • Germany, 1990-2005 
• Wind, solar PV, hydro, geothermal, biomass  
Böhringer, 
Cuntz, Harhoff, 
& Otoo (2014) 
• FIT rate 
• RES-E capacity installed 
• Patents • Econometric single country study 
• Germany, 1990-2009 
• Wind, solar PV, hydro, geothermal, biomass  
 Bointner (2014) • Promotion of  energy 
technologies  
• Patents 
• Public R&D  
• Econometric cross-country study  
• Germany, Japan, US, Austria, 1974-2012 
• 7 energy technologies (energy efficiency, 
fossil fuels, renewable energy, nuclear, 
hydrogen, fuel cells, energy storage)  
 Breitschopf  
(2015)  • Policy mix incl. FIT, RES-E deployment 
targets, public R&D  
• Patents  • Econometric single country study 
• Germany, 1980s-2010 
• Solar PV  
 Reichardt & 
Rogge (2014)  • Policy mix incl. vision, RES-E deployment 
targets  
• RD&D 
• Adoption
2
  
• Comparative company case studies 
• Germany, 2000s to 2013 
• Offshore wind  
 Johnstone et al. 
(2010)  • Various policy instruments incl. public 
R&D , deployment 
targets  
• Patents • Econometric cross-country study 
• 25 OECD countries incl. Germany, 1978-2003 
• Wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, waste, 
ocean  
 Walz et al. 
(2011)  • Various policy instruments incl. public 
R&D, deployment 
schemes  
• Patents • Econometric cross-country study 
• 12 OECD countries incl. Germany, 1991-2007 
• Wind  
 Emodi, 
Shagdarsuren, & 
• Various policy 
instruments incl. public 
• Patents • Econometric cross-country study 
• 12 OECD countries incl. Germany, 1997-2011 
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Tiky (2015)  R&D, FIT, RES-E 
generation  
• Wind, solar  
 Peters , 
Schneider, 
Grießhaber, & 
Hoffmann (2012)  
• Foreign v. domestic 
tech.-push policy (public 
R&D) and demand-pull 
policy (REC-E capacity 
installed)  
• Patents • Econometric cross-country study 
• 15 OECD countries incl. Germany, 1978-2005 
• Solar PV  
 Dechezleprêtre 
& Glachant 
(2014)  
• Foreign v. domestic  
demand-pull policy 
(RES-E generation)  
• Patents • Econometric cross-country study 
• 28 OECD countries incl. Germany, 1991-2008 
• Wind  
 EFI (2014)  • FIT  • Patents  • Literature review 
• Germany and cross-country, 2000-2014 
• RES-E technologies  
 Frondel, Ritter, 
Schmidt , & 
Vance (2010)
1
  
• FIT • RES-E generation 
& capacity inst., 
• Incentive to im-
prove technology  
• Single country case study 
• Germany, 1990-2008 
• Wind onshore, solar PV, biomasss 
 Ragwitz et al. 
(2014)  • EEG  • Innovation dynamics  • Literature review • Germany, 2000-2014 
• RES-E and complementary technologies  
 Strunz (2014) • Post-Fukushima political 
decisions 
• Renewable-based 
energy system 
• Qualitative case study 
• Germany, 1950s-today 
• RES-E technologies 
 Rennings & 
Rexhäuser 
(2014)  
• Energiewende policy mix • Patents 
• Innovation 
dynamics  
• Literature review and case study 
• Germany, 1990s-2014 
• RES, energy efficiency  
RES-H/T  Klessmann, 
Held, Rathmann 
& Ragwitz, 
(2011)
1
  
• Various policy 
instruments incl. FIT, 
obligations,  
• RES-E generation 
& capacity 
installed 
• RES-H 
deployment 
• RES-T 
deployment  
• Comparative country case studies with a 
quantitative indicator (updated from Held et 
al. 2006) 
• EU 27 countries, 1998-2005 
• Wind onshore, wind offshore, solar PV,  solar 
thermal, biomass, biogas, biofuels, geothermal 
 Marth & 
Breitschopf 
(2011) 
• Policy mix incl. 
obligations  
• Incentive  to 
improve 
technology  
• Qualitative expert interviews 
• Germany, 2000s to 2010 
• Micro combined heat and power (CHP)  
 Steinhilber, 
Wells & 
Thankappen 
(2013) 
• Various  • RES-T 
deployment  
• Comparative country case studies 
• Germany and UK, 2000s-2012 
• Electric vehicles  
Energy 
efficiency 
Horbach, 
Rammer, & 
Rennings (2012)  
• Various policy 
instruments incl. public 
R&D, standards, limits  
• Introduction of 
innovations  
• Econometric single country study 
• Germany, 2008 
• Energy-efficiency across industries, i.a. 
 Rexhäuser  & 
Löschel (2014) n/a • Patents  • Econometric single country study • Germany, 2000-2009 
• RES v. energy-efficiency across industries  
Grid infra-
structure  Römer, Reichart, Kranz, 
& Picot (2012)
• Various  • Implementation of 
smart grid 
technology  
• Qualitative expert interviews 
• Germany, 2000s-2011  
• Smart grids, smart meters, energy storage  
 Muench et al. 
(2014) • Various  • Implementation of smart grid 
technology  
• Qualitative expert interviews 
• Germany, 2000s-2013  
• Smart grids  
Organization 
and business 
model  
Bontrup & 
Marquardt 
(2015)  
• Electricity market 
liberaliation and 
Energiewende policy mix 
• Corporate 
strategy, 
performance and 
organization  
• Comparative company case study 
• Germany, 1998-2014 
• Big four electricity suppliers  
 Kungl (2015)  • Electricity market 
liberaliation and 
Energiewende policy mix 
• Corporate 
strategy, actions  
• Comparative company case study 
• Germany, 1998-2013 
• Big four electricity suppliers  
 Richter (2013) • Energiewende policy mix • Business models  • Qualitative elite interviews 
• Germany, 2000s-2012  
• Electricity suppliers 
 Wassermann et 
al. (2015)  • EEG  • Corporate strategies 
• Business models  
• Qualitative single sector case study 
• Germany, 2000s-2013 
• Electricity suppliers, energy services  
 Cantner, Graf, • Policy mix incl. RES-E • RES-E inventor • Econometric single country study 
83  
 
Herrmann, & 
Kalthaus (2014) 
installed capacity, public 
R&D  
networks  • Germany, 1980s -2011 
• Wind, solar PV  
 Ketata, Sofka, & 
Grimpe (2015)  • Regulatory pressure for sustainability  • Sustainability innovation 
capabilities  
• Econometric single country study 
• Germany, n.d. 
• Manufacturing sector  
 Makowski, Wu, 
Yagi, & Kokubu 
(2015) 
• Post-Fukushima political 
decisions  
• GHG emissions  • Econometric study, panel data regression 
• Germany and Japan, 2006-2012 
• All sectors  
4.2.2 Innovation beyond RES-E 
Contributions to the study of the impact of Energiewende on innovation beyond RES-E are 
rare and typically confined to single industry or single technology case studies. Overall the 
impact of policies here is less clear than the overall positive picture that emerges, despite the 
debate, from innovation in RES-E. 
4.2.2.1 RES in heating and transport 
RES do not only play a role in electricity, but also in the other uses of energy, heating and 
transport. There is little research on policy effectiveness in either area, possibly because both 
types of energy have been less in political focus than electricity and RES are still of 
comparatively minor importance in both. Studies in the field typically examine technological 
feasibility or potential, and indicate the need for further political support rather than evaluate 
its effectiveness. Similar to what is stated in the official monitoring reports, also independent 
researchers find that the deployment of RES in heating (RES-H) and transport (RES-T) 
clearly lacks behind electricity due to being of lower political priority (Klessmann et al., 
2011).  
Nevertheless, there are a few contributions regarding renewables in heating. 
Investigating the effectiveness of RES-H support schemes across the EU, Klessmann et al. 
(2011) find that an obligation to employ RES in heating  as installed in Germany by the 2009 
Renewable Energy Heating Act (EEWärmeG) is one of the best policy instruments to 
incentivize the deployment of RES-H in European comparison. The positive impact of the 
EEWärmeG obligation is, however, limited by the exceptions that are granted. Another in-
depth investigation is Marth & Breitschopf's (2011) study on the innovation effect of a policy 
mix in combined heat and power (CHP) in Germany1. Using expert interviews to assess the 
influence of firm-internal factors, market factors and political factors on innovation activities 
                                                 
1 Since CHP combines heat, electricity, and the notion of energy efficiency, this study is also relevant for the 
respective other sections of this literature review. 
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in micro-CHP, they find, however, that the political influence is ambiguous at best. In general 
technology providers welcome policies that boost the market for CHP, such as the Combined 
Heat and Power Act (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz, KWKG) and the Renewable Energy 
Heating Act (EEWärmeG) claiming that diffusion subsidized by these instruments also 
provides incentives for them to invest in further technological development. The KWKG, 
however, is not considered powerful enough. The EEWärmeG sent some positive impulses 
by mandating the use of renewable energy for heating in new buildings. However, the 
positive effect of these instruments on innovation is offset by other regulations, which erect 
administrative and technical barriers to micro-CHP deployment. Regulations regarding the 
technical installation of micro-CHP systems as well as registration and accounting guidelines 
limit the attractiveness of micro-CHP as a heating solution. 
There is even less literature on the effectiveness of Energiewende policies regarding 
renewables in transport. RES-T is a wide area that encompasses different transport modes 
such as sea, air, rail, and road transport, as well as different possible RES energy carriers in 
each of these transport modes, such as biofuels, biogas, power-to-gas from RES, hydrogen 
fuel cells, or RES-E (cf. Chapman, 2007; Geels, 2012). Reviewing literature from all these 
areas is not in the scope of this thesis. Based on common knowledge and experience one can 
assert that policies have to date not achieved a widespread diffusion of RES carriers in any of 
the transport modes to such an extent that the conventional transport systems will soon be 
overhauled. Regarding the use of biofuels as alternative to gasoline in the combustion engines 
of cars and trucks, Klessmann et al. (2011) state that policy instruments such as tax 
exemptions and quotas can be effective for deployment, however, their efficacy depends on 
the strength of the incentive provided. Germany's biofuel share fluctuated throughout the 
2000s when the quota was lowered in 2007, suggesting that the incentive or obligation was 
not strong enough (2011, p. 7647). Regarding electric vehicles, Steinhilber, Wells & 
Thankappen, (2013) hold that the diffusion of electric vehicles as well as their further 
technological development remains slow as current policies are yet not strong enough to 
break the predominance of the conventional individual transport system around combustion 
engines. 
4.2.2.2 Energy efficiency 
As energy efficiency is the second big pillar for the achievement of the overarching 
Energiewende targets after RES (Fischedick & Thomas, 2013; Löschel et al., 2014c), there is 
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a lot of interest in researching progress and barriers towards making Germany more energy-
efficient. However, similar to research in RES-H and RES-T, many studies focus on 
potential, instead of policy evaluations. A difficulty in reaching an overall assessment of the 
innovation effect of policies is that energy-efficiency is a very broad area that is difficult to 
scope since it is relevant to everything that consumes energy, in each of its forms. Energy-
efficiency plays a role in e.g., the energy use of buildings, in electricity generation, the energy 
consumption of electronic products and industrial production processes. Most publications 
agree that the attention to energy-efficiency has increased and that politics has made a 
positive contribution to this, however, that a lot of untapped potential remains (cf. Fischedick 
& Thomas, 2013). 
Horbach, Rammer & Rennings (2012) use firm-level data from the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) across a variety of industries to examine antecedents to a variety of 
environmental innovations incl. energy-efficiency. They confirm that the most important 
motivation for energy-efficiency is cost savings, however, that political interventions such as 
public R&D funds and standards or limits matter greatly matter for inducing environmental 
innovation. They argue that while in an area such as energy-efficiency where innovation 
results in clear financial benefits these market incentives for innovation should in theory 
suffice to stimulate it, political intervention may still be needed to curb market and behavioral 
failures (Horbach et al., 2012, p. 119f). 
Rennings & Rexhäuser (2014) show that Germany has achieved technological 
progress in energy-efficient technologies with an increase the share of energy-efficiency 
patents since the mid 2000s. Comparing the characteristics of firms inventing in both 
technologies, Rexhäuser and Löschel (2014) find that firms who register patents for energy-
efficiency are also inventors in conventional technologies. This indicates that energy-
efficiency inventions take place in diversified industrial firms, whereas a lot of the patented 
inventions in RES technology stem from firms only focused on RES. Naturally, it is harder to 
research firms with diversified activities as it might not be possible to distinguish the 
influences on efforts and finance gone into energy-efficiency invention and innovation from 
influences and activities in areas less relevant to Energiewende. 
4.2.2.3 Grid infrastructure 
Extensions of and improvements to the grid network that takes, transmits and distributes 
electricity are important to cope with decentral and fluctuating electricity from renewable 
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energy sources. Developments are needed on the physical side of the grid in terms of 
electricity lines and electricity storage capacity, as well as on the virtual side with grid 
management and tools to increase flexibility. However, academic publications tend to address 
technical opportunities or barriers to implementation, rather than investigating the political 
antecedents to the development, implementation and diffusion of such technologies. 
Without explicitly mentioning the electricity grid, but very likely alluding to smart 
grids and energy storage, Ragwitz et al. (2014) assert that the EEG has triggered innovation 
activities in technologies complementary to renewable energy and required for a decentral 
energy system. They do, however, not go into detail regarding the exact trigger or 
mechanism. Römer, Reichart, Kranz & Picot (2012) investigate barriers to the diffusion of 
the infrastructure needed for smart grids, smart meters and decentralized energy storage, 
which they view as a necessity given the politically-induced high share of RES-E in 
Germany. They argue that in addition to insufficient economic incentives, a contradictory 
legal and regulatory framework impedes diffusion (Römer et al., 2012, p. 492f). Similar 
conclusions are reached by Muench al. (2014) in a comparable research context. 
4.2.2.4 Organizational aspects 
Some academic contributions investigate firm-internal organizational change triggered by 
Energiewende. These studies do not explicitly research the innovation impact of particular 
policies, but nevertheless suggest that developments that are direct or indirect consequences 
of Energiewende policies have lead to organizational changes in firm. The focus overall is 
almost exclusively on electricity suppliers, firms from other affected industry comparatively 
less researched.  
In a study for the environmental non-governmental organization Greenpeace, Bontrup 
& Marquardt (2015) investigate the strategy, performance and organization of the largest four 
German electricity suppliers since the liberalization of electricity markets and throughout the 
process of energy transition. They argue that top managers have not reacted to the political 
changes taking place as past business success had made them inert and complacent. It was 
only after the 2011 Fukushima incident and the acceleration of the nuclear exit that they 
became serious about response strategies and the development of new business models 
around renewable energy, infrastructure and energy services.  
Kungl (2015) examines the strategies and behaviors of the four largest German 
electricity incumbents against the background of the energy transition from 2008 to 2013. He 
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finds that political and regulatory changes were the most important dynamics affecting the 
firms in the time period studied. While making similar observations to Bontrup & Marquardt 
(2015) in terms of late adaptation, Kungl argues that this was a deliberate strategic decision to 
defend the traditional business model. Albeit wrong in hindsight, it was not inertia, but a false 
interpretation of the environmental tendencies that drove it (Kungl, 2015, p. 31f). 
Regarding the business models of electricity suppliers, Richter (2013a, 2013b) argues 
that Energiewende, in particular the decentralization of the electricity system that was 
brought about by the rise of RES-E, has affected electricity suppliers in such a way that they 
were forced to develop new business models for the supply of renewable energy. In a similar 
direction, Wassermann et al. (2015) examine how actors are developing a service offering for 
the direct marketing of RES-E, a provision of the 2012 EEG amendment, based on re-
organization, collaboration and competition.  
Looking beyond electricity suppliers, Cantner, Graf, Herrmann & Kalthaus (2014) 
investigate the influence of the German policy mix on corporate inventor networks in 
renewable energy since the 1980s. They find that policies influence the way that firms work 
together in the innovation process. Policy-induced growth in installed RES capacity drives 
the average number of cooperations that firms have as well as the total number of firms 
cooperating. Public R&D expenditures and consortium-based research grants also drive the 
total number of firms cooperating in RES. Policy instruments have hence time positively 
influenced innovation activities in terms of cooperation.  
Using data on the manufacturing sector taken from the German Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS), Ketata, Sofka and Grimpe (2015) examine how firms develop 
capabilities required for sustainable innovation, defined as innovation for the reduction of 
resource- and energy consumption, economic stress and improvements in health and safety. 
They find that regulatory pressure towards sustainability increases the development of these 
capabilities. While it is not the most important factor, investments in employee trainings are, 
it is a significant predictor of sustainable innovation capabilities. This suggests that political 
influence manifests itself in organizational features on the firm level such as, in this study, 
organizational capabilities. 
Lastly, Makowski, Wu, Yagi & Kokubu (2015) investigate corporate greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in Germany and Japan before and after 2011, the year of the Fukushima 
nuclear incident in Japan, to find out if the respective political decisions taken immediately 
after the incident had an effect on firms in terms of emission reduction. They do not find this 
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to be the case in Germany as the GHG intensity pre- and post-2011 remains virtually 
unchanged. 
4.3 Three research gaps and three controversies 
The preceding literature review shows that an investigation of the innovation effect of 
Energiewende is not completed yet. There are good reasons and some, albeit contested, 
evidence to suggest that the policies associated with Energiewende have affected innovation 
activities in RES-E and beyond. While there seems to be agreement on some topics there are 
controversies regarding other aspects. There are also research gaps when it comes to how the 
innovation effect of Energiewende has hitherto been studied. Three research gaps and three 
controversies are particularly prominent.  
Despite the great variety of studies on the innovation effect of Energiewende, three 
gaps in empirical research emerge in particular: research with an understanding of 
Energiewende as a complex transition process, a broad definition of innovation, and firm-
level investigations.  
First, there is a lack of empirical investigations that understand Energiewende as a 
complex transition process. Some publications, at least many of the empirical ones, view 
Energiewende only through one particular policy, such as the EEG, or even only a part of it, 
such as a feed-in-tariff. While the EEG is certainly a core policy, looking at it exclusively and 
without its context does not capture the transformative aspects that Energiewende has taken 
on as a policy mix and a process that evolved over time. A comprehensive study of the 
Energiewende's innovation effect requires a more integrated understanding of Energiewende 
that considers the entire policy mix incl. interactions between different policies, interactions 
with other influencing factors and changes over the course of the process.  
Second, there is a lack of empirical research that employs a broad definition of 
innovation. Many of the studies implicitly only focus on a particular stage of the innovation 
process, such as invention. Patents, for example, are an output indicator for the invention 
stage. Schumpeter and others, however, argue convincingly that the innovation process 
involves multiple steps including the implementation as well as the diffusion of new ideas 
(cf. section 2.1.1). In order to capture the innovation effect of the energy transition in its 
entirety, innovation hence needs to be considered from the early stages of idea inception to 
the dissemination of a novelty throughout an industry or economy. This also involves 
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studying technological as well as non-technological innovation, and various sectors relevant 
to the energy system, not just electricity. 
Third, there is a lack of empirical research on the firm level. Although there is an 
agreement that firms are the most critical actors in the innovation process (cf. section 2.1.4) 
most studies do not investigate firms, but rather use aggregate data such as patents to capture 
the results of corporate innovation activities. Such data is conducive to academic research as 
it is accessible through public databases, available in large quantities and suitable to 
comparisons. Data on the firm level is much harder to obtain and interpret, especially for 
diversified firms where the activities relevant to innovation in the context of Energiewende 
only constitute a part of all innovation activities, and may not be specifically tracked. Some 
empirical studies cited above (Horbach et al., 2012; Rennings & Rammer, 2009; Rexhäuser 
& Löschel, 2014) rely on data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a systematic 
collection of panel data from about 6,000 German firms conducted annually as part of the 
German contribution to the EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS). However, published 
every January for the calendar year two years in advance, CIS/MIP data becomes available 
with a time lag of at least 1.5 years. The latest data set published in January 2016 contains 
information on corporate innovation activities in the year 2014 (Rammer et al., 2016). Until 
academic contributions using this data become available a further delay is incurred. This 
means that data for the years after 2011, which is of special interest following Fukushima and 
the accelerated Energiewende, is only available for three years now and has not been 
analyzed to that end yet. Current investigations of innovation on the firm level hence need to 
conduct their own data collection, such as done by a few of the contributions reviewed in the 
form of qualitative case studies. As explained above, also the expert commission of the 
official monitoring process recommends data collection and the investigation of innovation 
activities on firm level (Löschel et al., 2014b). 
In addition to these research gaps, the literature exposes several controversies when it 
comes to assessing the innovation effect of Energiewende. The three most striking ones 
pertain to the innovation impact of the EEG, the innovation impact of the accelerated 
Energiewende post-Fukushima, and the impact of the Energiewende policy mix on 
organizational innovation within firms. 
First, there is a very lively academic debate regarding the innovation impact of the 
EEG. Contentious since its installation, controversy also persists in the assessment of its 
effect on innovation, especially when it comes to the invention and implementation of 
90  
 
novelties. As elaborated above (cf. section 4.2.1.2), two groups of researchers come to almost 
diametrical results. While the first group, experts around the federal government's expert 
commission for research and innovation (EFI), negate a positive effect of Energiewende on 
innovation based mainly on innovation in RES-E and patents as an innovation indicator 
(Böhringer et al., 2014; EFI, 2014; Frondel et al., 2010), the Energiewende monitoring 
process expert commission and researchers from the Mannheim-based Center for European 
Economic Research (Zentrum für europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) and Fraunhofer 
ISI claim a positive impact, and one that goes beyond patents and RES-E (Löschel et al., 
2014b; Ragwitz et al., 2014; Rennings & Rexhäuser, 2014; Rexhäuser & Löschel, 2014). 
Solving this controversy is relevant in the wider academic debate on the innovation effect of 
demand-pull policy instruments (cf. section 2.2.2.2) as well as for policy makers in Germany 
and beyond. 
Second, there is a controversy regarding the impact of the post-Fukushima 
"accelerated Energiewende" that was initiated by the fall 2011 political decisions to shorten 
the remaining life time of nuclear power plants while maintaining the ambitious targets 
pertaining to GHG emissions, RES deployment and energy efficiency. As the term 
Energiewende as an object of popular discourse was only introduced following these 
decisions (cf. section 3.3.4), and the mainstreaming has some authors argue that this 
development has concentrated innovation efforts and specifically triggered major changes 
among electricity suppliers (Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015; Kungl, 2015). Strunz (2014) sees 
the post-Fukushima decisions as the critical element that finalized a "regime shift" (2014, p. 
153)  from a fossil-nuclear to an RES-based energy system and therefore positioned firms to 
focus their activities on succeeding in the new energy system. Others do not attribute 2011 
any special significance in comparison to political interventions and the transition of the 
energy system that had been ongoing since years before (Böhringer et al., 2014; EFI, 2014). 
Getting a better understanding of the actual impact of 2011 in terms of innovation is central 
to the federal government that was at time heavily criticized for its allegedly rash decision to 
reverse the life time extension for nuclear power plants that had been passed less than a year 
in advance. Clearly the federal government views 2011 as a turning point that deems 
recognition; the Energiewende monitoring process was only installed in fall of 2011 
stipulating 2011 as the first reporting year (BMWi, 2012a). If this radical decision was able to 
give an impulse to innovation activities, it would be another justification for this course of 
action. 
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Third, there is a dispute to what extent Energiewende policies have triggered changes 
within incumbent firms. Given the lack of firm-level investigations elaborated as a research 
gap above, there is little understanding of what happened inside firms affected by 
Energiewende policies regarding their innovation decisions; how they perceived political 
intervention and when, to what extent and why they changed their innovation activities. The 
little that is known concerns the strategies and actions of large, incumbent electricity 
suppliers. In this literature there are two largely opposing explanations for their behaviors, 
one camp blaming the late reaction to the ongoing energy transition to corporate inertia 
(Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015), another one holding that it constituted deliberate actions to 
prevent systemic change (Kungl, 2015). This dispute has repercussions that go beyond 
electricity suppliers. Electricity suppliers only constitute one group of corporate actors 
relevant to innovation in the energy system. Others are, for example, the grid operators on 
local and national level (DSOs and TSOs, respectively) who have the critical task to build 
and maintain a grid network that can integrate fluctuating RES-E and provide for security of 
supply at the same time. Equally important are technology providers, who develop and 
supply the technological equipment needed in the energy system. This pertains to generation 
technology, but also physical and virtual grid infrastructure and technology directed at the 
demand side. Lastly, there are also materials firms, which have an important role to play 
regarding the development and supply of materials to achieve Energiewende targets, 
especially when it comes to physical grid technology and energy efficiency. In addition, 
many technology providers and materials firms are heavy consumers of energy at the same 
time, and therefore hugely affected on the process and operational side of their business, in 
addition to products. For all these corporate actors, gaining insights into the roots of firm 
decisions and if action (or inaction) regarding innovation are deliberate decisions or corporate 
inertia is important for the corporate decision-makers themselves and equally for policy 
makers alike. While policy objectives are usually set at a meso or macro level, i.e. for an 
industry or in an economy, respectively, the micro level, i.e. the choices of individual actors 
is what in the end cumulates in higher level results. Being able to interpret inaction as 
deliberate choice or inertia hence informs the appropriate political response. The same is true 
for corporate decision-makers in during a transition process. They too benefit from 
understanding organizational barriers to innovative activities in order to be able to better 
address them. 
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With respect to the current state of the literature, this thesis aims to contribute towards 
closing the research gaps and clarifying the controversies around the innovation effect of 
Energiewende. The empirical investigation that follows in chapter 6 addresses the three 
research gaps. The discussion in chapter 7 revisits the three controversies reflecting on the 
results of the empirical investigation. 
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5 Conceptual framework for empirical enquiry 
This chapter prepares the empirical investigation by drafting the conceptual framework on 
which it will be based. The purpose of drafting a conceptual framework is to position this 
research within the academic literature outlined in chapter 2.2 and to clarify the approach 
towards empirical investigation in the following chapters. It has been stated above (section 
2.2) that three literature streams – sustainability transitions research, environmental 
economics, and organization and management studies – are relevant to the research question. 
The development of a theoretical framework for empirical enquiry hence draws on these 
three literature streams. Since Energiewende constitutes a transition towards sustainability, 
the thesis is placed in the tradition of sustainability transitions research, more specifically the 
multi-level perspective (MLP). Since this sustainability transition is politically-induced, the 
research framework is also informed by environmental economics where ample research on 
the effectiveness of environmental policy has been carried out. Since the research interest lies 
in investigating corporate innovation, concepts from the organization and management 
literature will also be considered.  
Developing an integrated conceptual framework from the combination of these three 
literatures is a novel approach to studying the innovation effect of the German energy 
transition and one of the key contributions of this thesis. The multi-level perspective in 
sustainability transitions research has not in this way been combined with environmental 
economics and organization and management studies yet. The combination of theoretical 
perspectives to investigate a specific research interest has the potential to further enhance the 
current understanding of the phenomenon under study. The integration of different theoretical 
angles to investigate one particular subject often shows that literatures are mutually beneficial 
and enhancing rather than exclusive. Researchers have called for integrated conceptual 
frameworks in the realm of the investigation of sustainability transitions before (Del Río 
González, 2009). As the review of the current state of research (cf. chapter 4) shows, existing 
investigations of this research subject tend to stand in only one of these theoretical literatures 
and hence disregard the potentially beneficial insights from other schools of thought. The 
integrated framework here constitutes a contribution to the theoretical literature as well as 
(through its findings) to existing knowledge regarding the research interest.  
The framework presented here retains an open and flexible character as the research 
interest is exploratory and hence the research framework should not limit possible findings in 
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advance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flick, 2014, p. 65 ff). The framework constitutes backdrop and 
guidance for the empirical investigation, but does not make explicit hypotheses to be tested 
and confirmed. Instead, the theoretical framework scopes and structures the data collection 
and data analysis and provides an anchor to relate research findings to the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature.  
The first section of this chapter explains why this thesis stands in the tradition of 
sustainability transitions research and fundamentally adopts a multi-level perspective (section 
5.1). This clarification is necessary, since research in the tradition of the MLP typically uses 
its three levels as the conceptual framework, and the socio-technical system as unit of 
analysis, and the approach taken in this thesis differs significantly with the theoretical 
framework as set out in this chapter and the focus on companies as actors within a system, 
rather than the system as such. Furthermore, albeit this is increasingly changing, the MLP is 
typically associated with the study of past transitions and it needs to be clarified how the 
approach can be used to study transitions that are still ongoing, as is the case with 
Energiewende. The second section of this chapter (section 5.2) develops the conceptual 
framework for the case studies that follow in chapter 6 and explains the four elements of the 
framework innovation activities (section 5.2.1), German Energiewende policy mix (section 
5.2.2), context factors (section 5.2.3) and firm characteristics (section 5.2.4). The final section 
elaborates characteristics of the firms in the energy technology value chain as they constitute 
the target population for the empirical research (section 5.3). 
5.1 The multi-level perspective, ongoing sustainability transitions and 
corporate innovation 
Sustainability transitions literature in general and the multi-level perspective (MLP) in 
particular are very suitable for studying the innovation impact of Energiewende. 
Energiewende is an ongoing transition towards sustainability that has at its core a transition 
of the socio-technical system for energy (esp. electricity) provision and usage in Germany, as 
explained previously (cf. section chapter 3.2). A couple of the basic tenets of the MLP, 
conceptually as well as ontologically, are highly suitable to this research interest. In other 
areas such as addressing ongoing transitions, investigating the effect of a policy mix, and 
studying corporate innovation the MLP needs to be qualified or expanded in order to make it 
applicable. Table 7 gives on overview of the assumptions similar to the MLP as well as 
departures from the structural MLP model. They are further detailed below.  
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Table 7: Assumptions in line with the MLP and departures from it in this thesis 
 
 
First of all, although this thesis investigates the effect of Energiewende on corporate 
innovation, it fundamentally takes the perspective that transition processes are co-
evolutionary and that therefore an innovation effect does not mean simple and linear 
causality. When policy makers set targets or develop new policies such as Energiewende they 
do so in reaction to societal developments that have previously taken place and with a certain 
vision and picture of the future in mind. These political actions then influence the behavior of 
social groups, individuals and companies, which in turn shapes the next round of political 
activities. In addition, decisions taken by these actors are always influenced by a multitude of 
factors, rather than a single one. These complex, iterative, and interdependent interactions 
take place continuously over a significant period of time, which makes it very hard to discern 
what exactly has caused what. Employing the MLP means to acknowledge this complexity 
and inherent interrelatedness and conceive any phenomenon as the unique result of the 
interplay of a set of influencing factors.  Hence while investigating how and why innovation 
occurs there is no claim to causality in a sense that it can be replicated in a different context 
(cf. also the methodological discussion in section 6.1). The aim is to identify and understand 
a range of interrelated influencing factors and mechanisms in a context- and actor-specific 
setting, and deduce stylized facts and implications (Kaldor, 1961) that help policy makers and 
firms advance Energiewende.  
Second, this thesis embraces the heuristic of the three levels that interact in a 
transition process. Distinguishing a landscape, regime and niche level to conceptualize 
"overall dynamic patterns in socio-technical transitions" (Geels, 2011, p. 26) makes sense 
intuitively. The definition of regime as path-dependent "deep structure" (Geels, 2011, p. 31) 
of a socio-technical system draws on well-established concepts from sociology, evolutionary 
and institutional economics (Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; North, 1990). The two 
96  
 
derived levels of niche and landscape explain sources of deviation as well as stability for the 
regime. In general, this provides a useful analytical framework for looking at and interpreting 
complex transitions. 
Third, this thesis supports the views on the duality of structure and agency proposed 
by researchers in the MLP tradition. As explained above (section 2.2.1.4), because of the 
popularity of the three level model, it is frequently alleged that the MLP puts overemphasis 
on structure at the expense agency in the analysis and explanation of transition processes (cf. 
section 2.2.1.4). However, the importance of actors is stressed in key theoretical contributions 
to the development of the MLP (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2011; Geels & Schot, 2007). Agency and 
structure are mutually enabling rather than mutually exclusive analytical dimensions. The 
metaphor of the three levels is a useful and accessible representation of structure that should, 
however, not be taken as a justification to ignore agency (Geels, 2011). In contrast, agency is 
one of several analytical dimensions that one might take (Geels, 2004). 
Despite this endorsement of the MLP in general, several things need to be clarified 
and adjustments made in order to make the MLP relevant to the research interest in this thesis 
(cf. Table 7). First, since Energiewende is still ongoing, it needs to be elaborated how the 
MLP can be used and what its contribution is to studying a socio-technical transition that is 
not yet completed. The heuristic of the three levels is especially suited to historical ex-post 
studies of transitions since the emergence of niches, the significance of landscape events, the 
evolution of technological trajectories and transition patterns, and the timing of regime shifts 
can conclusively only by understood in retrospect (Augenstein, 2015). Furthermore, the MLP 
is an interpretive framework, not a model to predict the future. This potentially limits its 
allure when it comes to studying transitions that are still ongoing, as one contribution of ex-
ante studies is the ability to anticipate the future course of development. However, an 
increasing number of publications employ versions of the MLP to study ongoing transitions. 
They show that this perspective has its merits also when investigating contemporary 
phenomena (Augenstein, 2015; Geels, 2012; Kern, 2012; Van der Vleuten & Högselius, 
2012).  
First, building on the above contributions, the focus of this thesis is dynamics on a 
micro level and the activities of actors in the transition process. Niche-regime dynamics 
(Augenstein, 2015; Geels, 2012), landscape-regime dynamics (Geels, 2012; Van der Vleuten 
& Högselius, 2012), regime-internal dynamics (Geels, 2012; Van der Vleuten & Högselius, 
2012) and multi-regime dynamics (Augenstein, 2015) are important to understand ongoing 
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transitions as change starts on these very low levels before it spreads and manifests itself in a 
regime shift and ultimately the transition of a socio-technical system. Since it is actors that 
are shaping structural change, a focus on the cognition, strategies and behaviors of actors is 
worthwhile especially in ongoing transitions (Augenstein, 2015, p. 87). In a niche, actors 
work on radical innovations and seek to establish them, possibly changing the socio-technical 
regime as a result. In a regime, actors react to niche, regime-internal and landscape 
developments in a way that may maintain and reinforce the regime, but may due to regime-
internal semi-coherence also cause tensions and bring about regime cracks (Geels, 2012, p. 
472 ff). Even landscape developments only gain significance because of the way they are 
interpreted and acted upon. Landscape developments may be perceived in a way that 
reinforces established cognition and behaviors and hence maintains the current regime, or in a 
way that challenges these. Seen in isolation, a landscape development does not imply a 
definite route for action. Augenstein (2015) illustrates this point using the Fukushima nuclear 
incident  as an example: "Even though it [Fukushima] is used as legitimization for a 
government-induced energy transition project focused on renewable energies, it could in 
theory have just as well been used as an argument for increased efforts in nuclear R&D or a 
political focus on technologies improving safety and reducing risks" (Augenstein, 2015, p. 
85).  
While this approach of analyzing ongoing transitions in terms of the MLP does still 
not enable a clear and unambiguous prediction of the future, it does, however, help to collect 
indications and identify trends from which one may deduce the future development. Focusing 
on actors one can hence infer what changes are emerging and may manifest on a systemic 
level over time. For example, the identification of mechanisms and patterns in current 
transitions, which have previously also been observed in historic transitions, may provide 
insights into the rate and direction that a transition will take on (Augenstein, 2015; Geels, 
2012). In this way the MLP can even be useful to assess the effectiveness of policies in 
stimulating transitions (Kern, 2012). Furthermore, in the case of an ongoing transition lessons 
learnt from the study of actors may if dispersed still influence transition dynamics. The 
results can inform actors in the current transition and influence their decision-making, which 
will in turn shape how the transition plays out in the future. This corresponds to the objective 
of this thesis to draw implications for policy makers and firms. Instead of being universally 
valid in all cases irrespective of context, this can hence be relevant in the particular case of 
the German Energiewende.  
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Second, the framing of Energiewende as a politically-induced transition and the 
research interest in investigating the effect of the politics of this transition on corporate 
innovation means this thesis looks at a political course of action as the primary source of 
change. It has been noted before (section 2.2.1.4) that research using the MLP can have a 
bottom-up bias in the sense that niches are usually seen as the source of innovations. 
However, an improved understanding of the role of politics and policies in sustainability 
transition processes has already been called for (Markard et al., 2012). This thesis explicitly 
departs from technological niches here, to focus on the effect of public policy instead. That 
does of course not mean that niches are not important. First, transitions on all levels co-
evolve, as explained above. Second, public policy that implements Energiewende would most 
likely not have emerged in its current form had it not been for technological "niche" 
developments of renewable energy generation technology and civil society organizations 
demanding their use, as described in chapter 2.3.  
The effect of public policy on an ongoing transition has been analyzed using the MLP 
before (Geels, 2012; Kern, 2012; Kern & Smith, 2008). The MLP cannot provide the 
(quantitative) effectiveness assessments of public policy that are common in the 
environmental economics literature, but instead sheds light on the potential of a policy to 
stimulate transitions. Geels (2012) argues that public policy needs to pursue two objectives in 
order to foster sustainability transitions: first, it should stimulate the development of niche 
innovations and second, it should exercise pressure on the regime to adopt such innovations 
through economic, market-based instruments as well as traditional environmental regulation 
(Geels, 2012, p. 9). The MLP can help evaluate to what extent and how a policy contributes 
to transition dynamics and prompts structural change while of course "always keeping in 
mind that the eventual outcome with regard to an overall transition of a socio-technical 
system as a whole depends on a plethora of other factors as well" (Augenstein, 2015, p. 110). 
Because of the complexity involved in a transition it is again not possible to predict the exact 
outcome of a policy, but it is possible to get a better understanding of what might happen and 
what factors may prove to be important. 
Third, since the research interest of this thesis is corporate innovation, it is not the 
energy system as such, but companies as actors within it that are the units of analysis. This is 
rather unusual, most MLP contributions tend to study systems and therein the emergence of 
niche innovations, which usually involves the focus on structural elements and groups of 
actors, if actors are involved at all. In contrast to this, this thesis explicitly studies firms 
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individually. The firms that this thesis is interested in can, however, all be considered to be 
part of the same socio-technical system, that is the system around the supply of and demand 
for electricity including the technology required for this, or as it is called here, the energy 
technology value chain (cf. section 5.3). Moreover, firms (or other actors, for that matter) are 
deliberately not assigned to the levels niche or regime, or to specific regimes, but they may 
represent either or both (cf. Figure 12). The approach here hence constitutes an extension of 
the MLP literature in that respect. 
 
Figure 12: Firms within a multi-level perspective of socio-technical change 
 
Source: Adapted from Geels, 2004 
 
The reason for not distinguishing niche and regime actors, at least not ex ante, is first, 
that this affiliation may change and second, that one organization may combine aspects of 
both, regime and niche. Studies especially of ongoing transitions show that the boundaries 
between niche and regime, as well as between fading and emerging regimes, are blurry and 
fluctuate over time (de Haan & Rotmans, 2011; Geels, 2004). Degrees of tension between 
niche and regime vary from antagonistic to symbiotic (Geels, 2011). As a consequence the 
delineation of niche and regime actors is not clear, neither in terms of actors nor in terms of 
structure (Augenstein, 2015, p. 85). Assigning categories beforehand can even limit the 
outcomes of empirical research as characteristics associated with the respective levels may 
leverage research biases and predefine results. Furthermore, organizational actors can stretch 
over both levels and be both at the same time, a regime actor and a niche actor. The 
organization and management literature calls this the tension between exploitation (of 
existing knowledge and routines) and exploration (for new knowledge and radical 
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innovations)  (March, 1991). Organizations that master the art of both simultaneously are 
often termed ambidextrous (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). However, it can be expected that 
incumbent actors lean towards an established or fading regime, while new players lean 
towards niches and a new or emerging regime. Lastly, actors can be part of multiple systems 
and regimes at the same time. All of these hold for corporate and political actors alike. Even 
more so than firms, political actors are typically considered representatives of the established 
regime. However, research has demonstrated that novel political forces and the instituting 
political actors can also constitute a source of niche innovation (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; 
Lockwood, 2016; Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014). Therefore the focus of the empirical 
research in this thesis is on actors, their cognition and their concrete actions set against the 
backdrop of insights from the multi-level perspective in sustainability transitions research. 
5.2 Elements of the conceptual framework 
As explained in the previous section, the multi-level perspective of sustainability transitions 
studies is used as an ontological and conceptual base, but a research framework that also 
integrates concepts from environmental economics and the organization and management 
literature is devised. Furthermore, the analytical perspective is changed from socio-technical 
systems to firms as units of analysis, albeit these firms are members of a particular socio-
technical system, namely the socio-technical system for energy in Germany, as defined by the 
energy technology value chain (cf. section 5.3). 
It has been argued before that the MLP could benefit from an integration of insights 
from literatures in business and strategic management. Geels (2011, p. 30 f) states that at least 
three theories could be well integrated into an MLP framework: first, the strategy literature 
on alliances and complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001) could expand the understanding 
of niche-regime dynamics by investigating how incumbents and new entrants collaborate. 
Second, literature on organizational learning such as ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) and the quest of companies to exploit existing knowledge 
or explore new knowledge (March, 1991) could help study firm-internal transition processes. 
Moreover, with a research interest in the evaluation of political initiatives that can broadly be 
described as "pro-environment" it makes sense to also build on the learnings regarding the 
innovation effect of environmental policy provided by the vast literature body of 
environmental economics (cf. section 2.2.2). 
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The research framework presented in the following is deliberately open. Since the 
research interest is to explore, it can only be adequately pursued in a framework that leaves 
room for new insights and is not constrained by narrow definitions and a limited number of 
hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989; Geels, 2011). This is also in line with the ontological approach 
put forward by the multi-level perspective. Given the empirical complexity and inherent 
interrelatedness of socio-technical transitions a narrow framework would not be able to 
satisfy the research interest as it foregoes the ability to develop new knowledge. In the next 
chapter (chapter 6), the framework will be used as a basis for data collection in form of semi-
structured qualitative interviews for the qualitative case studies that form the heart of the 
empirical research in this thesis.  
Three empirical research questions are hence asked, the combined answers to which 
will address the research objective to explore the effect of Energiewende on corporate 
innovation: 
1. How have German firms over time changed their innovation activities in the 
light of Energiewende?   
2. What is the impact of the individual components of the  Energiewende policy 
mix on these innovation dynamics? 
3. What is the impact of confounding factors and how do they interact with the 
components of the Energiewende policy mix? 
To answer these empirical research questions, the conceptual framework is a simple 
representation of a relationship between firms and their external environment. Firms are 
embedded in a particular environment with which they interact because of permeable firm 
boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Teece, 1986). Through these 
permeable boundaries they perceive developments in their environment and take them in to 
assess their relevance for corporate activities. Firms carry out innovation activities. The rate 
and direction of these innovation activities is the result of the interpretation of drivers from 
the external environment, as well as factors internal to the firm (Del Río González, 2009; 
Dosi, 1988). The link that is under particular investigation here is between the German 
Energiewende policy mix and corporate innovation activities. Confounding influences from 
context factors and firm characteristics will also be investigated.  
Figure 13 gives a graphical overview of this research framework. The four elements 
will be further explained in the following sections. Comparable research frameworks have 
been drafted by other researchers studying research questions in the realm of sustainability, 
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environmental policy and corporate innovation (Hoppmann et al., 2013; Rogge, Schleich, et 
al., 2011; Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 13: Research framework for company case studies 
 
5.2.1 Innovation activities 
Earlier in this thesis (section 2.3) innovation has been defined as the intentional and targeted 
invention, implementation and diffusion of a subjectively new or improved product, process, 
strategy, organization or business model that is perceived to be relevant in the context of 
Energiewende. The theoretical framework builds on this definition and studies corporate 
innovation in terms of innovation activities.  
Throughout the innovation process companies engage in several activities in an effort 
to achieve an innovation. Innovation activities are all scientific, technological, organizational, 
financial and commercial steps which actually lead to, or are intended to lead to, the 
implementation of innovations and therefore contribute towards corporate change. Some 
innovation activities are themselves innovative, others are not novel activities but are 
necessary for the implementation of innovations (OECD & Eurostat, 2005, para. 249). 
Innovation activities are an indicator of innovation inputs, rather than outputs. Studying 
innovation in terms of input indicators makes sense for the research interest of this thesis 
since input indicators are closest to the actual process of innovation on firm level. As such, 
they are suitable to track changes in innovation behavior, e.g., as response to external 
triggers, with minimal time lag, and also capture the intention to innovate (Arbussa & 
Coenders, 2007).  
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Not all corporate innovation activities are likely to be relevant to the transition of the 
German energy system. Especially large, diversified firms and firms on the upstream side of 
the value chain (i.e. energy technology and materials) will innovate in areas that are unrelated 
to the research interest. Only innovation activities "relevant in the context of Energiewende" 
are supposed to be investigated. The definition of relevance thereby will be left to the case 
study participants themselves as this may vary across firms. 
Innovation activities can vary regarding direction they take and the rate, or intensity, 
with which they are pursued (Arrow, 1962a; Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011). A special 
interest is taken in investigating when and why innovation activities take a certain direction 
and when and why the intensity of these activities changes. The resulting picture of 
cumulated changes in innovation activities of the energy technology value chain over time 
suggests the dynamics of innovation taking place and forces that contribute towards 
developing and changing the German energy system. 
In this thesis innovation activities are clustered into three different categories: 
exploration, development and implementation, adoption, and organizational change. This 
corresponds to the Schumpeterian process of innovation (cf. section 2.1.1) and covers it in 
full from invention to diffusion. It hence addresses the research gap of a too narrow definition 
of innovation (cf. section 4.3). Exploration, development and implementation are activities at 
the beginning, or upstream part, of the innovation process, what Schumpeter refers to as 
invention and innovation. Adoption is an activity at the end, or downstream part, of the 
innovation process as it contributes to diffusion. Exploration, development, and 
implementation, as well as adoption are mainly connected to product and process innovations 
and are mostly, but not always, technological. Organizational change cuts across the 
Schumpeterian innovation process that is mainly connected to non-technological innovations.    
All activities subsumed under these categories are commonly investigated in innovation 
studies, which ensures a comparability of the results with the existing academic literature 
((Hoppmann et al., 2013; Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012).  
Exploration, development and implementation 
First, there are activities targeted at exploration, development and implementation. 
These are activities with the objective to discover or develop something new for the 
firm and implement it consequently. While invention and innovation are distinct steps 
in the Schumpeterian model of innovation (cf.  
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Figure 2), they are in practice often hard to separate. Firms usually engage in invention not 
for the sake of the activity itself, but with the target to use its result. The objective to innovate 
is hence immanent in the decision to invent, which is why the activities are not looked at 
separately here.  
Within exploration, development and implementation, one can distinguish between 
research and development (R&D) and other activities. Research and development is the most 
prominent innovation activity and widely employed as an indicator in quantitative as well as 
qualitative studies (OECD & Eurostat, 2005; Schmiedeberg, 2008). It is often broken down 
into various types of R&D where standalone inhouse R&D is distinguished from R&D 
contracted out to external parties and R&D expenditure incurred in cooperative projects with 
other entities (OECD & Eurostat, 2005; Schmiedeberg, 2008). While a second "D" for 
"demonstration" is also sometimes added to explicitly include all expenditure incurred before 
the implementation of a product or process, this thesis sticks to the more frequent use R&D. 
Data availability permitting, R&D is a good indicator for the effort that goes into 
technological product and process innovations (OECD & Eurostat, 2005). Since it is 
quantifiable e.g., per company per year or per technology, it provides many options for data 
analysis. In fact, many innovation surveys mainly focus on gathering R&D data over time.  
R&D, however, is only one of several exploration, development and implementation 
activities at the firm level. First, technological developments may take place outside of 
"classical" R&D departments, e.g., in production facilities or project-specific setups 
(Evangelista, Sandven, Sirilli, & Smith, 1998; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Second, non-
technological invention and implementation is an ever more important area that is typically 
not accounted for in R&D  (OECD & Eurostat, 2005; Arbussa & Coenders, 2007). Activities 
for non-technological invention and implementation are seldomly further classified. Very 
generically they may involve idea generation, concept development, testing and 
implementation in a wide variety of areas such as new business development, non-physical 
products i.e. services, marketing and customer experience, or business model. 
In the context of Energiewende exploration, development and implementation 
activities with the objective to re-invent larger parts of corporate activities may be expected. 
As a sustainability transition like Energiewende places an emphasis on environmentally-
friendly technology more interest in such technology can be expected. Indeed current 
research has already shown the rise of companies producing renewable electricity generation 
technologies and other environment-friendly technology has increased in Germany (Laleman 
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& Albrecht, 2014; J. I. Lewis & Wiser, 2007; Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 2014). Changes may 
hence include an expansion of the range of activities a firm engages in (e.g., new products or 
business areas) in the form of explicit diversification of the range of corporate activities or 
replacement of old activities by new activities.   
Adoption 
Second, innovation activities include the adoption of novelties. These are activities where 
physical and non-physical assets produced outside of the firm are adopted and subsequently 
employed without making significant changes to the asset. These activities include the 
acquisition of external knowledge such as licenses, patents or trademarks as well as 
acquisition of machinery and equipment (Arbussa & Coenders, 2007; OECD & Eurostat, 
2005). In addition, there are also activities that are harder to observe because they are not as 
formalized as outright expenditures. These may include the absorption of knowledge from the 
external environment for that knowledge to be exploited internally, thereby contributing for 
the knowledge to spread (Arbussa & Coenders, 2007). In the context of Energiewende it is 
important to pay special attention to adoption as many contributions that negate an effect of 
Energiewende on innovation do so by limiting their attention to the earlier stages of the 
innovation process and ignoring diffusion (cf. section 4.3).  
Organizational change 
Third, there are innovation activities targeted at the firm itself, more precisely its internal 
organization. Organizational change is increasingly recognized as a crucial type of a firm 
level innovation activity (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; OECD & Eurostat, 2005). Such 
activities can contribute to and help implement technological changes, but also occur 
independently.  As activities take place within the firm, they are usually not formally tracked 
and often not reported to the outside world, which makes them very hard to measure. 
Furthermore, activities at the organizational level are much broader than the previous two 
innovation activities explained and do not lend themselves to a classification. Activities may 
include the development and implementation of a strategy and objectives as well as various 
organizational changes regarding structure, processes, people and capabilities, or interaction 
with the external environment.  
Organizational change is expected to be of particular importance in the context of a 
sustainability transition like Energiewende. A significant change in the dynamics of a firm's 
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external environment can be expected to affect the strategic priorities for innovation as well 
as the way that innovation activities are organized. Especially very new innovation that 
constitutes a break with previous corporate strategy, processes and routines, or business logic 
may require a somewhat separate organizational structure in order to develop and grow 
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). This idea is very similar 
to the conception of niches in the sense of the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2011), just that 
the niche here is contained in one corporate organization. Also, firms may experiment with 
organizational structures that allow them to explore new developments while at the same time 
also staying strong in the areas they are already good at i.e. create an organization that is 
more ambidextrous (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013).  
Related to this is also the notion of changing the entire business model. As explained 
earlier (cf. section 2.2.3), the business model is a multi-dimensional, comprehensive concept 
that describes how a company creates and captures value through its specific combination of 
target market, value proposition, value chain, cost and profit, value network and competitive 
strategy  (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Changes to the business model may be required 
where the company finds that its way of doing business is in many aspects no longer suitable 
to a new external environment. This may especially be the case in periods of rapid and radical 
external change (Chesbrough, 2007; Tongur & Engwall, 2014), but also the proposition to 
build a new business model based on sustainability has been developed (Schaltegger, 
Lüdeke-Freund, & Hansen, 2012). 
Building on the sustainability transitions as well as the organization and management 
literature, one can also expect an effect on the way that a firm organizes its collaborative 
activities with firms and other external partners. Collaboration can take place in the early 
steps (invention/innovation) of the innovation process and will here predominantly concern 
traditional innovation functions such as R&D, but it can also take place in the latter step of 
diffusion where it may take the form of marketing collaborations or joint ventures in a new 
business area. In the context of sustainability transitions, collaboration may be important for 
introducing new technologies or other innovations to a market.  The ability of new entrants to 
cooperate with exiting players may be decisive for a niche technology to take off (Geels, 
2011). For incumbent firms the collaboration may be a learning opportunity, a re-positioning 
in light of the expected success of the niche technology, or an extended due diligence if the 
objective is a possible acquisition (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). All collaborations are efforts to address the 
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uncertainty and complexity that doing new things, especially under the pressure of external 
change, entails (Chesbrough, 2003). Complementarity of assets and resources between the 
incumbent and new entrant plays a key role here (Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 1997). In 
addition to collaboration between incumbents and new entrants, collaboration may also take 
place vertically along the value chain with suppliers or buyers, with firms from other 
industries, or actors other than firms (Hagedoorn, 2002; Von Hippel, 1976, 1994). In fact, 
"open innovation" i.e. seems to be the new paradigm in management literature and practice 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Gassmann et al., 2010).  
5.2.2 German Energiewende policy mix 
In the external environment the Energiewende policy mix is explicitly separated from other 
influencing factors. This is because of the research interest in investigating the effect of the 
politics of Energiewende on corporate innovation. Of course the Energiewende policy mix 
can neither be seen in isolation, nor are its boundaries definitely clear. However, representing 
it here as a distinct influencing factor is a necessary and justifiable simplification for the 
following empirical research. 
In line with the conceptual propositions by Rogge and Reichardt (2013) a 
comprehensive policy mix framework that is especially suited for investigating 
environmental technological change is employed. Three aspects of the policy mix are 
distinguished: vision and strategy, an instrument mix, and policy process. This distinction 
builds on theoretical contributions and empirical findings in, mainly, the environmental 
economics literature.  
Vision and strategy encompasses policy objectives and targets, as well as roadmaps 
and principal plans for achieving them (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013, p. 8 f). This aspect hence 
captures the long term perspective inherent in a political course of action. Empirical research 
has shown that political vision and strategy is an important determinant of corporate 
innovation and therefore likely to play a role in the context of Energiewende. Although the 
political long term perspective does not tend to be relevant for day-to-day activities since it 
does not set actionable incentives, it provides guidance to the future possible state of the 
world and can hence steer firms' innovation activities, especially where they are geared 
towards the long run  and involve high uncertainty (Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. 
Schmidt et al., 2012).  
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The instrument mix constitutes the implementation of the long term perspective in 
concrete policies. As explained earlier in this thesis (cf. section 2.2.2), empirical research in 
environmental economics has evolved in particular around investigating which type of policy 
instruments is best suitable to foster environmental innovation, what design features a policy 
needs to possess and how policy instruments need to be combined in an instrument mix to 
bring about innovation. To address the multitude of ways to look at policy instruments, 
Rogge and Reichardt suggest a useful matrix typology that distinguishes instruments by type 
(economic instruments, regulation, information) and purpose (technology-push, demand-pull, 
systemic regulation) (2013, p. 12). Adopting this typology will allow to link research findings 
back to the respective policy instrument debates found in the academic literature. For the sake 
of simplicity, this thesis classifies policy instruments primarily by their purpose in terms of 
innovation i.e. the latter one in the matrix set up by Rogge and Reichardt; technology-push 
instruments, demand-pull instruments, and systemic regulation (cf. section 2.1.3).   
The last aspect, process, refers to the emergence and implementation of these policy 
elements rather than their content or design features as such. The policy-making process 
refers to the stages of the policy cycle from the identification of the need for political 
intervention over policy formulation and decision-making to implementation and assessment 
(Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). Firms tend to monitor policy processes relevant to them 
and interact with policy makers throughout this process thereby influencing the outcome and 
being influenced in return. Firms may adjust their behavior before a certain policy is being 
implemented (or adjusted) based on their expectations formed throughout the policy-making 
process (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). Especially since Energiewende politics is not 
fixed at one point in time, but has evolved and changed significantly over the years, the 
policy process can be expected to be important here. Specific steps or episodes in policy-
making around Energiewende may have had an influence on innovation activities, but once 
again also the style of the policy-making process and its features in terms of e.g., 
predictability and reliability (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). 
5.2.3 Context factors 
In addition to the German Energiewende policy mix, several other factors of a firm's external 
environment can be expected to affect innovation activities. It should be noted here again that 
the notion of co-evolution implies that these context factors are interrelated with one another 
and also with the German Energiewende policy mix that is at the core of the research interest. 
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Representing them as separate factors is hence a simplification. Four context factors are taken 
into account here: market and industry dynamics, non-German environmental policy, 
technological developments and landscape developments. 
First, environmental economics and management and organization studies stress that 
market and industry dynamics such as supply and demand, prices, competition and new entry 
may affect innovation decisions (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2005; Newell, 
Jaffe, & Stavins, 1998, 2006). In the case of Energiewende several factors such as e.g., 
demand for environmentally-friendly technology, the electricity price or intra-industry 
competition could be important. A difficulty here is that market and industry dynamics can be 
an influencing factor in their own right, but they can also be a mechanism through which 
environmental policy plays out in a dynamic way, e.g., when demand-pull policies create 
markets for a specific application (Hoppmann et al., 2013; Requate, 2005). This distinction 
needs to be paid attention to in the analysis.  
Second, policies other than the one under investigation, i.e. non-German 
environmental policy, may affect corporate innovation activities. Since the study is situated in 
the realm of environmental policy, a policy area that is also regulated on a European and 
international level, policies at these levels may have an impact. Indeed several empirical 
studies suggest such a link e.g., between the European emissions trading scheme and 
innovation activities of firms (Cames, 2010; Martin et al., 2011; Rogge, Schleich, et al., 
2011; Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012).  
Third, landscape developments may also have an impact. The multi-level perspective 
holds that exogenous events may disrupt established regime structures and cause regimes and 
systems to change (Geels & Schot, 2007). In the context of Energiewende, nuclear incidents 
such as the one at Fukushima in 2011 or Chernobyl in 1986 may have constituted such events 
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Strunz, 2014). Furthermore landscape developments attenuate 
change on the regime level (Geels & Schot, 2007). In the management literature as well as in 
company practice landscape developments are often phrased in terms of megatrends. 
Megatrends are slowly evolving, long-term changes that affect a wide range of aspects of 
society and economics on a global scale (Naisbit, 1982; Slaughter, 1993a). Frequently cited 
megatrends today include changes to global demographics (Miles, 1999), income structures 
(Kharas, 2010), the digitalization of all aspects of life (Hood & Margetts, 2007; Rosenberg, 
2001; Tapscott, 1996) and global warming and climate change (N. H. Stern, 2006). 
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5.2.4 Firm characteristics 
Lastly also firm characteristics can influence corporate innovation activities (Ahuja et al., 
2008). Four firm characteristics are distinguished here: value chain position, industry 
position, resources and capabilities, and cognition.  
First, the value chain position within the energy technology value chain can be 
expected to be of importance (Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012; 
Taylor, 2008). The energy technology value chain is made up of different types of corporate 
actors, two of which are distinguished here. Energy technology and materials companies 
provide the technology that is used to generate electricity and transport it. Electricity 
generation and transmission firms generate the electricity and deliver and sell it to customers. 
Each of the value chain steps is defined rather broad and encompasses various industrial 
sectors. The two value chain steps differ in the nature of their business, the structure and 
dynamics of the market and industry they operate in, and the role that innovation has played 
traditionally (see also section 5.3).  
Second, a firm's industry position i.e. whether a firm is long-established in an industry 
or a new entrant may affect innovation activities. Industry incumbents are typically 
associated with inertia and resistance to change, while start-ups are considered dynamic, 
entrepreneurial and quick to adapt. There is a bias in innovation studies to focus on 
incumbents with ample empirical research on incumbent performance in the light of radical 
technological change (C. W. Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Start-ups are usually only 
investigated in the context of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 2004) and as the source of 
technological change. However, as Energiewende has arguably helped bring about entirely 
new industries like wind or solar and helped many companies in these industries grow (J. I. 
Lewis & Wiser, 2007) it is worthwhile making this distinction and paying attention to the 
differential effect in terms of industry position here.  
Third, the resources, capabilities and cognition that a firm possesses may also 
influence innovation activities. The resource-based view of the firm holds that firms are 
heterogeneous actors characterized by their resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991) and that 
differences in firm characteristics are likely to lead to variations in innovation activities as 
well as interpretations of external events (Dosi & Nelson, 2010; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
Clearly it is difficult to identify resources and capabilities from the outset. The technology 
portfolio might provide a clue as it represents a firm's technological capabilities and assets 
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995) and consequently determines the degree to which it is 
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affected by Energiewende. This can play out in various ways. On the one hand being strongly 
invested in particular assets and the customer and value network relationships that come with 
it can impede change (Christensen & Bower, 1996), on the other hand a large stock of 
knowledge generally boosts the capacity to absorb further learnings from the environment 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  Moreover, the degree of technological diversification as such 
may play a role. In general is positively associated with innovation activity as companies are 
considered to be more open to explore (Chen, 1996) and knowledge can be transferred across 
different technological domains (D. J. Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007). But one could also 
imagine that diversification decreases the incentive invest in innovation when a certain 
technology that is threatened by an external environmental change can easily be abandoned. 
Cognition may influence the interpretation of external events and therefore the reaction to 
them in terms of innovation activities. The importance of cognition is recognized across 
various literatures. Companies operate with a dominant logic of heuristic rules, norms and 
beliefs that guides decision-making (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Corporate cognition helps 
companies make sense of their external environment and influences corporate decisions 
regarding strategy and innovation (Barr, 1998; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Nooteboom, 2005) 
(cf. section 2.2.3). It is not the change in the external environment itself, but rather the 
corporate interpretation of that change that determines the response (Barr, 1998; Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). For example, whether a change in the environment 
is perceived as an opportunity or a threat can significantly influence corporate reaction 
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Sharma, 2000). Cognition is also what determines if a political 
course of action or policy is deemed to be credible, stringent, or predictable (cf. section 
5.2.1). Expectations of the future are also formed based on cognition and are equally 
important for corporate actions (Requate, 2005). However, the dominant logic of a firm can 
also render it unable to respond to external developments (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and can 
impede making necessary changes to the business model (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). 
In the language of the multi-level perspective, corporate cognition reflects the rules of the 
regime that a firm is embedded in. Developments on the landscape or niche level only gain 
relevance when they are interpreted by regime actors and hence in light of these rules 
(Augenstein, 2015, p. 85). But just as regimes are made up of various sub-regimes and their 
rule sets are only semi-coherent, corporate cognition can be expected to vary across firms and 
change over time. As a transition is defined as regime change (Geels, 2011, p. 26), a change 
to the cognitive structure of regime actors determines the success of a transition. In the 
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context of the influence of Energiewende on corporate innovation one can hence expect 
cognition to be of pivotal importance. 
5.3 The German energy technology value chain 
Firms of the energy technology value chain constitute the population of which cases will be 
selected in the empirical part (chapter 6). The energy technology value chain was chosen as 
the research case, because it is these firms that are particularly strongly affected by the 
transition of the German energy system and from which innovation as a response to the 
transition, but also innovation that will further shape the transition, is expected. The German 
energy technology value chain is defined as the group of corporate actors in Germany that 
help fulfill the function of the energy system, i.e. to provide and utilize energy. While there 
may be several possibilities to cluster these actors into different sectors and industries, they 
are distinguished by two different functions here: first, electricity generation and transmission 
on the downstream end of the value chain and second, provision of energy technology and 
materials at the upstream end. It is hence vertical steps that are differentiated, although the 
linkages between both types of firms may indeed be circular as both are potential suppliers 
and customers of one another; firms of the second group may supply physical, technological 
products to firms of the first group, while firms of the first group may supply electricity.  
The two groups exhibit fundamental differences in terms of their business, their 
industry, and the role that innovation traditionally plays (cf. Figure 14). These differences are 
likely to have an impact on their reaction to Energiewende in terms of innovation activities, 
which is why value chain position has been included in the conceptual framework as a 
confounding factor (cf. section 5.2.4). 
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Figure 14: Comparison of energy technology value chain steps 
 
 
Electricity generation and transmission firms are the classical utilities that operate 
large power plants, generate electricity and transport and distribute it to industrial, 
commercial and private customers. In addition to electricity they are often active in the 
production and distribution of heat and gas as well. While they increasingly offer services 
and heat and gas are striving adjacent business areas for many firms, their core product, the 
provision of electricity, has remained virtually un-changed since the development of on-grid 
electricity in the 19th century (Cames, 2010). The product is actually a service as electricity is 
not provided as a physical good that can be stored, but consumed immediately as it is just a 
source of energy. Being defined by physical laws its properties and as such product 
characteristics cannot easily be differentiated. Moreover, the provision electricity (but also 
heat and gas) relies on heavy physical infrastructure, networks of transmission and 
distribution grids, which transport energy from points of production to points of use. The 
network feature of the industry implies rising returns to scale and therefore a natural tendency 
towards monopoly. Combined with a high public interest in energy security, this has rendered 
the industry traditionally highly regulated. Regulatory involvement includes subsidies and 
guarantees for generation facilities, strict rules for electricity markets and grid access, and 
close scrutiny of industry conduct and price setting behavior. In the past even more intrusive 
regulation such as restrictions of competition, geographical monopolies and price targets 
were the norm in the industry. Indeed the industry only emerged from state-owned, protected 
utilities to competitive firms following the liberalization and privatization efforts of the 1990s 
(cf. section 3.3.3). Yet, energy generation remains an industry where regulation is key and 
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business often comes second. However, profitability has usually been high with energy 
companies routinely enjoying operating margins beyond 10%. As a consequence of a stable 
core product, large sunk costs for physical assets and the attenuating lines of stable 
regulation, industry dynamics have traditionally been low. While the liberalization of the 
electricity market and the abolishment of territorial monopolies opened doors for new 
players, the industry quickly consolidated with four large firms continuing to dominate the 
supply of electricity in Germany.  
Electricity generation and transmission has traditionally been regarded a low-
innovation industry. In two of the most important quantitative indicators of innovation, R&D 
expenditures and capital investments, the industry ranks among the lowest in Germany 
(Rammer et al., 2014). Being a services industry, one must of course be cautious when 
applying such traditional criteria of innovation as they exhibit a bias towards manufacturing 
firms; for example services industries seldom report R&D (OECD & Eurostat, 2005). 
However, there is no industry-level dynamic that indicates overhauls in the sense of creative 
destruction and the energy industry has not been known for innovations of any kind. 
Energy technology and materials firms are companies of various industries that 
develop, produce and sell products for the supply and utilization of energy. Such firms may 
be found in several industrial sectors including electrical engineering, mechanical 
engineering, software and information technology and process industries. Irrespective of 
formal sector affiliation all companies that offer products and services relevant to the energy 
system qualify here. In the context of Energiewende, especially products for energy 
generation, storage, transmission and distribution, energy management and the efficient 
utilization of energy are sought after. In addition to the technology as such, materials and 
services for these areas of application are of equal importance (Löschel et al., 2014c, p. Z-
21). Energy technology and materials firms, especially the larger ones, tend to be diversified 
and offer a large range of products for various applications. However, smaller, focused firms 
exist as well. Since manufacturing is a stronghold in Germany, products tend to be physical, 
but the provision of services is gaining importance. In contrast to electricity, heat and gas, 
product differentiation through e.g., technological properties is possible and a standard term 
of competition. Due to the industrial base, electricity is a key production factor for many 
firms, especially in the process industries. The market definition of these companies tends to 
be global, or at least beyond Germany. Furthermore, although large firms certainly exist, the 
industry structure remains dispersed. Regulation is a normal factor in the external 
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environment, but not a defining determinant of industry structure and conduct. Profitability 
tends to be low compared to the standards of the energy industry with operating margins 
generally below 10%, a testimony to the competitive pressures industry players are subject to. 
In contrast to electricity generation and transmission companies, firms in energy technology 
and materials are typically considered very innovative. Electrical engineering, mechanical 
engineering and chemicals for example occupy top ranks in Germany when it comes to their 
innovation intensity measured by R&D expenditures and capital investments (Rammer et al., 
2014, p. 7). All three are considered research-intensive industries (ibid., p. 2). 
It is clear that both value chain steps are of tremendous importance when it comes to 
the German energy transition. The first one is directly affected by any change to the energy 
system, the second may as a consequence experience changes in an important customer 
segment and furthermore have to envisage changes to its own use of electricity and other 
energy sources in the production process. However, since the electricity generation and 
transmission industry has not been a stronghold of innovation in the past, it is unclear what 
can be expected in the context of Energiewende. In terms of public and political attention 
certainly, the second value chain step and especially those firms of it that belong to the 
German manufacturing base is where the focus to deliver innovation lies (BMWi, 2012a). 
This is not a surprise since the strength and the potential of the German economy is typically 
seen in the producing industries, so this plays well to the targets of competitiveness and a 
general economic boost due to Energiewende. 
The innovation effect at large can only be understood when looking at an entire value 
chain. For technological innovations at least, invention and implementation tends to sit 
further upstream, while the diffusion of technology is fostered by the downstream customers. 
This may not apply to all products and services, but in certain areas such as e.g., energy 
generation technology this partial split of the innovation process is certainly the case. If one 
regards the innovation process from a purely technological point of view, electricity 
generation and transmission contributes to the diffusion of technology through upgrades and 
new investments into their power generation technology portfolio, infrastructure network or 
other physical assets. Vertical cooperation e.g., in joint development products can hence be 
expected to be of importance (Cames, 2010). However, going beyond technological 
innovations as it is the ambition in this thesis one may expect more such differentiations and 
mutually beneficial integrations between these steps.  Finally, the discussion thus far may be 
more applicable to incumbents in the respective value chain steps, than to new entrants. This 
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is also a reason why market position was included as a separate firm characteristic in the 
theoretical framework (cf. section 5.2.4). 
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6 Findings of exploratory company case studies 
Following the elaboration of theoretical literatures (chapter 2), a close look at Energiewende 
(chapter 3) and the status quo regarding its innovation effect (chapter 4), as well as the 
development of a theoretical framework (chapter 5), this thesis now turns to its core part, the 
empirical investigation of the research interest, the effect of Energiewende on corporate 
innovation.  
The empirical enquiry employs an exploratory, qualitative research design and 
investigates the research interest through a series of case studies with firms of the energy 
technology value chain. While the research has been carried out through case studies, the 
presentation here proceeds not case-by-case, but according to the empirical research 
questions that guide the conceptual framework. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the research methods and process employed in 
the qualitative case studies are elaborated (section 6.1). Then, the findings of the case studies 
are presented by empirical research question with first, the development of innovation 
activities and innovation dynamics (section 6.2), second, the impact of the individual 
components of the Energiewende policy mix (section 6.3) and third, the impact of the 
confounding context factors and firm characteristics (section 6.4). 
6.1 Research methods and process 
The empirical investigation consists of exploratory case studies of companies in the energy 
technology value chain employing qualitative research methods. The use of qualitative, 
exploratory case studies to investigate a phenomenon is especially suitable if little prior 
knowledge exists and the phenomenon under study is highly complex and embedded so that 
individual variables and influencing factors cannot easily be identified. Figure 15 provides an 
overview of the research steps and the timeline associated with them from research design to 
data presentation. While the research process is depicted in terms of linear, sequential steps it 
is important to note that iterative loops between individual steps were frequent, which also 
explains their overlaps in terms of timeline. Following the definition of comparative case 
studies as the research design, a sample of firms was selected for these case studies according 
to their relevance to the research interest. Data collection mainly relied on interviews 
conducted with members of these firms, but was triangulated with public information from 
company websites, annual reports and secondary sources. The text material emerging from 
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the interviews was coded and analyzed using qualitative content analysis. The results are 
presented in this thesis not by individual case, but clustered by the elements of the theoretical 
framework (chapter 5). The following sections are organized by these research steps and 
further describe approach and methods used in each. 
 
Figure 15: Steps and timeline of the research process 
 
 
6.1.1 Research design: qualitative comparative case studies  
The empirical part employs a research design of comparative qualitative case studies of firms 
in the energy technology value chain. The firm is the unit of analysis and one firm is 
designated one case. While the investigation of each case is carried out case-specific through 
interviews and other means of data collection, cases can be compared as the particular 
dimensions specified in the theoretical framework are tracked throughout sample selection, 
data collection and data analysis. The categorization along these dimensions allows the 
investigation of similarities and differences across and within groups in an effort to be able to 
deduce results that are applicable beyond the cases in the sample  (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
This particular choice of research design and methods is appropriate (Flick, 2014, p. 
15) for the exploratory research interest of this thesis. Qualitative research has the discovery, 
exploration and creation of new knowledge as its primary objective (Flick, 2014, p. 11; 
Lamnek, 2006, p. 81). It builds on the epistemological perspective of social constructivism 
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which holds that no knowledge exists independent of the social and cognitive context in 
which it is developed and challenges the existence of neutral and objective reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966; Lamnek, 2006, p. 48). The emphasis of qualitative research is hence on 
verstehen i.e. understanding and interpreting a phenomenon under research rather than the 
testing and falsification of hypotheses that positivist research traditions rely on (Flick, 2014, 
p. 90; Lamnek, 2006, p. 216). Therefore it is especially suitable if the phenomenon under 
study is complex, cannot be captured in a simple, linear cause-effect relationship and 
therefore needs to be investigated under consideration of its context. Furthermore it can be 
applied where quantitative methods fail e.g., if there is little existing theory to build on and a 
limited availability of data because events and processes are current and ongoing. Qualitative 
research can address research questions with a focus on exploration, such as questions asking 
what, how and why (Flick, 2014, p. 150). All of these apply to the research interest of this 
thesis. Case studies are a well-documented and frequently-employed research design in 
qualitative research. The focus on a limited number of cases allows studying a phenomenon 
at a great level of detail and under consideration of the specific context it is embedded in 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009). The use of case studies to explore innovation on a firm level 
was already advocated by Schumpeter (Andersen, 2013; Schumpeter, 1947). With written 
and verbal text as the main material, qualitative empirical research departs from mathematical 
and statistical models and turns to interviews, focus groups, participant observation and 
ethnographies instead (Flick, 2014, p. 43; Lamnek, 2006, p. 266). Given the investigation of a 
social phenomenon embedded in its specific context employing qualitative research methods 
no claim to universal validity, applicability and relevance of the research findings can be 
made (Jahoda, 1989).  
The interaction between the researcher and research objects in data collection, the 
interpretive tradition in data analysis, and the fact that text material is more difficult to 
comprehend than numerical data warrant particular attention on side of the qualitative 
researcher with regards to quality assurance. This is made difficult by the fact that established 
quality criteria for quantitative research such as external, internal, and construct validity, 
reliability and objectivity are only partially applicable to the questions as well as the method 
of giving answers in qualitative research (Flick, 2014, p. 487). Thorough foundations of the 
research design and methods as well as rigorous and transparent execution of the steps of the 
research process are important to avoid allegations of bias and journalistic style (Spencer, 
Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). Three steps are taken in particular to ensure academic 
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quality in the qualitative empirical investigation in this thesis: triangulation, process 
transparency, and the reliance on established and well-documented qualitative research 
methods. First, triangulation fundamentally means taking different perspectives in research. 
Instead of relying on one source, it entails deliberately changing perspective and looking at a 
phenomenon from a different angle (Flick, 2014, p. 183). References to this will be made 
throughout the following sections. Second, process transparency is important as qualitative 
research is often lengthy, iterative and deals with verbal and written data that is harder to 
comprehend, summarize and analyze than numerical data. Also the nature of conducting 
qualitative research especially in data collection and analysis is arguably more prone to being 
unduly influenced by the researcher (Flick, 2014, p. 500). Transparency of the research 
process and reflection of biases and undue influence can certainly only enhance research 
quality. The space devoted to discussing research methods and process in this and the 
following sections, as well as a reflection of the limitations at the end of the thesis (section 
8.2) seek to establish this transparency. Lastly, throughout the decades that qualitative 
research has been carried out, researchers have developed suitable and well-documented 
methods for each step of the research process (Flick, 2014; Lamnek, 2006). The use of these 
methods will also be detailed in the following sections. 
To construct each case, material from different sources of data was sequentially 
assembled, analyzed and documented. Data from interviews conducted with members of the 
respective firms form the core of the case studies (cf. section 6.1.3). The temporal perspective 
taken was mainly retrospective focusing on the time span from the 1990s to the end of 2014. 
Depending on the interviewee's preferences and knowledge, however, shorter or longer time 
spans were investigated. The materials making up one case study include an overview of the 
firm and the interview partner(s) assembled in preparation for the interviews, the interview 
audio files, coded interview transcripts and a collection of materials from website, company 
reports and secondary sources. Materials are not included in this thesis as anonymity was a 
prerequisite to be able to get access to sensitive, non-public information such as innovation 
activities and the perception of political processes. The sanitized, coded and analyzed 
interview transcripts as well as the learnings from the other data sources form the basis for 
the findings presented later in this chapter. The individual steps of the research process will 
be detailed further in the sections below. 
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6.1.2 Sample 
Firms were selected for the case studies according to their relevance and contribution to the 
research interest. In qualitative research the selection of cases is purposive and seeks to 
establish a sample that is relevant and interesting (Patton, 2002). This is in contrast to 
quantitative research where cases are drawn randomly in order to ensure representativeness. 
No claim is hence made that the sample drawn constitutes a general representation of its 
population.  
The externally observable firm characteristics included in the conceptual framework 
(section 5.2.4) were defined as sampling dimensions:  
1. Value chain position  
a. Value chain position (energy technology and materials, electricity 
generation and transmission) 
b. Technology portfolio – range of activities (focused, diversified) 
c. Technology portfolio – sector (8 different ones defined) 
2. Industry position (incumbent, start-up) 
They define the dimensions and categories of comparison that need to be held constant in 
order to investigate within and between group differences. The assignment of firms to 
categories was done by the author using publically available information from the official 
websites. Firms founded after 1990 were classified as start-ups1. Companies with several 
business units of which at least one is not energy-related were classified as diversified.  It was 
ensured that the selection of cases studied has a sufficient variation with all categories being 
included in the sample. In addition other information and data pertaining to the sample such 
as revenue, employees and R&D expenditures were also tracked. 
Besides providing for variation on these dimensions, cases were added to the sample 
based on their substantive contribution to answering the research question. It was ensured that 
particularly relevant cases were studied incl. large and influential firms, thought leaders on 
innovation and the environment, firms with managers very vocal about their opinion on 
Energiewende, as well as firms considered laggards and inert. In this way the ambition was to 
have include typical cases as well as cases that are deviant (Patton, 2002). Naturally, access 
                                                 
1 Two exceptions to this were made. First, transmission system operators although founded in the 2000s were 
labeled incumbents since they were just carved-out from incumbent electricity suppliers. Second, one solar 
technology firm founded before 1990 was labeled start-up since its major activities only began later. 
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was critical, too. Given interviews with experienced and senior employees are the core of the 
data collection strategy, the availability for such an interview was a hard criterion for 
inclusion in the sample. More details on approach strategies and response rates will follow in 
the next section (6.1.3). Cases were added in an iterative, step-by-step manner until saturation 
occurred i.e. new cases did not add new information to the sample (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Tables 3-5 below are sampling matrices of the value chain position and the respective 
other sampling dimensions. They provide an overview of the distribution of the cases across 
these dimensions. The sample consists of 27 cases in total, 11 of which belong to different 
sectors in electricity generation and transmission and 16 of which to different sectors in 
energy technology and materials (Table 8). Of the 11 electricity generation and transmission 
firms 9 are incumbents and 2 start-ups, in energy technology and materials 11 firms are 
incumbents and 5 firms are start-ups (Table 9). All 11 electricity generation and transmission 
firms have a range of activities only focused on energy, while of the 16 energy technology 
and materials firms only 7 firms are focused and 9 firms have a diversified portfolio of 
activities (Table 10). In addition, Table 11 gives more information on the sample in terms of 
revenue, R&D expenses and percentage share of R&D of revenue. 
 
Table 8: Sampling matrix 1 (value chain position x technology portfolio – sector) 
Value chain position  Tech. (sector) # cases  
Electricity generation and transmission  Electricity supply (national) 5 
Electricity supply (municipal) 4 
Electricity transmission 2 
Energy technology and materials  Electrical and mechanical engineering 5 
Chemicals 3 
Solar technology 3 
Software and IT 2 
Heating and climate 2 
Energy efficiency services 1 
Ʃ  27 
 
Table 9: Sampling matrix 2 (value chain position x industry position) 
Value chain position Industry position # cases  
Electricity generation and transmission  Incumbent 9 
Start-up 2 
Energy technology and materials  Incumbent 11 
Start-up 5 
 Ʃ  27 
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Table 10: Sampling matrix 3 (value chain position x technology portfolio – range of activities) 
Value chain position Tech. (range) # cases  
Electricity generation and transmission  Focused 11 
Diversified 0 
Energy technology and materials  Focused 7 
Diversified 9 
Ʃ  27 
 
Table 11: Revenue and R&D expenses of firms in sample 
Indicator  Value # cases  
Revenue 2014 (€ billion)  < 1 €B 7 
1,000 – 10,000 €B 9 
10,000 – 20000  €B 5 
> 20,000 €B 6 
R&D expenses 2014 (€ million)  Not reported 8 
< 100 €M 8 
100 – 500 €M 7 
> 500 €M 4 
R&D / revenue 2014 (percent)  Not reported 8 
< 1 % 6 
1 – 5 % 9 
> 5 % 4 
 
6.1.3 Data collection 
Data collection was centered on interviews with members of the firms in the sample. 
Interviews were chosen as the preferred method of data collection because of the lack of 
publicly available data to investigate the research question, as well as the ability to enhance 
understanding through direct, contextual involvement with case study subjects. Interviews are 
a method to tap into non-public information and study a phenomenon through the lens of the 
actors involved in it. Interview data was triangulated with publicly available information 
from company websites, reports and secondary information sources. 
6.1.3.1 Episodic elite interviews as a data collection method 
Episodic interviews with corporate elites were chosen as the interview style. Episodic 
interviews combine elements of semi-structured interviews such as definitions and opinions 
with elements of narrative interviews such as stories and perceptions. As experiences are 
"stored and remembered in forms of [both] narrative-episodic and semantic knowledge" 
(Flick 2014, p. 273), this interview style was especially suitable to investigate the research 
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questions of how firms had perceived the various policy elements of Energiewende and why 
and how innovation activities had been changed as a result. An interview guide based on the 
conceptual framework contained a list topics and questions to frame the conversation (cf. 
section 6.1.3.2 below). However, openness was preserved to new and different turns in light 
of what the interviewee found relevant to share. Interviewees were particularly asked to recall 
and retell events that occurred in the past as cognition within an organization is often shared 
in terms of narratives (Augenstein & Palzkill, 2015).  
The interview targets, senior employees with significant experience in the firm, were 
defined as the "corporate elites". The classification as "elite" is a deliberate distinction to the 
"expert" interviews common in social sciences. Experts provide an opinion on a topic of 
which they possess good knowledge. They may have a comprehensive overview of a subject 
matter and can often claim a neutral, objective standpoint. In contrast to this, elites provide an 
inside-out perspective based on their personal, first-hand experience (Littig, 2008) which is 
grounded in the "privileged position [...] and [...] influence" (Richards, 1996, p. 199) they 
hold or have held. In a corporate context elites are usually identified in a "senior or middle 
management position [...] with functional responsibility [...] considerable industry experience, 
and frequently also long tenure in the company" (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & 
Tahvanainen, 2002, p. 613). Interviewing experts produces secondary data, interviewing 
elites elicits primary data. This was deemed relevant for the research question since it is 
especially the lack of primary data on an innovation effect of Energiewende that has been 
contemplated (Löschel et al., 2014c; Rennings & Rexhäuser, 2014).  
There are of course several limitations associated with interviews as a data collection 
method in general and elite interviews in particular. First, interview data is subjective as it is 
a personal account. It does not necessarily a comprehensive description of a phenomenon and 
most certainly affected by biases. Second, interviewing one or several individuals that are 
members of an organization is still only an imperfect representation of the opinions and 
cognitions of the organization as a whole. While individuals in one organization tend to think 
along similar lines, they are by no means the same (Daft & Weick, 1984). Interpretation of 
external events may vary across members of a firm and it is important to note that individual 
reflections are only an imperfect representation of a point of view that is supposed to hold for 
the entire firm. However, one can tap into corporate cognition only through its individuals. 
Third, interviewers will have an impact on the results through the questions they ask and the 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee that enfolds throughout the interview. 
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Lastly, in the context of interviewing elites time constraints on part of the interviewee and 
power asymmetries between interviewer and interviewee may in addition bear on results 
(Richards, 1996). These shortcomings were addressed through thorough preparation and post-
interview review of the results. The following sections describe the individual steps of the 
data collection process. 
6.1.3.2 Preparation and target approach 
A generic interview guide was prepared based on the conceptual framework (cf. section 5.2). 
It consisted of a list of topics to be discussed in the interviews as well as particular questions 
regarding these topics (cf. Figure 24, appendix). Despite the guide the interviews were kept 
deliberately open to develop in ways that suggested by the interviewee. This guide was first 
tested with fellow researchers and then in a test interview with a firm fitting the sampling 
criteria. Since no changes to the guide were made after the test interview it was decided to 
include the test interview case as a regular case in the research.  
Interview targets were approached between December 2014 and March 2015. Three 
different sources were used to identify targets: first, personal acquaintances; second, network 
references, third, cold calls. All targets were first contacted with customized emails 
explaining the objective of the research as well as the participation required on parts of the 
interviewee. Non-responses were followed-up by email and phone about four weeks later. In 
general responses received were very satisfactory indicating a high interest in the research 
topic. Of 50 requests, 32 individuals (64%) participated in interviews.  
Employees in lower, middle and senior level management positions, specific 
functional departments (innovation, R&D, strategy, politics), and a minimum 2 year tenure 
were considered best suited to answer the questions at hand. Exceptions to these criteria were 
made, however, where access and availability mandated to do so and the specific experience 
of interview targets was still relevant. The organizational unit that the interviewee belonged 
to was not a selection criterion, but still tracked. Table 12 provides an overview of the 
characteristics of the 32 interviewees.  
 
Table 12: Overview of interviewee characteristics 
Characteristic  # of interviewees 
Hierarchy1  Top management  11 
Middle management 17 
Lower level management 4 
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Functional department  R&D  8 
Innovation  7 
Strategy  6 
Communications  5 
Politics  4 
Sales  2 
Tenure  < 2 years  0 
2-5 yeas  8 
5-10 years  12 
>10 years  12 
Organizational unit  Central department in single business firm 16 
Central department in multi-business firm 11 
Independent company in multi-business firm 3 
Decentral business unit in multi-business firm 2 
 
1. Top management = company executives and their direct reports; Middle management = direct reports of top management; Lower level 
management = other employees with managerial function; Functional employee = employees without a managerial function  
 
In preparation of the interviews data was systematically assembled on the firm and the 
interviewee. The company website, official documents such as annual financial statements 
and sustainability reports and the internet were searched for relevant information. Documents 
and data were identified based on key words (e.g., "Energiewende", "innovation", "company 
name", "interview name") and selected based on relevance to the research questions. 
Documents were archived in case study databases. Key financial data was assembled from 
websites, annual reports, and BCG ValueScience Center, a proprietary database by The 
Boston Consulting Group, so that a database with financial and innovation-relevant data 
points case study subjects was set up. Information gained during this research process also 
served as preparation for the interviews. Figure 25 in the appendix contains an example of the 
guidelines and data sheet used in interview preparation. The generic interview guide was 
customized for each interview to be able to talk about firm-specific developments during the 
interviews (e.g., surge in R&D spent or introduction of an environmental product portfolio) 
and to challenge the information gathered during the interview process.  
6.1.3.3 Execution of the interviews 
Interviews were conducted between January 2015 and June 2016 in person or over the phone. 
In four instances more than one person was interviewed per firm. These were very large firms 
where it was deemed useful to speak with more than one person in order to capture different 
nuances of responses. In two instances, interviewees preferred to be interviewed in pairs 
rather than individually, so 30 interviews were conducted in total. A roughly equal share of 
cases as well as interviews was maintained across the two value chain steps considered (cf. 
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Table 13). A full list of interviews and interviewees including title, type of firm and date of 
the interview can be found in Table 17 in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 13: Cases, interviews, and interviewees by value chain position 
Value chain position  # cases # interviews  # interviewees 
Electricity generation and transmission  11 13  13 
Energy technology and materials  16 17  19 
Ʃ 27 30  32 
 
 Personal interviews in the interviewees' offices were preferred, but not always possible to 
schedule due to time constraints and the geographical dispersion of the interview targets 
across Germany. Therefore of 30 interviews, 18 (63%) were conducted over the phone. 
Language of the interviews was German since that was the mother tongue of all participants. 
Interviews were scheduled for 60-90 minutes, depending on the interviewee's availability. 
Average interview time was 72 minutes. Interviewees were guaranteed full anonymity, 
control over the data used for research (through review and editing rights to the interview 
transcript) and access to research results. With the consent of the interviewees all interviews 
(100%) were recorded, although the recording device failed in two instances. 
6.1.3.4 Follow-up and processing 
After the interviews impressions were captured in terms of interview memos, and interview 
data was prepared for analysis. Information provided during the interviews was double-
checked with publically available information and the documents and data assembled in the 
preparation of the interview. Interview records were transcribed between May 2015 and 
October 2015. Transcription was conducted using the transcription rules described by Flick 
(2014, p. 389 ff). Transcriptions are word-by-word of all parts of the interviews relevant to 
the research questions i.e. omitting irrelevant episodes such as introductory small talk. 
Omissions are indicated in the transcripts. Interviews were made anonymous in the process of 
transcription. Placeholders were substituted for names of individuals, products, firms and 
organizational units. In total 29 hours and 42 minutes of audio material were transcribed to 
428 pages of text. In the two instances where technical failure prevented audio recording, 
extended interview memos were drafted instead of transcripts. Interviewees were sent the 
transcribed document (or interview memo) to review. Only 7 interviewees made minor edits 
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(single words, clarification of names, times) to the respective documents, no statements were 
substantively changed. 
6.1.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis was conducted using the transcribed interviews as text material and the content 
structuring technique of qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000, 2012) as main method. 
Qualitative content analysis is a systematic, but flexible approach to analyze qualitative data 
by reducing its complexity (Flick 2014, p. 430). The analysis was assisted by the qualitative 
data analysis tool Atlas.TI. 
First, a list of initial codes was drafted based on the theoretical research framework. 
Second, using this list, the transcribed interviews were coded paragraph-by-paragraph with, 
in a first step, automatic assignment of codes using key words and, in a second step, manual 
review of the automatic coding through reading the transcribed interviews in full, checking if 
codes were assigned appropriately or if codes were missing, and re-assigning codes if 
necessary. Third, as the result of the review the initial list of codes was extended and 
changed. Fourth, the analysis proceeded by going through the codes sequentially and 
reviewing the paragraphs associated with them. Paragraphs were read and re-read, compared, 
organized and the essence of their meaning extracted. Sometimes sub-categories were 
developed for a code. Fifth, extracts and codes were woven together for data presentation and 
in the course of writing this thesis it was decided which of the paragraphs associated with a 
code would best illustrate the claim made before. 
6.2 Innovation activities and the development of innovation dynamics  
This section presents the findings of the case studies on how Energiewende has affected 
innovation activities in the energy technology value chain. It is the answer to the empirical 
research question: 
 
How have German firms over time changed their innovation activities in the light of 
Energiewende? 
 
The case studies provide a comprehensive understanding of the innovation dynamics in the 
context of Energiewende in Germany. They show that significant changes to the innovation 
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activities of the companies surveyed have taken place over the time period studied. The 
dynamics are presented here in terms of the three categories of innovation activities 
distinguished in the conceptual framework (cf. section 5.2.1): exploration, development and 
implementation, adoption, and organizational change. This provides a deep insight into how 
firms coped with Energiewende and addressed it through their innovation activities over time. 
It is investigated what changes occurred, when they occurred, which firms or types of firms 
were affected by and drove these changes and why they acted in a particular way.  
Throughout the analysis, the results presented are induced from the case study 
materials and stay close to the information provided especially during the interviews. Direct 
quotations from the interviews are therefore used to illustrate the claims and results. While 
the identity of the source of the quote is concealed, it is indicated what type of firm a quote 
comes from in terms of market position (start-up v. incumbent), range of activities (focused 
v. diversified) and value chain position (energy generation and transmission v. energy 
technology and materials) and/or sector (e.g., energy supply, chemicals) employing the 
categories defined in section 6.1.2. This is important contextual information and also testifies 
to the impact of firm characteristics, which will be elaborated in more detail in section 6.4.2 
in the subsequent chapter.  
6.2.1 Exploration, development and implementation 
The case studies show that Energiewende relevant exploration, development and 
implementation has been carried out by firms in Germany over the past decades and that they 
have exhibited several changes of dynamics over time. As activities and dynamics vary 
significantly across the technologies and applications relevant in the context of 
Energiewende, the analysis is structured along different meaningful groups that emerged 
through the interviews: renewable energy generation and supply, conventional energy 
generation and supply, energy consumption and efficiency, smart grid and energy 
management, and energy storage.    
6.2.1.1 Renewable energy generation and supply 
The case studies provide evidence for the common perception that renewable energy sources 
(RES) in general, and technology for the generation of electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E) in particular, are among the most important target areas for innovation 
activities in the context of Energiewende. RES was a topic that featured prominently in every 
130  
 
case study with participants emphasizing their activities in the area, but also shortcomings 
and restraints they have or have had in the past. 
6.2.1.1.1 Early development and retreat to niche 
A first push to explore and develop technology for energy supply from RES occurred in the 
1970s to 1990s following the oil crisis. Especially incumbent energy technology firms and 
some electricity suppliers started conducting research, development and demonstration 
(R&D) for various RES technologies incl. wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) and hence laid 
the foundations of these technologies today.  
The major driving factor behind these early activities was the perceived risk to the 
supply of crude oil as an energy source that was triggered by the first oil crisis. The oil price 
spikes of the mid-1970s to early 1980s (cf. Figure 16) sparked an interest in developing 
alternatives sources of energy supply. Furthermore, such investments were promoted by 
public funding for R&D through the German federal government's Energy Research Program 
(Energieforschungsprogramm) and other public funding initiatives for research in 
renewables. The Energy Research Program was initiated in 1974 against the backdrop of the 
oil crisis as the first policy instrument with the explicit objective to support innovation in 
energy technology (cf. section 3.2).  
- "In the 1970s with the […] oil crisis, that is when we started exploring 
renewable energy." (interview 23-1, incumbent foc. heating tech firm) 
- "We started to invest [in R&D] when politics started to become interested in 
alternative energy. Of course we also reacted to the research subsidies […]." 
(interview 2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
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Figure 16: Crude oil price 1968 - 2015 real and nominal 
 
Source: Own graphic with data from EIA (2016) 
 
As the oil price resumed to pre-crisis level in the mid-1980s also the perceived need 
for alternative energy sources declined. Incumbent energy technology and electricity supply 
firms with the majority of their business in conventional generation did not anticipate a 
sufficiently large market anymore. Public research subsidies for RES decreased in the late 
1980s. As a result incumbent firms often discontinued activities or continued them at a low 
level to serve the pro-environmental public opinion that had emerged from the environmental 
movements:  
- "We developed solar thermal systems [and other technologies]. […] However, 
that was still rather crude because subsidies stopped at some point […] and oil 
got cheaper again." (interview 23-1, incumbent foc. heating tech firm) 
- "We had a wind power plant for testing and demonstration [in the 1990s], but 
this was rather for PR reasons." (interview 7-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
However, besides the incumbent energy technology firms and electricity suppliers, a 
bunch of new firms with an exclusive focus on renewables were founded in the 1908s and 
1990s.  Often these new firms emerged from university research institutes and were a step 
towards commercializing the technological progress achieved there, or were driven by 
entrepreneurs with the vision of a green energy future. These start-up firms tended to 
continue their research activities even when the incumbents dropped out as they expected a 
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market for RES technology in the long run and were incentivized with a strong intrinsic 
motive of green energy supply.  
- "Energy transition was actually the vision when we were founded; to be able 
to supply from 100% renewable sources" (interview 13-1, start-up foc. solar 
tech. firm). 
They made investments into the development of RES technology, thereby improving 
its performance and lowering production costs. Significant progress was achieved although 
the rate of improvement was limited due to financial constraints. One interviewee argued that 
the technological development observed in renewable energy technology would not have 
been possible without these "medium-sized enterprises and firms that were just start-ups 15 to 
20 years ago" (interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm). 
6.2.1.1.2 Market growth and mainstreaming 
It was only in the early 2000s that incumbent energy technology and electricity supply firms 
rediscovered RES as a viable business and revived their exploration, development and 
implementation activities. While electricity suppliers contributed towards innovation 
especially through the investment in adoption and consequential diffusion of RES technology 
(cf. section 6.2.2.1), energy technology firms focused on business development and 
technological improvement. Start-up firms only active in renewables expanded their business, 
incumbent energy technology firms started to create new business areas around RES 
technology through organic growth or acquisitions. They also invested into expanding the 
respective areas by developing their RES product offering and conducting R&D.  
The major reason for this resurgence was the increasing demand for energy from RES 
and RES technology and the vast global market potential expected in the medium and long 
term. Throughout the 1990s the large energy technology firms had observed the RES market, 
but considered it too small to participate and left it to niche actors and start-ups. It was only 
when the potential of the market rose around 2000 that they got interested again. A global 
market offered sufficient revenue potential and globally active energy technology firms 
considered their ability to provide high quality technology globally as a strength and 
competitive advantage in comparison to niche players.  
The rising market potential was to a large extent politically-induced. The concern 
about climate change and other environmental effects of fossil fuels had developed into a 
global trend. In an effort to combat it, government around the world set up targets and 
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incentive schemes for the deployment of RES technology around 2000. Of this global market, 
Germany made up a significant part, but was still one of many. While it was driven by the 
attractive feed-in tariff installed through the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare 
Energien Gesetz, EEG), Germany's limited endowments especially in terms of wind and solar 
irradiation, provided an alleged natural constraint to market growth. The energy technology 
firms surveyed emphasize their global perspective and consequently the global market 
potential as the relevant factor in their investment decision for both business development 
and R&D. 
- "In order for us to enter, an emerging industry [such as RES] needs to reach 
the point where the expected market potential can no longer be exploited by 
[small niche players]. When they hit their limits regarding processes, global 
reach, quality, or financing. That was around 2001 and 2002" (interview 10-1, 
incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm).  
- "[The EEG did] not really drive [our entry into wind] because we have always 
had a view on the world market.  […] It was rather the whole political outlook 
on renewables and an energy transition, internationally, that provided 
confidence that the global market […] will develop. " (interview 10-1, 
incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
For many incumbent energy technology firms in the case studies, the entry into RES 
technology was impaired by their existing capabilities and resources as well as a cognitive 
bias towards the established business with conventional energy technology. These factors 
influenced the decision to start investing as well as the choice of renewable technology to 
invest in. First, the resources and capabilities which they possessed and which were 
successful in the conventional energy business were not considered useful for RES. This 
applies to internal technological capabilities, knowledge and organizational structures, but 
also to the established business networks and customer base. The target customers for 
conventional and renewable technology differ significantly. While the conventional energy 
technology customers tend to be few, large firms, the latter ones are many, small firms or 
private customers, requiring a different sales and marketing strategy. Second, the nature of 
RES with their low energy density and consequently the need to supply energy from many 
small-scale sources instead of large central plants was per definition considered inefficient 
and for that reason not viable to develop into a proper market. A "this cannot work anyway"-
attitude was common. This bias is why it was for most companies easier to invest in wind 
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rather than solar PV. Wind technology was much closer than PV to the business of 
conventional fossil-fuelled power plants due to comparatively larger capacities, low 
generation costs and an industrial rather than residential customer base.  
- "We wanted to get away from fossil fuels. […] We just did not find a way to 
enter that PV market, the internal barrier was our inability to define a unique 
selling point. […] We used to say "well, wind turbines spin", so that is not too 
different to our conventional generators" (interview 2-2, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm).  
- "We are very happy in our role as a supplier [in business-to-business 
transactions]" (interview 25-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical 
engineering firm). "With wind, especially offshore, it's always large industrial 
clients. That suits us" (interview 2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical 
engineering firm).   
In addition to skepticism regarding the viability of the technology and associated 
business model, the established technology and materials firms were also wary to get into 
businesses that they felt were overly influenced by politics and hence oversubsidized. 
Markets that were dependent on revenues not sustained by market forces were considered too 
risky. While this is surprising given that the electricity industry as major customer base for 
energy technology has been regulated and in fact often state-owned since its foundation, 
several case study participants stressed this aspect. To a certain extent this conviction was 
abandoned as the market entries did take place, but caution was maintained and a future 
without subsidies anticipated in the planning process. 
- "We had something almost like a dogma, definitely in the 1990s, but also 
afterwards in the 2000s […]. We don't go into subsidized markets." (interview 
2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)  
- "If my business case depends on returns that are not generated by market 
mechanisms I run a portfolio risk. […] This is not sustainable from a business 
perspective and that is why we are strictly against it." (interview 21-1, 
incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "That's too volatile, too insecure. […] We would of course still gather 
experience with pilots and small projects, [but not make a full market entry]." 
(interview 2-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)  
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- "This only changed when we entered wind. […] [However,] we also held the 
opinion that wind was the first technology that would work without subsidies." 
(interview 2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)  
While the global market growth was critical for investments into R&D in the first 
place, the case studies also reveal that it created a certain tension between investing in 
technological development and investing in production capacity. This was found to be the 
case especially in solar PV1, an industry that went through a boom-and-bust cycle in the 
2000s. While the solar PV market has expanded globally since 2000, dynamics have varied 
across countries. Germany, which constituted more than 50% of the world market for most of 
the 2000s, had a boom after 2003 with growth rates well beyond 100% per year. Installations 
reached peaks of around 7 GW each year in the years 2010 to 2012, only to break down by 
50% each year in the subsequent years 2013 and 2014. Italy and Spain experienced similar 
cycles. These countries had seen the installation of subsidy schemes that incentivized 
residential and small scale installation of RES-E technology with an attractive and secure 
feed-in-tariff (FIT) and therefore accounted for the high number of installations demanded in 
Germany most noteworthy through the Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (EEG). Subsequent cuts 
in the subsidies because of the 2008 financial crisis and rising criticism caused a market crash 
after 2012. As the European market faded, growth was picked up, however, by China and 
Japan, who today make up 25% of the world market each with capacity additions of around 
10 GW per year (compare Figure 17).  
                                                 
1 It should, however, be noted that solar technology is the only area of RES where focused firms were 
investigated in this empirical enquiry.   
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Figure 17: Annually installed solar PV capacity by country 2000 - 2014  
 
Sources: Own calculations based on IRENA (2015), EPIA (2009) and IEA PVPS (2012) 
 
The turmoil of the solar industry affected successes and failures of industry 
participants as well as exploration, development and implementation activities in the 
industry. The high growth rates in solar PV installations in the 2000s sparked industry-wide 
investments in production capacity to reap the benefits of market growth through higher 
sales. Euphoria was high as standalone solar technology firms as well as solar subsidiaries of 
diversified engineering companies were doing well. Indeed R&D expenses dropped in 
relation to sales for most firms surveyed between 2007 and 2010. Hence when demand was at 
peak some firms tended to exploit the current market opportunities instead of continuing to 
invest in R&D at the same rate as before.  
- "We were completely sold out in 2009/10, there were not enough solar 
modules in the market. […] That is why we started a massive investment 
program [in manufacturing] in 2010." (interview 19-1, start-up foc. solar tech. 
firm)  
-  "There was a phase in which many of the established PV start-ups […] were 
intoxicated [by their success]. However, with success and alleged stability, 
money was squandered. […] Large parties were thrown and money invested in 
everything from headquarters to sales networks to factories all over the world. 
[…] Completely inefficient and at the expense of the core technology." 
(interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm)  
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 In addition, Chinese firms emerged as competitors adding production capacity and 
putting downward pressure on costs. Technological know-how especially around machinery 
and production processes had spilled from Western companies and was put to use. "We 
produced in China and transferred know-how to our partner, until they did not need us 
anymore," describes a solar PV manager (interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm). Soon 
global production capacity was about twice as large as global demand and prices dropped in 
light of the massive overcapacities. PV module performance of comparatively higher-cost 
producers in Europe and North America was not sufficiently superior to justify higher costs. 
In addition, module prices dropped below product costs. Many solar firms saw their 
competitive edge fade away. Diversified firms exited the market. Specialized solar PV firms 
stayed if their financial situation permitted them to do so. 
- "We are good at bringing products to industrial scale […] large quantities, 
good quality, competitive prices. However, it turned out that solar cells could 
not be sufficiently differentiated. We were unable to produce significantly 
better solar cells than a low cost provider. That led to our exit [in 2013]." 
(interview 25-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)  
- "As a pure PV player we are only able to do PV. We cannot act like a 
corporate and [disinvest]" (interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm)  
The firms that stayed in the market with a view on its long-term potential re-installed 
their investments in technological improvements. R&D intensity picked up again after 2011.  
6.2.1.2 Conventional energy generation and supply 
The case studies reveal that besides expanding into renewables, incumbent energy technology 
firms as well as electricity suppliers continued to invest in the exploration, development and 
implementation of conventional, fossil-fuel based energy technology. Activities in this area 
were highest in the mid 2000s and the focus was on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions through increasing the efficiency of conventional generation and preventing GHG 
from getting into the atmosphere.  
6.2.1.2.1 Exploration of carbon capture, utilization and storage 
Investments into the exploration of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCS) surged in 
the mid- to late-2000s. Firms from all steps and sectors of the energy technology value chain 
showed interest and invested in R&D for CCS. Similar to the development in RES 
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technology, these investments were especially driven by the global market demand expected 
for CCS technology. The threat of climate change had become a mainstream societal concern 
in the mid 2000s. Politicians around the globe were devising policies to prevent it and as a 
consequence firms were anticipating a market potential in all areas relevant to reducing CO2 
emissions, not only the previously discussed RES. Especially the adoption of emissions 
trading in several countries, including the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 
forged expectations that CO2 emitted into the atmosphere would be priced in the future and 
therefore the demand for technology to prevent such emissions would rise.  
- "Climate change and global warming were important topics." (interview 7-1, 
incumbent foc. national electricity supplier). 
In addition to market potential, the reason why many firms were fond of CCS was 
because it addressed the problem of carbon emissions without changing the traditional, fossil 
energy sources coal, oil and gas. Therefore fundamentals of the energy industry regarding 
customer base, industry structure and technological basics would remain unaffected. This 
indicates the same bias towards conventional energy because of resources and capabilities as 
well as cognition that prevented incumbent energy technology firms to invest in RES. 
Especially for industry participants with reservations towards renewables, CCS constituted an 
alternative way to combat climate change. CCS testing and demonstration plants were 
constructed, often in vertical collaboration between technology or materials firms and 
electricity suppliers. 
- "From around 2006 we invested increasingly in CCS." (interview 7-1, incumbent 
foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "The peak [of our R&D investments] was between 2009 and 2011." (interview 20-
1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
Lastly, the development of CCS technology was supported by public research funds in 
Germany as well as the EU. 
However, CCS lost its allure and investments ceased when carbon prices of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme dropped during the financial crisis in 2008/09 and 
stayed low due to low demand and overly generous allocations of permission permits. 
Furthermore, tests had been less successful than expected and political standards got stricter 
due to safety concerns. In Germany this route is today considered closed and also 
internationally the business prospects seem slim. 
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- "We were heavily engaged in technologies to reduce carbon emissions. We 
developed CCS and would have been able […] to provide customers with 
solutions. [But then the market did not come]." (interview 2-2, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm)   
- "We realized in 2012 that CCS […] is not a global topic and will only work in a 
few markets. […] In Germany it was replaced by energy storage." (interview 20-1, 
incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "We dismissed CCS […]. It is not sustainable to put CO2 in tanks […]. And the 
locations where CO2 is produced are not good places to put it in the ground. These 
are reasons for us to say, if we want to get rid of CO2, we need to do that 
differently." (interview 21-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm).  
- "We have reduced CCS to observer status. […] It is not a solution for us because 
we cannot imagine to have the right political framework to be able to finance the 
large investments required […]. Nobody in the energy industry will invest in this." 
(interview 6-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
6.2.1.3 Energy consumption and efficiency 
Not only on the generation, but also on the consumption side, exploration, development and 
implementation envisaged changes in dynamics in the context of Energiewende. The case 
studies show that while energy efficiency has always been an important topic for the internal 
processes of firms, especially in energy-intensive industries, the strive to improve processes 
and develop products for enhanced energy efficiency in various applications got a new 
dynamic in the mid- and late 2000s.   
6.2.1.3.1 Improving the energy efficiency of products and processes 
The first deliberate attempts to increase the energy efficiency of products and processes were 
made after the oil crisis in the 1970s. Energy technology firms in a variety of areas became 
conscious of energy consumption and initiated R&D and other activities to find ways to 
become more energy-efficient in their products and processes. Process improvements might 
involve organizational change, e.g., through improved energy management procedures and 
rules, and are often not formally defined as research projects, which means expenses are not 
tracked in R&D. 
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 As energy constitutes a cost factor in the production process as well as in the lifetime 
usage of a product, reducing the energy required clearly provides an innovation incentive to 
companies due to the cost savings expected to be achieved. In industries where the largest 
part of energy consumption occurs during the production phase, firms focus on the energy 
efficiency of their production process. For products that are energy-intensive during their 
lifetime, the focus lies on reducing energy consumption of that product.  
- "Energy efficiency has always been important and will always be important, 
particularly in industries where energy constitutes a large part of the costs." 
(interview 10-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)  
- "In our opinion energy efficiency has always been an important driver." (interview 
8-1, incumbent foc. heating tech firm) 
The major driver in the 1970s was that the price of oil and other fuels was high 
following the oil crises and customers were increasingly considering energy costs in their 
decision to purchase products. Demand for energy-efficient products was hence expected to 
increase. In addition, public funds for exploring possibilities to reduce fuel consumption 
became available, especially since the introduction of energy consumption as one 
development area in the second Energy Research Program of the German federal government 
in 1981.  
With regards to recent dynamics, many firms note that the importance of energy 
efficiency in product development and internal processes rose noticeably in the mid to late 
2000s. Particularly noteworthy is the components and materials sector, where the chemical 
firms surveyed increased energy-related R&D expenditures and even set up special research 
units for energy topics incl. energy efficiency. As an energy-intensive industry, the chemical 
industry has traditionally been conscious about the security as well as the costs of its energy 
supply. However, since the mid 2000s the importance of the topic rose even more and energy 
topics in general, and energy efficiency in particular, did also come to be regarded in terms of 
a business opportunity. The main reason behind energy efficiency's surge in importance for 
chemical companies was the expected increasing global demand for energy efficient 
products. Once again the global political initiatives to reduce GHG emissions as well as the 
expectation and fear of higher energy costs triggered investments in R&D. In all of this 
German politics and the German market were important, but the companies surveyed agreed 
that they defined their market on a global scale. 
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- "We founded a [research centre] for energy efficiency [in 2008] […] and have 
since then developed and […] launched products. […] Addressing our own 
internal energy consumption because it reduces costs is a relatively new 
addition to our activities." (interview 21-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm)    
- "We are looking at energy in two ways […] traditionally as a factor of 
production […] and for a couple of years now as a business opportunity." 
(interview 24-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "Reducing our energy consumption has always been a topic […] and an area 
of activity, but it got an additional push through [global energy transitions]. 
We are providing more internal funds now for research in order to stay at the 
forefront." (interview 26-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm)  
In general, a combination of factors has influenced these dynamics in energy 
efficiency. First, the potential for cost savings is an important motivation discussed several 
times, although no interviewee has explicitly mentioned rising energy prices as a driver for 
the recent dynamics. Moreover, the European and German long term targets for a reduction 
of the overall energy consumption as well as regulation around energy efficiency such as 
standards, labels and certification requirements have triggered investments. Lastly, the 
availability of public funds for R&D has driven energy efficiency invention and 
implementation on the product side.  
- "[German and European] energy efficiency targets […] are the foundation of 
our business. […]The European commitment to energy efficiency with the 
ERP directive was critical. The topic would not have been tabled in Germany 
otherwise." (interview 12-1, start-up foc. energy efficiency services provider) 
- "The ERP directive […] mandates us to only use very energy efficient or 
renewable technologies in Europe. […] This occupies product development." 
(interview 8-1, incumbent foc. heating tech firm) 
- "Framework conditions change from one day to the next. […] That is not 
investment security." (interview 12-1, start-up foc. energy efficiency services 
provider) 
- "Markets have been created that do not work because of economic criteria, but 
because of bureaucratic ones, [energy management systems and certification 
requirements, for example]." (interview 25-1, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
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6.2.1.3.2 Energy efficiency as a service business 
In addition to energy efficiency in physical products and processes, energy efficiency also 
emerged as a service business from the mid 2000s onwards. Firms that provide energy 
efficiency services give advice how to reduce the costs of energy consumption and design 
and implement technological as well as non-technological solutions to this end. Clients of 
such services can range from large industrial firms to individual households. Electricity is not 
the only form of energy that energy efficiency firms target with their service offering; also 
heating and cooling or the provision of gas and steam is part of the portfolios. 
Incumbent electricity suppliers and energy technology firms have expanded into this 
business area increasingly since the mid 2000s, often by setting up specific departments or 
business units for this service. In addition start-ups have also been founded for specifically 
that purpose. For incumbent firms energy efficiency services tend to complement their 
physical product offering and serve their existing customer base: Electricity suppliers, esp. 
the municipal ones, typically focus on residential and small commercial clients, the energy 
efficiency consulting units of energy technology firms cater to industrial and large 
commercial clients.  
Invention and implementation in energy efficiency does not take the form of 
developing a specific technology, but rather to find better ways of linking technological 
products in an effort to develop solutions to make energy supply and usage more efficient. As 
such not all firms do technological R&D, but instead attribute their innovation activities to 
developing non-technological solutions for clients often through business development or 
project-specific work. 
- "We founded an energy services company in 2012 [following a project-based 
exploration of decentral energy management since about 2009]. […] Our 
business is to develop rules, criteria and simulations to support [energy 
efficiency in] the value chain." (interview 25-1, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
Invention in energy efficiency, esp. where it is concerned with process improvement 
and the developing of consulting services may not be reflected in R&D expenses.  
The drivers behind business development and innovation in energy efficiency services 
are very similar to those for energy efficiency in products and processes; mainly pressure to 
reduce energy costs because of the expectation of higher energy prices and regulation. 
However, energy efficiency service providers stress the role of politics even more than firms 
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that are focused on increasing the energy efficiency of their products and processes do. 
Especially the legal requirement to implement a certified energy management system in order 
to be exempted from contributions to the financing mechanism (EEG Umlage) of the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act created a sudden boost for energy efficiency consulting 
overnight when it was first implemented in 2014. 
6.2.1.4 Smart grid and energy management 
So far the discussion of exploration, development and implementation in the context of 
Energiewende has only focused on energy supply and energy demand. However, the case 
studies reveal that from the mid 2000s onwards the focus of innovation activities shifted 
increasingly from supply and demand towards the link between the two and the energy 
system as a whole.  
This systemic perspective on energy gained importance as the consequences of high 
electricity generation from renewables became apparent throughout the 2000s. Generation 
had become more decentral with thousands of small-scale producers of electricity from 
renewable energy sources. Electricity consumers had turned into "prosumers" who take 
electricity from the grid as well as feed into it hence requiring additional functionality from a 
grid network that was originally installed only for the distribution of electricity. Furthermore, 
the volatility of the supply of electricity from renewables and the geographical divergence 
between centers of supply and demand put a strain on the transmission grids and increased 
the call for changes to the system. In addition to adding capacity to the physical grid 
infrastructure (cf. section 6.2.2.3) and developing energy storage solutions (cf. section 
6.2.1.5), the answers were sought through exploring better ways to manage the amount and 
timing of electricity fed in, transported with and taken out of the existing grid and. 
There is a variety of terms to describe the methods, approaches and tools to this end, 
incl. smart grid, energy management, virtual power plant, demand side management and 
demand response. The terms are overlapping and often not mutually exclusive.  However, 
with the exception of improved physical grid technology (cf. section 6.2.1.4.1) they all refer 
to information technology (IT) based products that have data processing as a central element. 
The objective of all is to increase the reliability, flexibility and efficiency of the electricity 
grid network. Firms active in this area include incumbent and start-up energy technology 
firms and electricity suppliers, but also firms that are traditionally not active in the energy 
technology value chain, such as IT and high tech companies. 
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Smart grid and energy management technology has applications for the electricity grid 
directly, as well as for electricity generation and consumption i.e. the supply and demand 
sides. Rather than changes to methods and absolute amounts of electricity production and 
consumption, energy management is concerned with the timing of electricity supply and 
demand in an effort to increase flexibility. Being able to adjust patterns of electricity 
production and consumption may alleviate strains on the electricity grid and reduce the risk 
of blackouts.  
6.2.1.4.1 Managing grid capacity and utilization and improving grid technology 
Energy technology firms as well as energy materials firms started to invest in R&D for 
developing improvements to the grid in the mid 2000s, often in collaboration with 
distribution system operators (DSOs) and transmission system operators (TSOs) as system 
operators are directly affected by the changing requirements of the energy infrastructure 
brought about by the energy transition. New functions and applications were aimed at making 
grids fit to cope with decentral electricity feed-in, fluctuations in the supply of electricity 
from renewables, and geographical divergences between centers of supply and demand.  
Software plays an important role in that respect. Software for grid management can 
help address many restrictions of transmission and distribution grids and is cost-efficient 
compared to extending or renewing the physical grid infrastructure. Software can for example 
improve grid utilization as close monitoring and management of the grid decreases the safety 
margin needed to run it without a risk of excessive heat or voltage. This can ease the capacity 
restrictions of transmission grids, which can occur when large amounts of electricity need to 
be transported from a place of production to place of consumption. 
- "Since the first EEG [in 2000] we have been actively observing the system. 
[…] Since the mid 2000s […] we have developed [software] to be able to 
better cope with the feed-in of renewable energy, the volatility of generation, 
bottlenecks in long-distance electricity transmission and running grids at 
maximum capacity. Information technology is key to control these." (interview 
1-1, incumbent div. software/IT firm) 
The reasons for seeking to develop ways to improve the grid can be found in the 
changing demands to the grid infrastructure that emerged over time. Manifestations of this 
change came in terms of incidences of capacity restrictions, overvoltages and blackouts. A 
blackout across Europe in November 2006 when a shutdown of a major transmission line 
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incidental with high electricity generation from wind power caused an overloading of the 
remaining transmission lines was by one interviewee noted as an eye-opening event for 
finding ways to improve grid performance. TSOs and DSOs have to address such changes as 
they are by law required to provide grid access and ensure grid stability. Energy technology 
and materials firms hence saw a market demand developing from TSOs and DSOs in 
Germany, but also in other countries that are going through a similar energy transition with 
decentral generation and renewable energy. In addition, as electricity grids provide a service 
to the wider public, R&D in these areas was often supported by public funds. 
In addition to grid management, however, energy technology and materials firms also 
started to explore ways to improve the physical substance of the grid through using different 
materials or components in power lines and interconnectors.  
- "About 2.5 years ago [in 2012/2013] […] we looked at the electricity value 
chain […] and realized there are areas where a technological leap forward is 
possible […] and has significant business potential. […] One area is efficient 
power transmission with superconductors." (interview 24-1, incumbent div. 
chemicals firm) 
6.2.1.4.2 Supply side energy management 
On the supply side, energy technology firms and electricity suppliers develop solutions to 
manage decentral, renewable electricity generation capacity. So-called virtual power plants 
(VPPs) pool several small-scale power generation units in order manage them in an 
integrated way. Management includes the operation of the power units and the marketing of 
electricity output in an effort to maximize returns of the pooled capacity. The amount of 
electricity fed into the gird can be varied depending on electricity price signals e.g., to benefit 
from high prices in times of supply shortage or to avoid penalties when actual electricity 
production diverges from planned electricity deliveries as may especially be the case in terms 
of fluctuating RES. Generation units can usually be accessed from remote, switched on or 
off, or electricity be diverted to or extracted from storage if storage units are integrated as 
well. VPPs can consist of only renewable generation capacity, a mix between renewable and 
conventional, or conventional only. Very often gas-based power plants are integrated into 
VPPs, especially such combined heat and power (CHP) plants where the primary purpose is 
to provide heat and electricity is just a by-product. 
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Incumbent and start-up energy technology firms and electricity suppliers began to 
develop VPP applications around 2010. Some account for these development costs in R&D, 
but many firms do not. First market launches of the resulting products and services started 
around 2013/2014. Interviewees confirm that there is a lot of activity in the market, but that 
no dominant players or business models have emerged yet. Three applications of VPPs are 
currently being explored in particular: VPP as a software or platform, VPP as a service 
offering and VPP for internal optimization and cost reductions. 
First, firms from several backgrounds such as software and IT companies, dedicated 
energy technology start-ups, but also electricity suppliers are developing the software or 
platform needed to manage a VPP in order to license it to customers.  
- "We developed [software for VPP applications] very early on […]. But only since 
2014 we are finally in the position to have relevant pilot customers […] as the 
topic is developing speed. […] Grid operators have extended their control systems 
to involve VPP functions […], also independent [non energy] players are active." 
(interview 1-1, incumbent div. software/IT firm) 
- "We are offering our tool to third parties […]. This is a major step towards 
software solution." (interview 18-1, start-up foc. national electricity supplier) 
Second, firms who have developed and operate a VPP use it to provide a management 
and marketing service to owners and operators of power plants:  
- "We are offering […] to take over resource planning and electricity marketing. 
[…] Plants are […] often erected especially for the provision of heat; the 
electricity is supposed to be marketed as profitable as possible on top of that" 
(interview 18-1, start-up foc. national electricity supplier).  
- "We are offering this as a service to our large and industrial customers" (interview 
4-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier).  
For electricity suppliers, this offering often emerged from previous services such 
contracting, electricity trading or direct marketing of RES-E volumes. Contracting denotes 
the physical operation and management of power plants on behalf of their owners, often 
manufacturing firms and industrial parks. This is a core service offering especially of 
municipal electricity providers. Electricity marketing and trading involves the provision of 
market access, risk management and portfolio optimization services, all capabilities necessary 
since traded electricity markets developed after liberalization in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Trading floors are typically operated only by the national electricity suppliers and 
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larger municipal ones who then take over the respective services for smaller players on a 
contractual basis. Provisions for the direct marketing (Direktvermarktung) of RES electricity 
i.e. without selling it to the transmission systems operator (TSO) were installed in the EEG 
2012 amendment as way to introduce market mechanisms into the promotion of RES-E 
technology and decrease the dependence on outright subsidies. Owners of RES-E generation 
capacity need access to electricity markets in order to benefit from the guaranteed market 
premium and often rely on electricity suppliers with such access for that service. 
- "The hard thing about VPPs is […] the technical interface. Qualification of the power 
plants, connecting them physically, the information technology bit. Explaining the 
customer what remote direct access means." (interview 15-1, incumbent foc. 
municipal electricity supplier) 
- "Intelligent portfolio management is the essence [of VPPs]. We have been doing that 
for some time. It has emerged step-by-step since we developed energy trading in the 
early 2000s. […] The only novelty is now, that one has to be able to even more 
directly access and remote control the operation of customers' plants." (interview 4-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "We take on RES production capacity that falls under the EEG. This works especially 
well with wind, because the plants can be controlled from remote and are therefore 
easily regulated and pooled. […] We have been doing this basically since the 
introduction of the market premium in 2012. […] The VPP is reality so-to-speak." 
(interview 6-2, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
Third, firms use VPPs to manage the fluctuations from their own RES-E generation 
and smooth them out before electricity is fed into the grid in order to increase compliance 
with the pattern of electricity supply communicated to TSOs in the planning phase:  
- "Our focus is on [reconciling] fluctuating wind energy with [our commitments 
to deliver electricity into the grid]. […] To avoid the financial risk from 
penalty payments and […] to address fluctuations in the electricity supply in 
general" (interview 17-1, start-up foc. national electricity supplier). 
The main reason to develop VPPs was hence the perceived market demand from 
network operators and electricity suppliers to find a solution for managing decentral 
generation capacity in an integrated manner and better address the fluctuations from RES-E. 
Firms surveyed with a geographic focus on Germany emphasize the consequences of the 
German energy transition as the root cause of this need, while firms with global activities 
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proclaim similar needs across several countries. In addition to the change of the energy 
system as such, this demand was furthermore supported by systemic regulation that penalizes 
non-compliance with electricity schedules planned in accordance with the grid accounting 
and planning system (Bilanzkreismanagement). These penalties set a financial incentive to 
develop a solution for flexibility and improved compliance with the planning system. 
6.2.1.4.3 Demand side energy management 
Also on the demand side there are business activities to increase the flexibility of energy 
consumption. These activities are usually called demand side management or demand 
response. Demand side management came up in the late 2000s parallel to the interest in the 
supply side. The idea is akin to that of the management of distributed generation; sources of 
electricity consumption are pooled in an attempt to shift the timing of consumption in 
response to the supply-demand balance and electricity market price signals. Energy 
management of supply and demand side are in fact opposite sides of the same coin, they have 
similar requirements in terms of being able to control electricity generation or consumption 
from remote and in response to market signals. VPPs and demand side management can work 
in one system and firms often offer both.   
Activities are typically distinguished by type of energy consumer; large, industrial 
consumers versus residential consumers. While there is general agreement that due to the 
relatively large consumption of energy per unit in industry compared to private households, 
industry constitutes a much larger lever for demand side management than residential 
customers, a lot of business activity revolved around households. Especially municipal 
electricity suppliers became enthusiastic proponents of smart meters, which are devices that 
measure electricity consumption and are able to transfer consumption data digitally in order 
to establish transparency and eventually manage consumption in a better way. The idea was 
to motivate consumers to move their electricity consumption to times with lower prices or to 
pool such devices in order to be able to manage electricity consumption centrally. The initial 
drive for smart meters was brought about by European regulation mandating their use that 
was implemented in Germany in 2012. However, the coordination needed to connect 
thousands of small consumers turned out to be difficult to establish and households did not 
seem to be motivated to change their consumption behavior for the relatively minor 
reductions in their electricity bills. 
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- "All pilots in private homes have come to the conclusion that only a small 
fraction of electricity consumption can be moved in time. […] It's really 
sobering." (interview 1-1, incumbent div. software/IT firm) 
- "Smart meters are a waste of tax payers money" (interview 16-1, start-up foc. 
software/IT firm) 
- "[When it comes to smart meters] we have been cautious, not like some 
competitors. […] We had selected initiatives […] just to learn. […] Customers 
are only interested for about two weeks if they don't have a direct benefit." 
(interview 15-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier)  
- "Our customers consume [such small amounts], I don't see energy suppliers 
bothering to managing this" (interview 17-1, start-up foc. national electricity 
supplier) 
For industrial applications, demand side management seemed more promising:  
- "The effect is much larger in the commercial and industrial segments. It is also 
much easier to realize economic benefits than with washing machines." (interview 
5-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier)  
- "Demand response seemed a no brainer to me. Everything else is expensive or 
risky […]. It's software and internet, that comes basically for free, and it works 
with the existing infrastructure." (interview 16-1, start-up foc. software/IT firm)  
The topic was picked up by start-ups and to a certain degree incumbent energy 
technology companies emerged since around 2009/2010 in an effort develop and launch 
software and tools for demand side management. The idea was to provide a service to 
distribution and transmission system operators through pooling large electricity consumers 
and shifting their consumption by minutes, hours or even days if the grid and market situation 
required them to do so.  
- "In 2009 when we started looking at the German market, we could not believe that 
there was no demand response yet. The energy transition was confined to 
renewable electricity supply. On the software side […] there were pilots, nothing 
that actually was integrated in the market." (interview 16-1, start-up foc. 
software/IT firm) 
However, while the concept of demand response was generally embraced, firms found 
that the regulatory system that governs electricity grid and market access constituted a barrier 
which was difficult to surmount. The regulatory framework is built on and hence reinforces a 
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specific set-up of the energy system with defined roles and players. This made it difficult to 
establish new approaches that were not provided for in the regulations. 
- "We did find customers, industrial firms were happy to speak to us. But at the 
same time we always had to be aligned with every other player in the energy 
industry, that's what the regulation provides for. […] Market access regulations 
and energy accounting systems are monstrous. […] We did not have a role in the 
system. The business of demand response aggregation is not provided for in the 
regulatory frameworks. […] We would have had to cooperate with or become 
electricity suppliers. […] It works in other countries, but not in Germany." 
(interview 16-1, start-up foc. software/IT firm) 
Just as with supply side energy management, the driver of demand response is the 
market demand to find a solution for the changing energy system and increase the flexibility 
of the system to accommodate fluctuating RES-E. This demand emerged as a consequence of 
the higher RES deployment following the EEG feed-in-tariff in Germany. However, while 
exploration, development and implementation for demand side energy management have 
surged since about 2010  it is often the inadequacy of systemic policies such as rules 
regarding electricity market access that impede further business development in that area. 
Insecurity in which direction the market for demand response is going does also contributes 
to this.  
6.2.1.5 Energy storage 
Another business area that has seen a surge in activity is the development of energy storage 
solutions. In addition to increasing the grid capacity and shifting electricity supply and 
demand, storing electricity provides another way to cope with fluctuating electricity feed-in 
and strains on the grid.  
6.2.1.5.1 Improvement and systemic integration of energy storage technology 
Energy technology firms as well as electricity suppliers have been exploring and developing 
energy storage technology as well as solutions for embedding it in the energy system since 
the late 2000s.  
- "The topic of energy storage […] has gained importance in the past 2-3 years." 
(interview 20-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
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- "Besides the fact that the ideas have been around for ages, the need for systemic 
solution [incl. off-grid with energy storage] gained attention in 2005/06. However, 
corresponding products […] have only been developed since 2009/10." (interview 
13-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm). 
Electricity storage can take several forms, which are all still being explored in parallel 
to one another. The classical and well-established option is use of hydroelectric power plants. 
Through the operation of the water pumps to transport water uphill electrical energy is 
converted to kinetic energy and preserved in that way. The subsequent downhill flow of 
water powers generators that transform it back to electrical energy. To date this is the only 
established large scale solution for electricity storage. However, other technologies such as 
power-to-gas or batteries are now in focus of innovation efforts. Power-to-gas storage 
systems use electrolysis to convert excess electricity to methane and feed it in the natural gas 
grid or gas tanks for storage. The gas can then be used for multiple purposes such as 
powering environmentally friendly vehicles with fuel cells or gas engines, producing heat, or 
generating electricity in gas-fuelled power plants. Lastly, batteries can be used as energy 
storage devices as electrical energy is converted to chemical energy during the charging 
process. Batteries can be installed at RES-E power plants in industrial as well as residential 
settings to absorb the excess electricity that cannot be fed into the grid at the time of 
production and release it again at a later point in time. For residential applications batteries 
are getting increasingly important in so-called off-grid systems. Off-grid systems serve 
households that aspire to be self-sufficient and produce electricity and possibly heat through 
solar systems or combined heat and power (CHP) on a micro scale. These households only 
feed into or take energy out of the grid if prices are attractive enough to do so. Batteries 
provide a way to bridge electricity shortages or carry over stored electricity to sell it at higher 
prices in the future. Also electronic vehicles use batteries and a fleet of such vehicles could 
constitute a system for decentral, mobile battery storage.  
As explained in the previous section (cf. section 6.2.1.4) energy storage is a possible 
way to cope with the fluctuations of electricity from renewable energy sources by storing 
excess electricity instead of feeding it into the grid immediately and thereby possibly 
destabilizing it. The exploration, development and implementation activities seen are a 
response to the demand for such solutions that emerged after the growth in the deployment of 
RES-E in Germany exposed the shortcomings of the current grid infrastructure. Indirectly 
this was triggered by the German EEG, which caused the mass deployment of RES-E. 
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Exploration, development and implementation activities regarding energy storage is also 
often supported by public R&D funds. 
Case study participants have noted that to some degree business development in 
energy storage is impeded because no market for electricity from storage has been defined. 
Storing electricity and selling it later is more expensive than feeding it directly into the grid, 
yet both are rewarded equally via the electricity price. In that way energy storage suffers from 
similar regulatory barriers than those that have been described in the context of demand 
management above; since the current system does not provide for energy storage its 
integration into the market and consequently the ways to make money with it are limited. 
- "There is little progress in energy storage […] because there is no market. Pumped 
hydro storage has traditionally worked because of a day/night arbitrage in 
electricity prices. […] Peak prices have fallen, which reduces the incentive to store 
electricity in the way it has been done [at night]." (interview 10-1, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "The basic dilemma that we have when it comes to innovation [in energy storage 
and distributed energy] is that we don't know anything about the market. We 
looked at the market for energy storage, but it was hard for us to quantify the 
potential because we don't know how the market is going to develop. We cannot 
tell who the large players are, the four large energy suppliers or the regional level 
or even end customers […]." (interview 21-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "Energy storage such as power-to-gas or power-to-heat […] are things that work 
technologically, but commercially, esp. when it comes to regulation, there is still a 
lot to do." (interview 22-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "Since the declaration of Energiewende the entire topic area of smart grids, smart 
markets, and so on is becoming ever important. However, […] we are not doing 
that much more than before, because it is so complex and we don't really know 
what to develop. […] The framework conditions are still open." (interview 13-1, 
start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
Nevertheless, most market participants are wary of the installation of strong 
incentives to increase the deployment of energy storage such as feed-in tariffs for electricity 
out of storages and rather favor changes to the electricity market regulations that facilitate the 
installation and integration of storage facilities. 
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6.2.2 Adoption 
The case studies show that Energiewende policies and other factors have had an impact on 
the adoption of knowledge and technology in Germany and hence contributed to the diffusion 
of more environmentally friendly technology. The analysis is structured along the most 
meaningful categories of such knowledge and technology that emerged during the case 
studies: renewable energy generation technology, energy-efficient technology and the 
electricity grid. 
6.2.2.1 Expansion of generation portfolio to renewable energy 
The case studies reveal to no surprise that the most noteworthy technological diffusion that 
occurred in the context of Energiewende was the widespread adoption of technology to 
generate electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E).  This adoption was fuelled 
especially by the attractive feed-in tariffs for RES-E installed by the 2000 Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG). Although the German feed-in tariffs were directed at households and 
private investors rather than firms, electricity suppliers did incorporate RES technology in 
their generation portfolio over time. 
In the 1990s ventures into renewable energy generation were single pilot projects for 
incumbent electricity suppliers, most importantly to demonstrate to the interested public that 
the topic was addressed at all, but not with a serious business interest behind it:   
- "We discussed this very early, even in the 1990s when subsidies for solar 
technology only just started. But [RES technology] was rather belittled and 
dismissed as a short-lived trend. It took a long time for us to get interested. […] 
Of course we did a few tests, […] but this was rather for PR-reasons. Window 
dressing if you want to call it that." (interview 7-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier)  
- "There were some activities [in the 1990s], but not sophisticated or strategic […], 
a test wind farm for example. […] We tried funny things. […] We did our 
business as usual and these new initiatives rather came from citizens and civil 
society." (interview 5-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
Incumbents in the electricity generation business had a hard time realizing the potential 
of renewable energy because financial returns were unattractive compared to what the 
industry was used to because the decentral generation that follows renewable energy was 
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contrary to the established business logic which held that energy was most efficiently and 
hence best generated and distributed from large, central power plants.   
- "As a business area [renewables] did not satisfy the rate of returns required by 
energy suppliers." (interview 5-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "We were not interested in the petty business of solar plants. This was just too 
contrary to our understanding of our business as an energy supplier. We had 
always been focused on large, central power generation plants." (interview 7-1, 
incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
In the years following 2000 electricity suppliers began to add renewable energy 
capacity to their generation portfolios. The primary driver behind this was the installation of 
RES-E deployment schemes such as the EEG in Germany and other countries around 2000 
which had turned these investments into a positive business case, although still relatively 
unattractive in terms of investment returns compared to large conventional power plants. At 
first the entry into RES-E occurred rather opportunistically to serve political and public 
opinion and was merely supported by the positive business case. However, over time the 
sporadic activities became more strategic as firms chose location as well as renewable 
technology based on where they could generate the highest return. Activities were also 
institutionalized in dedicated renewable energy business units tasked with the development of 
RES projects and the operation of the RES capacity. 
- "Politics made us go into [renewables]. That is just zeitgeist. It was noticeable 
across parties and also in the general public." (interview 5-1, incumbent foc. 
municipal electricity supplier)   
- "We started to acquire wind farms in [the mid 2000s]. Of course also because of 
and with the financial incentives, that made the business case. But climate change 
and global warming were important topics as well." (interview 7-1, incumbent foc. 
national electricity supplier) 
- "EEG subsidies played a role for the business case." (interview 4-1, incumbent 
foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
The ongoing improvement of RES-E technology that decreased investment costs and 
improved the performance and longevity of such technology moreover helped to convince 
electricity suppliers of renewables. Many technologies were moving towards electricity 
generation on an industrial level, which resembled the classic large-scale power generation 
much more than the beginnings of renewables with small solar PV installations or single 
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wind turbines. Especially the emergence of offshore wind with large turbines of significant 
generation capacity and biomass where the electricity is produced through combustion just as 
in conventional power generation, were easy to comprehend and access for incumbent 
electricity suppliers. These technologies matched their perceived organizational capabilities 
and resources as well as existing business relations with customers and suppliers. Offshore 
wind due to its high technological and financial risks especially in the deep waters far from 
the shore was a business for the larger electricity suppliers, often acting in joint ventures. 
Biomass turned out to be attractive for municipal utilities as they could secure supply through 
their existing connections to local farmers i.e. producers of biomass. For many firms the 
pursuit of RES activities also meant expanding into new geographic markets. National as well 
as municipal suppliers moved into markets in other European countries, and sometimes even 
beyond Europe. 
- "We needed some time to break out of our opposition against renewables. […] 
Hydro has of course always been our domain, biomass as well, but especially 
wind and solar were not taken seriously." (interview 6-2, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
- "It was only in the mid 2000s when offshore started to emerge that we got 
interested. That was something we understood: large plants that generate lots of 
electricity." (interview 7-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier). 
- "[We have invested in biomass since 2003], but PV was never a topic for us […] 
because we would have taken the role of a sole financial investor. […] Biomass is 
closer to conventional generation. There is a supply chain. That means we can 
create value and contribute with our know-how." (interview 4-1, incumbent foc. 
municipal electricity supplier) 
- "It was a radical step we took there. We were a very traditional, organically-grown 
supplier. And then we changed our strategy in the direction of renewable supply. 
[…] And we went into the world." (interview 15-1, incumbent foc. municipal 
electricity supplier). 
6.2.2.2 Energy-efficient modernization of generation portfolio and other assets 
Next to renewable generation technology, fossil-fuel based electricity generation in 
conventional power plants remained a stronghold that incumbent electricity suppliers held on 
to throughout the 2000s. Conventional power plants remained the core of their business 
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model and reliable cash cows at least when wholesale electricity prices were at comfortable 
levels until 2011 (cf. section 6.2.3.5.3).  
In the mid 2000s several electricity suppliers started projects to update their 
conventional generation portfolio and even construct new, more energy efficient conventional 
power plants. The main motive for investing in conventional generation capacity while the 
energy transition was under way was that it still constituted an attractive investment case 
given the high electricity prices at the time. Furthermore, suppliers believed that conventional 
generation capacity would always be needed as reserve capacity and replacing 
technologically superseded power plants with the latest energy-efficient generation 
technology even provided an environmental rationale. Similar to the development of CCS 
technology (cf. 6.2.1.2), the price on carbon imposed by the EU emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) was an additional driver for the modernization of conventional generation capacity.  
- "There was a trend towards more ownership of power generation assets. Many 
companies tried to build power plants […], especially coal-fired ones. We had 
similar plans." (interview 15-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "Until about 2008 it was our strategy to modernize our generation portfolio. New 
power plants, highly efficient power plants […] for a future with emissions 
trading, this seemed attractive at the time." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
In addition to power plants, also other production sites, commercial and residential 
buildings, and physical assets in general were reviewed and modernized in the mid 2000s in 
order to make them more energy-efficient. The reasons here were immediate cost reductions, 
energy efficiency standards, and partially public relations motives to promote own energy-
efficient products by demonstrating their usage. 
6.2.2.3 Modernization and expansion of electricity grids 
The adoption of new technology also occurred in the area of power grids. In Germany the 
electricity grid infrastructure is managed by two different players, transmission system 
operators (TSOs) and electricity suppliers that act as distribution system operators (DSOs). 
TSOs own and operate they high voltage transmission grid that transports electricity across 
regions. They were created in the course of the liberalization of electricity markets 
throughout the 2000s as the electricity value chain unbundled and transmission grids were 
carved out of electricity supply companies. Low voltage distribution grids are still owned and 
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operated by the incumbent electricity suppliers. This can be either the large national ones or 
smaller, municipal ones.  
Electricity transmission and distribution companies have heavily invested in 
modernizing and updating the physical and virtual infrastructure of their grid since the mid 
2000s. Data on annual investment volumes by TSOs and DSOs shows a steady increase of 
investments in grid infrastructure since about 2005 with an additional boost after 2014 (cf. 
Figure 18). 
The case studies show that these investments go into grid expansion, but also 
modernization and update of existing grid infrastructures: offshore wind parks are connected 
to the grid, long distance transmission lines extended, the distribution grid updated to cater to 
the needs of prosumers, and software installed that enables a more effective management of 
grid capacity. Through these investments new technologies that were not used previously are 
rolled-out and diffuse across the energy systems.  
- "We are installing things that did not exist before, interconnectors [...], direct 
current transmission lines, [...] phase shifters - completely new types of 
assets." (interview 9-1, incumbent foc. TSO) 
 
Figure 18: Annual investments in the electricity grid by TSOs and DSOs 1991-2015 
 
*2015 data is planned 
Sources: Own graphic with data from BDEW (2016) for years 1991-2006, Bundesnetzagentur (2014) for year 2007 and 
Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2016) for years 2008-2015. 
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The main driver behind these investments is the mandate of grid operators to ensure 
the stability of the grid and with it the security of electricity supply. This is manifested in a 
series of laws and regulations. For TSOs especially the grid expansion plans and 
corresponding laws are relevant. The first such law (Energieleitungsausbaugesetz, EnLAG) 
was implemented in 2009, but subsequent changes and new laws especially following 
Fukushima increased the extent and pace of grid extension. As a consequence the investments 
of TSOs rose sharply in the years after 2011 (cf. Figure 18). 
- "The grid expansion decision was only finalized after [the political decisions 
following Fukushima in 2011]. We invest [much more now]. (Interview 14-1, 
incumbent foc. transmission systems operator)  
For DSOs, grid extension is guided by the legal requirement to connect end users of 
electricity to the electricity grid. Furthermore, the decentral installation of RES-E generation 
capacity imposes new requirements on the grids such as being able to take instead of just 
distribute electricity, which requires investment and updates. 
- "There is a lot of work and investment due in the distribution grid. The 
majority of renewables feeds into the distribution grid, not the transmission 
grid. The role of the grid has changed completely." (interview 6-2, incumbent 
foc. national electricity supplier) 
However, especially with regards to the distribution grid, the current regulatory 
framework may impede investment. As a network industry prone to natural monopoly almost 
every aspect of the TSO and DSO business is regulated. The German network industries 
regulator Bundesnetzagentur sets maximum permissible revenue for each TSO and DSO by 
adding a profit allowance to the average total costs of operating and maintaining the 
electricity grids. TSOs and DSOs have to set their grid usage fees i.e. the price component of 
their revenue in such a way that they do not exceed the maximum permissible revenue 
(Groebel, 2013). Since 2009 there is an additional incentive regulation to keep costs down. 
Grid operators are assessed on their relative efficiency in comparison to their peers and the 
maximum permissible revenue is set in such a way that inefficiencies must be eliminated in 
order to retain profitability. This is done for a regulatory period of five years instead of the 
previous annual cost regulation. In order to allow for investments, TSOs can apply for 
project-specific investment measures where, if approved, the investment volume can be 
added to the maximum permissible revenue hence justifying an increase in grid usage fees to 
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cover the investment. DSOs can apply for a flat percentage increase to their maximum 
permissible revenue for every regulatory period (ibid.).  
DSOs criticize that the current framework does not allow them to finance additional 
investments of a sufficient scale. This criticism has partially been taken up by regulators. An 
evaluation report published in 2015 finds that the incentive regulation has in principle 
succeeded in both increasing efficiency and securing investments, but that changes especially 
in the area of distribution grids are necessary in the light of Energiewende 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). The changes pertain to improving payback rate and time and 
incentivizing investments into virtual grid capacity such as smart grids and grid management 
over physical expansion. 
6.2.3 Organizational change 
Changes to several organizational dimensions emerge as innovation activities from the case 
studies: corporate vision and strategy, structural organization change, cultural change, 
collaboration, and business models (cf. Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Overview of dimensions of organizational change 
 
6.2.3.1 Corporate vision and strategy 
In the mid 2000s incumbent firms of both energy generation and transmission and energy 
technology and materials re-formulated their strategies, either the general corporate or more 
specifically their innovation strategies, in an effort to make their products and operations 
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more environmentally-friendly. Drivers were perceived customer and market demand, as well 
as public opinion and shareholder activity.  
The innovation and business development described in the previous sections was in 
some firms preceded by a distinct strategic decision to develop business in such a way. This 
was often the result of a deliberate strategy process that identified renewable energy and 
climate protection as important market drivers and therefore worth developing business in.  
- "Our energy transition started to take shape in 2006/07. […] We […] 
developed a new strategy […] with renewable generation as one pillar. […]  
This was a radical shift […] for a […] traditional electricity supplier like us; 
[…] renewable energy […] and [international expansion]." (interview 15-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "Our climate protection program [2007] […] was a strategic change with a 
view to the future, because so much change was happening around us in the 
energy system and the political landscape […]. The direction was towards 
climate protection, energy savings and CO2 savings […] but as an economic 
actor […] one also needs to look at how to earn money […]." (interview 5-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
- "[…] Through our climate program [2007] we committed [significant] 
investment to research in climate innovation." (interview 26-1, incumbent div. 
chemicals firm) 
- "[It was in 2005/2006 that we realized that] we need a solution for CO2 
emissions. And then it still took two years to enact this formally and 
organizationally" (interview 21-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm). 
For others, the strategy rather emerged through the activities undertaken. Changes to 
the strategy esp. in light of market development such as changes to energy prices and the 
financial crisis were also not uncommon. 
Realizing the strategic importance of environmental topics and the appeal that these 
topics have to customers and the wider public, diversified firms took a special effort to 
promote their environmental friendliness. They designated specific portfolios of their 
products that they marked green or environmentally friendly and in addition increased efforts 
to improve their products in such a way.   
- "Our environmental strategy [of 2005] is an innovation strategy around 
sustainability in the widest sense […], primarily it is an abstract requirement to 
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focus on particular products [or product characteristics]. […] The individual 
business units […] tried to shine […] in this competition. […] However, these 
aspirations took a back seat later, partly because of the financial crisis" 
(interview 10-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm)   
- "It was seen as a [business] opportunity […] to denote environmental and 
energy-friendly products as one portfolio. […] The elements that sustainability 
consists of [such as energy and resource efficiency] are also a selling point." 
(interview 2-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
All companies surveyed had installed strategies, plans and targets that entail 
developing their product businesses as well as their own operations in an environmentally 
friendly and sustainable way. 
6.2.3.2 Structural organizational change 
The majority of companies surveyed in the case studies have enacted structural changes to 
their organization over the past one to two decades that are relevant in the context of 
Energiewende. These structural changes pertain to the overall corporate structure in terms of 
organization of business units as well as to the organization of innovation activities 
specifically. 
Firms of all types across the energy technology value chain have created departments, 
business units or even separate firms to carry out business activities relevant in the context of 
Energiewende since the early 2000s. Many of the innovation activities described previously 
manifested themselves in organizational change in such a way. Examples of these are the 
organizational units for the renewable energy business that were set up by energy technology 
firms in the early 2000s and electricity suppliers in the mid- to late 2000s. In addition, formal 
organizations for energy efficiency also picked up in the mid- to late 2000s and business units 
around smart grid, energy management and energy have been emerging since 2010. The 
reason to formalize activities in these areas in terms of a structural organizational unit was the 
market and growth potential expected there and to increase the visibility of the respective 
products and services.  
In addition to general business activities, firms restructured the organization of their 
Energiewende related innovation activities since 2010 in order to increase central control 
elevate their importance. 
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Incumbent firms in energy technology and materials, especially diversified ones who 
are not only active in the energy sector, created organizational departments specifically 
tasked with exploration, development and implementation of energy-related activities. These 
departments were often part of a larger R&D organization or put under direct supervision of a 
company executive. Often the scope extended from external to internal topics such as energy 
supply, usage and efficiency. Moreover, the energy was often combined with other 
sustainability and environmental topics.  
- "We considered the topic sustainability so important [in 2010] that it should 
not be dispersed across the organization but occupy a central position. So we 
[addressed this with an organizational unit] made up of technology 
development and business development." (interview 20-1, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm). 
- "We put all energy-related topics central in [one] executive resort [in 2013]"  
(interview 26-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
Many firms in electricity supply and transmission centralized their innovation 
activities. Since innovation was for the longest time a low priority in the industry few had 
strong innovation organizations historically. For the large national suppliers it was common 
to have either a central R&D unit with few business links, or a range of activities spread 
across the firm without coordination. Innovation was hence running a risk of detachment 
from markets and business, double efforts or omission of important topics. Between 2010 and 
2014 electricity suppliers enacted changes to the organization of their innovation activities. 
These changes included centralization with varying degrees of intensity, from simple central 
coordination and monitoring to steering and budgeting. Often an emphasis was also put on 
reorganizing activities in such a way that they are closer to markets and customers by 
structuring them along the value chain, linking central R&D functions with the operational 
business units depending on which unit will likely be the major beneficially and combining 
employees from all relevant areas in virtual teams. The motivation was to increase 
coordination of the activities and become faster in terms of developing and implementing 
relevant novelties.  
- "[In our old organizational model] coordination was more of a coincidence." 
(interview 6-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
Across all firms restructuring and organizational separation was especially likely if 
the activities carried out were very new to the firm or addressed topics that were considered 
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disruptive for the established business. Firms realized that the more distant an area of 
innovation is to current business, the less likely it is to be adequately addressed within the 
established organizational structures. Therefore innovation activities in entirely new areas, 
without prospects of generating revenue in the medium turn and very different to established 
business in terms of business logic, capabilities required or customers served were 
increasingly pursued by organizational entities separate from day-to-day business. The very 
innovation-oriented energy technology and materials firms took steps towards this already in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s by insulating such activities from the rest of the organization. 
This entailed creating an explicit budget for such innovation activities, establishing teams and 
departments exclusively focused on such innovation or even founding full-fledged, legally 
independent innovation subsidiaries. Among electricity suppliers this separation has only 
started to take hold with the innovation towards new business models after 2011 (cf. section 
6.2.3.5). 
6.2.3.3 Cultural change 
The case studies also reveal that attempts have been undertaken to change corporate cultures 
as a response to coping with the changes of the energy system brought about by 
Energiewende. While cultural change has especially been in focus for electricity generation 
and transmission firms, also some incumbent energy technology and materials companies 
have described how they had sought a change of organizational culture in order to be able to 
effectively address the challenges of Energiewende. 
Previous sections (cf. sections 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1) have mentioned the cognitive biases 
found across the incumbents of the energy technology value chain favoring an energy system 
based on conventional, central electricity generation. These biases were inscribed in the 
minds of individuals, echoed in formal and informal communications and manifested in the 
way that business was conducted. Attachment to an established way of doing things 
combined with the stability that the conventional energy system exerted over a long time 
created organizations with members who tended to be adverse to change and were not willing 
and able to imagine, let alone develop and implement innovations. 
- "We knew that with our old business culture of securely operating large plants 
we were running into difficulties." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
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- "The balanced, but also slow and even sedate manner that characterizes our 
firm, does not make things easier, especially now in an environment that is 
more dynamic […]." (interview 4-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity 
supplier) 
- "The energy industry has developed from a monopoly and is free of 
innovation. And that resonates in our organization and in the entire sector." 
(interview 4-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier)  
This is why changes to the rate and direction of innovation activities, such as 
described earlier in this chapter, especially regarding renewable energy, a decentral energy 
system, and new business models, were accompanied by attempts to change the corporate 
culture towards becoming more innovative. In some firms the cultural change was a natural 
or evolutionary process that took place as a side effect of new strategies, business activities or 
technologies. In other firms, most noteworthy the large incumbent electricity suppliers, it was 
a deliberate attempt that was reinforced by the same margin decline after 2011 that triggered 
the search for new business models (cf. 6.2.3.5).  
- "We realized [in 2012] that it is not only costs and balance sheet, but also the 
corporate culture that is not healthy in our firm. So we started a transformation 
on the hard facts as well as on the soft facts side." (interview 3-2, incumbent 
foc. national electricity supplier) 
The ambition was to create a corporate culture that is more entrepreneurial i.e. where 
new ideas are encouraged, trying things out is supported, and failures valued as a learning 
opportunity. Furthermore, customer orientation and openness towards partnerships were 
supposed to be engrained in the organizations as they were both considered key for the new 
business models in the future energy system (cf. also sections 6.2.3.5 and 6.2.3.4). 
- "Our CEO wanted […] to establish a new innovation culture where we 
experiment, even with existing things." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
- "We asked ourselves, how we get the innovative culture of a start-up firm. Fast 
actions, rapid prototyping, stopping things if necessary." (interview 3-2, 
incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "Creating an internal culture with which we are able to react quicker to 
changing framework conditions, seek to innovate even small aspects, and be 
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more customer-oriented – that is the cultural change that we need to achieve." 
(interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "We need partnerships, […] even in minority stakes. This is new for electricity 
suppliers; it was unthinkable in the past." (interview 22-1, incumbent foc. 
municipal electricity supplier) 
The affected firms used various methods to achieve this. Electricity suppliers, 
especially the larger ones, developed special programs, event formats and communications to 
incite an entrepreneurial culture. Open innovation sessions, interactive panels and talks were 
supposed to bring everybody to the table and encourage active participation in the innovation 
and change process. Innovation days and innovation competitions provided employees with 
the opportunity to develop their own entrepreneurial ventures and compete for 
acknowledgement and, sometimes, funds. Network structures and the staffing of innovation 
project teams from various departments pooled human resources and facilitated knowledge 
exchange. Leadership programs enabled managers to encourage curiosity and innovativeness 
in their employees.  
- "We have several big cultural change programs ongoing. They involve the top 
management and all other management levels. This is an innovation […]. It is 
cultural change management […] with concrete actions." (interview 3-1, 
incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
The interviewees have mainly painted a positive picture of this change claiming it is 
successful in changing corporate culture and that initial resistance faded over time.  
- "It is a clash. Some love it, some hate it. It is definitely creating a stir." 
(interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "[Cultural change] is the hard part. Much harder than developing business 
models." (interview 3-2, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "You need to be patient. There is a lot of resistance in the beginning. […] But 
now after two to three years we are starting to speak the same language, do 
things differently, know what our mental barriers are so that we can address 
them." (interview 3-2, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "We did a couple of things that really hit, an innovation day, for example. […] 
Some departments got really creative. […] It worked." (interview 9-1, 
incumbent foc. TSO)  
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Albeit to a smaller extent than in electricity generation and transmission, also in 
energy technology and materials, cultural change was required to some degree as 
technological change took place. However, organizational restructuring and increasing the 
importance and visibility of the affected departments as described in the previous section 
(6.2.3.2) was by most interviewees considered sufficient to enact such change. Interestingly, 
some R&D or innovation departments consider themselves responsible for bringing about 
cultural change along with technological. One central R&D department of a corporate firm 
even described an internal consulting service specifically for change management. 
6.2.3.4 Collaboration 
The case studies show that collaboration has gained importance in the context of 
Energiewende. Collaborations affect every step of the innovation value chain from early idea 
generation and concept development to joint R&D, demonstration and marketing of products. 
Financially and organizationally they can take various forms e.g., informal exchanges 
(networks, groups), contractual arrangements (joint projects), the acquisition of equity in a 
partner firm (venture capital), or the foundation of legally separate organizations (joint 
ventures). 
As one area of collaboration, vertical relationships between firms along the energy 
technology value chain have been strengthened. As explained earlier (section 5.3), there is an 
established division of labor in the energy technology chain anyway whereby technology is 
provided by energy technology firms and purchased and used by electricity suppliers. As 
such both types of firms cooperate especially in test, demonstration and pilot projects in the 
late invention and early commercialization stages of a new technology. Cooperation with 
customers seems to become more important at every step of the value chain. Even electricity 
suppliers are looking at their customers for sources of innovation.  
- "Partners are now mainly downstream." (interview 6-1, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
- "You need alliances along the value chain […] especially in early phases or emerging 
markets." (interview 24-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
In addition to vertical relations, collaboration occurs increasingly between firms of the 
energy technology value chain and firms of sectors outside of it. Collaboration is especially 
sought where capabilities, assets or product and service offerings are considered 
complementary. Examples of such collaboration can be found e.g., between electricity 
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suppliers and automotive firms in e-mobility and between electricity suppliers and natural gas 
firms in power-to-gas energy storage and fuels. 
Collaboration also takes place across different market positions i.e. among 
incumbents or between incumbents and startups. Due to antitrust concerns collaboration 
among incumbents of different sectors is more frequent than among incumbents of the same 
sector. The latter may, however, still take place in ventures that are particularly risky and 
where boundaries can be well defined. Collaboration between incumbents and startups can 
take place in the same sector or across sectors. Incumbents rely on start-ups for fresh ideas 
and possibly intellectual property and knowledge of emerging technologies, while start-ups 
benefit from the strong financial position, market access and industry knowledge of 
incumbents. Startup-incumbent collaboration is especially important in all topics concerned 
with IT, digitalization and big data.  
- "There are hardware partner, but also IT and software - this was not the case in the 
past. […] Many small firms, few global players." (interview 6-1, incumbent foc. 
national electricity supplier) 
There are multiple reasons for the surge of collaboration in the context of 
Energiewende. First and foremost, collaboration is sought to pool complementary capabilities 
and assets in a way that enables the partners to be successful in a more complex energy 
system. The perceived increase in complexity is mainly attributed to decentralization and the 
shift to renewable energy. In addition, the advance of digital technology that is penetrating 
the energy sector also contributes towards perceived complexity. It is here where incumbent 
firms of all value chain steps fall short of the necessary knowledge and skills to be successful 
on their own and hence often have to rely on partners. As a related point, collaboration of 
course also means that technological and financial risks and burdens are shared. 
- "Complexity [in the changing energy system] is increasing every day and you 
cannot master every aspect of it. You need good partners." (interview 17-1, start-up 
foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "We are in areas that are at the edge of our established and successful business 
activities, where we do not typically have the competences, or only partially. In 
these areas we make faster progress with partners and reach a better substantive 
result." (interview 20-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "[Cooperation] is all about the capabilities that we require. […] It is critical to 
success." (interview 22-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
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- "If IT is the key [future success] factor we need the relevant expertise." (interview 
4-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
Second, collaborations in the form of consortia are a precondition for many publicly 
funded research projects. The funding available for energy projects usually requires groups of 
players such as firms from different industries, universities and research institutes to work 
together on a specific topic. This provides a financial incentive for collaboration, but also the 
opportunity to build a network especially in new and emerging technological areas. However, 
the costs of coordinating and transacting especially in large consortia are considered very 
high, which is why firms are skeptical of their efficacy and some. 
Third, collaborations provide an opportunity to experiment in a setting that is 
somewhat separate from the rest of the organization. Collaborations may provide a space 
shielded from established business processes and rules that may impeded innovation, which 
is very similar to the tendency to separate the organizational unit that is tasked with 
disruptive innovations described earlier (cf. section 6.2.3.2).    
6.2.3.5 Business models  
The case studies show that firms across the energy technology value chain, most prominently 
electricity suppliers, are trying to invent and implement new business models.  To re-cap, a 
business model lays out how a firm generates and captures value with its strategy, structure 
and activities incl. value proposition, target market, set-up of the value chain, revenue 
mechanisms and cost structures, position in the value network and competitive strategy 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002).  
6.2.3.5.1 Asset-light green electricity marketing 
The first wave of exploring, developing and implementing new business models in the energy 
technology value chain took place in 1998/1999 when start-up electricity suppliers began to 
market electricity without owning power generation assets or transmission and distribution 
grids. This was made possible by the liberalization of the electricity markets which was just 
taking place. In addition, the electricity supply start-ups surveyed for the case studies were all 
focused on electricity from RES and claim to have been driven by an intrinsic motivation to 
supply green and clean electricity as well. In terms of business models, this marked a 
significant departure from the way that the electricity industry had worked in the preceding 
decades.  
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The traditional business model in electricity generation and transmission builds on the 
ownership and operation of power generation assets and grid infrastructure. In this business 
model the electricity supplied to customers was considered a commodity i.e. a unitary 
product that can due to its physical properties not be differentiated. As a consequence sales 
and marketing were considered of relatively minor importance. The start-up electricity 
suppliers, however, saw an opportunity for product differentiation, not through changing the 
product that is delivered to customers, but through changing the supply chain and, most 
importantly, the packaging and marketing of the product to customers:  
"It was our first innovation to consistently exploit the provisions offered by the 
[liberalized] regulatory framework. Because of the liberalization of electricity markets we 
were able to supply electricity to residential customers." (interview 18-1, start-up foc. 
national electricity supplier)  
Electricity was made into a differentiated product, at least from a marketing 
perspective, by offering customers tariffs for guaranteed GHG and nuclear free electricity:  
- "We wanted to found an energy supplier who does the right thing 
ecologically." (interview 17-1, start-up foc. national electricity supplier)  
They procured the required electricity through the trading opportunities offered by 
liberalized energy markets and electricity exchanges, thereby increasing the share of 
electricity from RES in the national electricity mix without operating power plants and 
generating the electricity themselves:  
- "The EEG essentially led to investments in [RES] generation capacity […] 
However, for an energy service firm [such as an electricity supplier], there was 
no role there in that sense […] The German regulatory system does not 
provide for electricity generated in proprietary power plants to be directly 
supplied to end customers." (interview 18-1, start-up foc. national electricity 
supplier) 
These new electricity suppliers realized that there was demand and a willingness to 
pay for certified green electricity and created a business model out of that. Interesting 
enough, even though they started with a new business model, some start-ups tried to replicate 
the traditional value chain in the industry and clung to the idea of owning generation 
capacity:  
- "Investing in RES-E generation capacity has been part of our strategy from the 
start. The green energy industry has long lived with the conviction that the 
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energy transition works best if customers buy green electricity from 
companies that own and operate the RES-E production facilities themselves. 
However, we have meanwhile departed from that." (interview 17-1, start-up 
foc. national electricity supplier).  
Given the feed in tariff for electricity from RES was always higher than the market 
price of electricity, it would not have been economical (probably also not feasible from a 
regulatory point of view) to bypass that mechanism and supply electricity directly. It was 
hence deployment policies such as the EEG that incentivized RES-E capacity additions, not 
green electricity tariffs. However, the opportunities offered by electricity market 
liberalization coupled with an emerging market demand for GHG and nuclear electricity and 
an intrinsic motivation to provide such green electricity were the major drivers of this first 
wave of new energy industry business models. 
6.2.3.5.2 Complementary energy services 
Also incumbent electricity suppliers experimented with new business models when they 
developed energy service offerings in the early 2000s. When the industry was consolidating 
through mergers and acquisitions after the turmoil of liberalization, players were re-
positioning themselves in the industry and experimented with new business models beyond 
the provision of electricity. Energy services that have previously already been described (cf. 
section 6.2.1.4.2) such as contracting, providing access to traded markets for electricity and 
other commodities especially after the EEG 2012 direct marketing provision, as well as 
energy efficiency consulting services serve as examples. These were the first attempts to 
establish new business models, although these were meant to extend and support the core 
business of electricity provision rather than replace it.  
6.2.3.5.3 Digital and big data business model experimentation post 2011 
Since 2011 electricity suppliers, especially incumbent ones, have been exploring, developing 
and partially already implementing new business models especially in the context of 
digitalization and big data. This is a response to the price decline that has occurred in the 
wholesale electricity markets and an exploitation of the new opportunities offered by 
technological progress in information and communications technology. Energiewende and 
the concomitant transformation of the energy system is now a credible scenario with a firm 
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political commitment and since it does not seem to be possible to make a profit with the 
traditional business model alternative ones need to be found.  
In spite of all developments in the energy system, the traditional business model of 
energy generation incumbents – generating electricity in central power plants and distributing 
it to customers – did for a long time remain unchallenged. Electricity generation companies 
just operated RES-E capacity in the same way that they operated their conventional power 
plants and added green electricity tariffs to their customer product offering. The focus of 
corporate activities remained in the upstream part of the firm, the generation business. 
However, this changed when the conventionally fuelled power plants that the 
incumbents relied on for much of their revenue came under pressure due to falling wholesale 
electricity prices since 2011. The price of an electricity contract for delivery one year in the 
future dropped from all time highs around 80€ in 2008 to below 30€ in 2015, staying 
consistently below 50€ since 2011 (cf. Figure 20). 
. Owners and operators of power plants earn their revenue based on the money they 
get for electricity generated which they sell on the spot market or future markets. In the 
existing design of the German electricity market the price is determined only based on the 
energy generated i.e. compensation occurs per megawatt hour (MWh) generated and sold. 
The market price is set by the marginal production costs of the last power plant that is able to 
sell its electricity output at a given level of demand. The increasing generation of electricity 
from RES changed the economics for conventional power plants significantly. The generation 
of RES electricity at zero marginal cost coupled with the rule that all RES electricity volumes 
need to be sold on the market caused wholesale electricity prices to drop significantly and 
forced higher cost power plants to make losses. This phenomenon is also called merit order 
effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008).  
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Figure 20: Performance of Phelix Base Load One Year Futures and RWE AG 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on EEX and DAX electricity and share price data provided by finanzen.net (2016a, 2016b). 
 
The huge losses incurred in conventional energy generation are the primary driving 
force behind the search for new business models:  
- "Our motivation is the margin decline […] that is caused by [RES capacity] 
growth and oversupply of electricity […]. We were faced with the choice to 
reduce our business activities as many municipal electricity suppliers have done. 
But we decided […] to grow and substitute new business for our profit gap." 
(interview 22-1, incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier). 
- "The question is, how do we deal with the mess that we are in. […] It is 
impossible to say what will happen in conventional generation. That is a question 
of market design, a political question. […] We have to look for new business 
models. Although we know that it is hard to compensate for our losses, we still 
need to renew ourselves and expand. Our [business] will become smaller in scale. 
No large physical infrastructure […], but small investments, close to the customer. 
[…] And decentral electricity supply [with off-grid elements] would erode our 
business model even further." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national electricity 
supplier) 
While emergency cost reduction measures were implemented immediately following 
the drop in electricity prices and the post-Fukushima political decisions in 2011, it is since 
2013/2014 that incumbent electricity suppliers look ahead again and direct their efforts on 
finding new business models i.e. changing their traditional value chain, the products they 
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provide and the way they are provided, in an effort to not have to rely on revenue from 
electricity generation: 
- "To develop business models for a decentral world, that is [our] strategic 
direction. We believe that the future energy system will look differently. […] 
[And for us], it's all about earning money." (interview 3-2, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier) 
- "We know […] that we are not going to find a cash cow [like the one we had] in 
the previous 140 years." (interview 22-2, municipal electricity supplier) 
Many firms have to this end set up dedicated organizational units and teams 
specifically tasked with business model innovation. They also go new ways when it comes to 
the implementation of novelties e.g., co-operation with start-ups, partnerships with minority 
stakes or altogether outside of established business boundaries.  
- "[When we have developed a good concept and substantiated it] it goes to Sales. 
That can mean our Sales, but it does not need to. […] It really does not matter 
under which brand something is marketed" (interview 22-2, municipal electricity 
supplier). 
However, also firms not under direct revenue and cost pressure such as the electricity 
supply start-ups or players from the upstream part of the value chain and other sectors have 
been working on new business models in the electricity industry since about 2010. Incumbent 
electricity suppliers acknowledge this increasing competition from new players: "We have 
found in recent years […] that firms are entering our market who are not competitors in the 
classical sense. Telecommunication firms, electrical engineering companies, start-ups and 
other small innovative firms. […] These firms built on our value chain and have ideas for 
new business models in our market" (interview 3-2, incumbent foc. national electricity 
supplier). Although these firms do not have the same liabilities and immediate margin 
squeezes as pressures to act, they are still trying to shape how the energy system will look 
like and what business models may work:  
- "We are thinking about innovative business models, just as every electricity 
supplier does right now" (interview 17-1, start-up foc. national electricity 
supplier).  
- "We don't […] know what is gonna be possible, where we can invest, what 
business models will work" (interview 13-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm).  
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- "We are thinking much more in terms of business model innovation than we used 
to do" (interview 2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
In substantive terms, the new business models of all types of firms are targeted at 
ways to earn money in an energy system that is decentral, albeit nobody knows how exactly 
that system will look like. Common assumptions include that the generation as well as the 
consumption of electricity will be distributed geographically, that the system tends to be 
nuclear and GHG emission free and that it is able to cope with volatility and the fluctuation 
of supply that seems to be a consequence of the generation of electricity from RES. New 
business models that are being experimented with revolve around creating new functions in 
the energy system that do not exist right now, providing services to transmission system 
operators and providing additional services to consumers and prosumers of electricity. The 
regulatory framework that governs the energy system and the changes that are anticipated to 
take place because of Energiewende policies hence provide the boundary conditions in which 
the search for a new business model takes place.  
Moreover, the technological progress in information and communication technologies 
constitute the search space in which opportunities for new business models are expected to be 
found. Digitalization, big data and internet of things are keywords that were frequently 
employed when interviewees described the direction of their search for a new business 
model. In terms of the value chain, electricity suppliers have moved their focus from 
upstream generation to the downstream business now looking to invent and implement 
solutions for customers. 
- "We looked at what other electricity suppliers [and tech companies] are 
working on and quickly got to the topics big data, data analytics, […] 
disruptive digitalization, […] internet of things and smart and connected home 
– how will management and optimization work in a decentral energy world." 
(interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "[Nuclear and coal are gone], but we still have the market with end customers 
that has come back into focus." (interview 6-2, incumbent foc. national 
electricity supplier)  
- "It is about customer orientation, almost with brute force." (interview 22-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
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6.2.4 Synopsis: change dynamics in innovation activities 
This section has investigated the change dynamics of the German Energiewende, specifically 
to what extent and how German firms changed their innovation activities over time. It was 
divided into three innovation activities: exploration, development and implementation, 
adoption, and organizational change. The findings show that different dynamics can be found 
in each of these innovation activities as the focus of activities and the intensity with which 
they were pursed changed over time and indicate that the drivers of such activities are 
multiple, complex and intertwined.  
Exploration, development and implementation were noted in several technology areas, 
more specifically renewable energy generation and supply, conventional energy generation 
and supply, energy consumption and efficiency, smart grid and energy management, and 
energy storage. For renewable energy generation and supply the case studies identify the 
emergence of exploration and development activities in the 1970s to 1990s. Early 
developments were marked by technological experimentation in order to find alternative 
energy sources.  This development was triggered by the risk to the energy supply posed by 
the oil crises of the 1970s, a rising environmental awareness of the wider public and the 
installation of public funding for energy research. Renewable energy technology, however, 
stayed a niche throughout the 1980s and 1990s as market demand was low and mainly small 
firms invested in technological development. This changed in the late 1990s and especially 
after 2000 when the development of RES-E technology surged as a consequence of the RES-
E deployment policies that were implemented in Germany and other countries. Demand 
growth and the emergence of a sizable market reignited the interest in RES-E technology. 
Large incumbent energy technology firms, however, struggled to build their activities in RES 
technology as they perceived their existing assets and capabilities not to be complementary to 
the requirements of RES technologies. Not the technological exploration per se was the 
problem, but rather the implementation in terms of going to market with an industry and 
customer structure that they were not used to or did not possess. In addition, the view that 
RES technologies were inherently inferior to conventional technology was also widespread 
and prevented openness towards new developments. Those challenges had several portfolio 
restructurings and attempts and failures as a consequence. Ultimately, however, also large 
firms began to invest and together with fast growing energy technology start-ups accelerated 
the development of RES technology towards industrial scale. With the maturing of growth in 
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RES-E installations it became an area of steady activity with a sizable and still growing 
market. 
The exploration, development and implementation of ways to cut the energy 
consumption of products and processes followed a similar path, however, less pronounced. 
Driven largely by cost considerations the interest in energy efficiency fluctuated with 
expectations of energy prices and consequential customer demand for higher energy 
efficiency. There has been an increased focus since the mid 2000s against the background of 
political targets, stricter standards for energy consumption, and public concerns about climate 
change. At the same time energy efficiency also emerged as a services business. Non-
emitting conventional technology topic became a focus topic for exploration in the mid 
2000s, but interest, at least in Germany, has declined since.  
In the late 2000s the focus of exploration, development and implementation activities 
shifted from electricity generation and consumption towards more systemic topics in 
response to the challenges posed by a changing energy system and the demand for systemic 
solutions. A rising share of fluctuating RES-E in the electricity mix, geographically 
distributed generation capacity and a blurred distinction between consumers and producers of 
electricity challenged to the electricity grid network. The exploration of technology to 
improve the grid infrastructure, manage the electricity fed in or taken out of the grid with 
supply and demand side energy management, as well as various solutions to storing 
electricity took center stage. 
In terms of adoption, activities took place in the expansion of electricity generation 
portfolios to renewable energy, energy efficient modernization of generation portfolios, and 
modernization and expansion of electricity grids. After experimental installations in earlier 
decades, electricity suppliers started to add RES-E capacity to their generation portfolios after 
2000, mainly driven by a combination of public and political pressure and the subsidized 
compensation of the EEG feed-in tariff. For incumbent electricity suppliers the uptake of 
RES-E was, however, impeded by the protection of their strong portfolios of conventional 
electricity generation capacity and an inherent belief in the superiority of conventional 
generation, especially in terms of efficiency and reliability. In an effort to address the 
emerging environmental requirements, energy-efficient modernizations of the energy 
generation portfolio as well as other assets took place. The expectation of higher energy 
prices also played a role in these efforts. Since the mid 2000s electricity suppliers and 
transmission firms increasingly invested in the modernization and expansion of the electricity 
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grid network to cope with the rising amount of RES-E that had to be taken up and funneled 
through the system. 
Organizational change was identified with respect to corporate vision and strategy, 
structural organizational change, cultural change, collaboration, and business models. In the 
mid 2000s incumbent firms began to increasingly incorporate environmental elements in their 
corporate visions and strategies. Structural organizational change started to manifest itself as 
well. New business units or departments for Energiewende-related activities such as 
renewable energy or energy efficiency were established and the respective innovation 
activities often placed in separate entities and under supervision of the senior leadership. 
Cultural change came alongside structural change either naturally or, especially for large 
electricity suppliers after 2011, as dedicated programs to make their organizations ready for a 
new energy system. Overcoming the aforementioned biases and preconceptions was the key 
subject of cultural change programs. Organizational change was marked by a growing 
importance of collaborations. With systemic changes, but also other developments such as 
digitalization, firms increasingly had to rely on the complementary assets and capabilities of 
strong partners in order to succeed in novel activities. Business model innovation constituted 
another significant area of organizational change. New business models such as asset-light 
green electricity marketing and the provision of services in general emerged since the late 
1990s because of liberalization and since the late 2000s because of digitalization and the 
systemic change in the energy system. This development was compounded by the political 
decisions and market developments following the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. 
Fukushima in general strengthened innovation activities as Energiewende finally became a 
consensus after decades of political debate, but the traditional business model of electricity 
suppliers was specifically affected. The decline of the wholesale electricity price that took 
place after 2011 put a final stop to the traditional business model of large scale conventional 
electricity generation and forced incumbents to intensify their search for new business 
models. 
Across all three innovation activities it is particularly noteworthy that it was seldomly 
one driver that triggered a particular dynamic, but typically a combination of variables. 
Aspects of the Energiewende policy mix such as the long-term RES and emission reduction 
targets, public R&D funds, the effects of the RES-E feed-in tariff and standards clearly 
played a role, but so did market factors such as supply, demand and prices, as well as wider 
societal trends such as public opinion and digitalization. Over time these variables came 
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together in a web of influencing factors where the effect of one cannot easily be singled out. 
In addition the findings suggest that interpretations of external events were confounded by 
firm-internal factors such as assets and capabilities, a firm's business model and a cognitive 
representation of how an energy system should best be set up.  Following the presentation of 
the general development of innovation activities and innovation dynamics as it emerged from 
the case studies, the following chapter will discuss the drivers and influences of these 
dynamics in more detail. 
6.3 Impact of the Energiewende policy mix 
Having established that changes in innovation activities have taken place, the attention now 
turns to carving out in more detail how the Energiewende policy mix and its individual 
components vision and strategy, instruments, and process have affected these changes. All 
aspects discussed here as parts of the policy mix were noticed by companies and factors taken 
into consideration in their innovation activity. In many cases the political influence was 
indirect i.e. it only played out over time, via another mechanism and together with other 
influencing factors. However, certain political interventions were decisive in way that they 
significantly determined the innovation dynamics in the energy technology value chain. 
 
Figure 21: Overview of elements of the policy mix 
 
6.3.1 Vision and strategy 
The case studies show that the political vision and strategy devised by the German 
government as part of Energiewende did have an impact on corporate innovation activities, 
but only to a limited extent. The limited effects stem predominantly from the fact that vision 
and strategies are not practical enough to result in immediate corporate action. Vision and 
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strategy expressed in long term targets, plans and roadmaps are critical points of reference 
important to a stable policy framework, but they are not in themselves sufficient to drive 
innovation activities if other conditions (most importantly market demand) are not in place. 
In the context of Energiewende, three manifestations of the German political vision and 
strategy have been noted by companies as having had an impact on their actions; the first 
nuclear exit of 2000, long term targets regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
renewables and energy efficiency, and the political decisions for accelerated nuclear exit 
following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. 
The nuclear exit decision of 2000 was duly noted, but did not trigger immediate action 
in terms of innovation activities, mainly because it was not sufficiently credible. Electricity 
suppliers tended to not take it serious and were confident that they would be able to lobby a 
milder version eventually. Even if they did believe that change was going to happen, it was in 
a future too distant to be relevant for corporate actions at the time. Energy technology and 
materials firms were also only marginally affected. Those with activities in the nuclear 
industry anticipated a market decline, but not a significant one since their activities were 
mostly global and the German nuclear capacity only constitutes a small fraction of the global 
one. 
- My impression was that the energy industry did not take the earlier nuclear 
exit decision of [2000] very seriously. [...] The large electricity suppliers 
pushed the first exit aside. " (interview 2-2, incumbent div. 
electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "The year 2000/2001 when the nuclear exit treaty was signed, that was a first 
turn. It was considered visionary – but also in the sense that, it is going to 
happen sometime in the very distant future." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. 
national electricity supplier) 
The long term targets that were formulated in the course of the energy transition 
constituted important points of reference that firms used to understand and predict the future 
of the energy sector, but they did not have an immediate effect on corporate actions. The case 
studies show that firms use long term targets to make better predictions of the future 
development of their relevant markets. They are typically employed as a basis for scenario 
analyses and forecasts. The case studies reveal that firms' assessment of market potential was 
decisive for innovation activities. Long term targets underpin future market potential and 
nudge innovation activities, especially exploration, development and implementation, in a 
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certain direction. Credible long term targets hence provide guidance and direction, but are 
trumped by current laws, regulations and economic incentives when it comes to making 
short-term decisions. Targets are supported and made more credible by roadmap or plans for 
their implementation.   
- "Of course we consider [political targets in market forecasts and scenarios]. 
However, I claim that they are not very influential for today's strategic 
decisions. [...] We use them as an argument for entries into [new business 
areas], but they are too long term to use them as a basis for decision-making."  
(interview 2-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "They guide our actions to a certain extent, because they are an expression of 
political will and public sentiment. [...] They codify an implicit agreement." 
(interview 6-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "The BMU Leitstudie [that described scenarios for the development of 
renewable energy] and was in place until 2012 always guided our actions. [...] 
We did consider this sufficiently reliable, especially together with the 2010 
Energy Concept and the 2001 Meseberg Decisions [implementing EU 
decisions for an integrated energy and climate program]" (interview 4-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
Of the various long term targets that have been defined in the course of the energy 
transition, not all targets are equally important to all firms. Long term targets exist in various 
polities (Germany, EU, international) and for various areas such as greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, the deployment of renewable energy sources, energy efficiency or e-mobility. Of 
all the political long term targets defined over time, only the German 2010 Energy Concept 
and the EU targets for 2020 and 2030, which do not belong to the Energiewende policy mix, 
were specifically mentioned by interviewees1. Firms pay attention to targets set in markets 
where they are active in.  
The importance that firms attribute to targets depends on their areas of activities and 
market reach, as well as credibility of the targets. GHG emission reduction targets tended to 
be more important for industries who are large emitters, such as the chemical firms and the 
electricity suppliers surveyed. Targets pertaining to RES deployment were closely monitored 
by electricity suppliers and TSOs, and to a smaller extent by energy technology firms. Energy 
                                                 
1 This might, however, be the case because they are the most recent ones and the ones relevant now. 
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efficiency targets were particularly important to energy technology and materials firms. As 
targets go into market forecasts, they are weighed by the relative importance of the market to 
a particular firm. For firms active on a global market, such as most of the energy technology 
and materials companies surveyed, German targets by themselves only as important as the 
German market to their global activities. For firms with the bulk of their activities in 
Germany, such as energy generation and transmission companies, the German targets were 
the most important ones.  
The political decision to accelerate the nuclear exit following Fukushima increased 
the change dynamics across all sectors in the energy technology value chain.  
- "Everything got more dynamic after 2011." (interview 8-1, incumbent foc. 
heating tech firm) 
- "I have the impression that [after Fukushima] it was easier to get internal 
funding for [Energiewende relevant] R&D projects. But we did not start an 
entirely new program for energy transition research." (interview 26-1, 
incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "[With the political decisions after Fukushima] the energy transition became 
political mainstream." (interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
For energy technology and materials firms as well as TSOs, it did not have a 
fundamental impact on the direction of innovation activities as the strategic direction had 
mostly been set before and consequently all innovation activities were started and ongoing.  
- "Fukushima did not lead to substantial changes. Our direction towards 
sustainability had been set earlier." (interview 21-1, incumbent div. chemicals 
firm) 
- "Our decisions and investments are long term, single situations do not result in 
massive changes." (interview 19-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
- "[Dynamics did not change after 2011] because we are not working for private 
customers, only commercial and industrial ones. And that is a business driven 
by economics." (interview 26-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
For electricity suppliers, the situation got worse after the accelerated nuclear exit as 
the value of their nuclear assets dropped significantly over night and firm value decreased as 
a consequence. However, the strong push towards business model innovation which started 
after 2011 and has been described earlier (cf. section 6.2.3.5) was not only driven by these  
devaluations, but there was an overlapping effect of falling electricity prices which occurred 
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as a consequence of rising RES electricity volumes. Hence, it was not only the new post-
Fukushima political vision and strategy that initiated the changes in innovation activities of 
electricity suppliers, but rather the market price effects that are the result of other political 
interventions, such as the Renewable Energy Act, which is further elaborated below (cf. 
section 6.3.2.2).  
- "Fukushima and the political turnaround made it obvious that problems [for 
the energy industry] are getting worse. [...] It was the last straw. We had 
structural inefficiencies historically, but were able to afford them in the past, 
but over the time less so, and Fukushima finally pulled the plug." (interview 6-
1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
One interviewee even argued that the turnaround of Fukushima damaged innovation 
activity as electricity suppliers became financially unstable and were hence not able to 
continue investments at the same rate as before. This might have affected their own 
innovation activities as well as those of their suppliers, mainly energy technology firms, 
whose potential market decreased with decreasing financial capacities of their customers.  
Views on this, however, varied and remain inconclusive. 
Similar findings regarding the effect of vision and strategy on innovation activities 
have been presented in earlier empirical research in environmental economics and innovation 
studies. For example, conducting research on the innovation effect of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) several scholars have found that long term targets regarding 
climate protection and greenhouse gas emissions had a positive effect on innovation activities 
(Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012). Political environmental targets 
serve as market information that provide a cue to the long term development of a particular 
sector and as a consequence encourage innovation activities relevant to the environmental 
target in that sector (ibid.).  
6.3.2 Instruments 
6.3.2.1 Technology-push instruments 
The case studies show that technology-push instruments i.e. direct financial support for 
research and development (R&D) has been widely used and that they motivate innovation in 
the respect that the financial risks of R&D investments are decreased. Technology-push 
instruments are very effective at early stages of technological development and to foster 
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technological progress that requires the combined strengths of various actors, i.e. firms from 
different industries and value chain positions with universities and public research institutes. 
However, in addition to some procedural downsides they cannot create markets and hence 
provide for sustainability of the investments in technological development.  
All but one of the case study participants confirmed that their firm take or have taken 
public R&D funds. The main motive for using public funds is to share and hence decrease the 
financial risks of technological development. Public research programs were instrumental 
especially for the early technological development of RES technology. The origin of today's 
wind and solar technology firms often lies in universities and publically-funded research 
projects of the 1970s to 1990s.  
- "The development of renewable energy is closely linked to public research 
funding. The evaluation of the last Energy Research Program of the German 
federal government found out that, in contrast to other technologies, research 
funding in renewables was very successful in making academic research 
results into products [...]. An important pillar there is personnel transfer; 
academic research is where the R&D staff of the renewables industry learnt 
their skills." (interview 13-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
- "We are looking at all topics from a global perspective and public funds are 
important, especially when it comes to high risk topics." (interview 24-1, 
incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
In addition to risk reduction, building a network and partnerships for research 
collaboration were mentioned as the second important reason to use public funds. Most 
public research programs require the collaboration of many actors in a consortium in order to 
be eligible for funding. Such collaboration increases knowledge sharing and facilitates the 
development of products that require interfaces with other products or systemic elements. 
- "Publically funded projects provide the opportunity to immediately build a 
network, especially in areas without much prior experience." (interview 20-1, 
incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "One industry in the energy sector cannot master these big challenges by itself. 
You need alliances [...] When it comes to new areas you always need the trio 
of academia, industry and politics. [...] Public research funding is in our view 
an important instrument to align interests and push developments [in 
partnerships]." (interview 24-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
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In terms of the specific programs, the case studies did not fully reveal which support 
programs were used and which ones were considered most effective. Programs that were 
discussed include German funds managed by the German ministries for the economy and for 
research, the federal government's Energy Research Programs that have been in place since 
1974 and the EU's Horizon 2020. Global firms also make use of available funds beyond 
Europe. 
Many interviewees complained about the administrative burden of public research 
programs and the slow progress and high need for coordination in large research consortia. 
Another point of critique was that public funds are usually directed at basic research or early 
technological development and fail to make the link to a market launch. In the same vein they 
are also not market- and customer-oriented. Firms that view innovation very close to the 
market as there priority have claimed to make less use of public funds in the future. 
- "You need to know how to administer [public research projects]. I created a 
department for this [...], that's what large firms do." (interview 26-1, 
incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "We have been discussing to stay away from [research projects] with a 
consortium: endless discussions [...], meetings, [...] not actionable at all." 
(interview 9-1, incumbent foc. TSO) 
- "Topics for which funds are available are not close enough to what our 
customers want: too lengthy, too slow and with an awkward partnership 
structure. […] It does not do any harm and provides for some level of activity, 
especially in basic research, but it is not useful for execution and application." 
(interview 6-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
If the objective is socio-technical change in an industry or even economy, technology-
push instruments have the large downside that they do not create markets. They help create a 
technology, possibly even a product, but without the prospect of a market for that product the 
development will stop after the expiration of funds. As a consequence public R&D funds may 
be distortive in a sense that they encourage R&D in areas that are by the firms themselves not 
viewed as sustainable, because the market potential is not there. In the case of renewable 
energy for example, albeit the technological base was developed in the 1980s and 1990s, 
funded by public research grants, it only took off after deployment policies in the 2000s 
created a market for them. Previous development efforts were often discontinued when 
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funding ran out. Nevertheless, research subsidies can influence the direction and rate of R&D 
as they lower the barrier of additional corporate R&D investment. 
- "Public research funding on the supply side is nice to have, but it is prone to 
opportunism. Demand is what counts. […] Research subsidies can be effective 
[…] when they lower [the risks of R&D investments] […] and nudge firms 
into a particular direction. But research subsidies […] cannot create markets" 
(interview 10-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
These findings resonate with existing empirical research on the innovation effect of 
technology-push policy instruments. There is little doubt that direct investments into R&D 
have a positive effect on innovation activities (Johnstone et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2012; 
Rogge & Hoffmann, 2010; Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012; Walz et 
al., 2011; Wangler, 2010). However, empirical research has also shown that they may be 
insufficient by themselves and especially the existence of a market is a critical 
complementary factor for a positive effect on innovation activities (T. S. Schmidt et al., 2012; 
Reichardt & Rogge, 2014). 
6.3.2.2 Demand-pull instruments 
The case studies show that demand-pull instruments were critical in fostering innovation 
activities in the context of Energiewende. Demand-pull instruments seek to induce innovation 
by promoting the deployment of a certain technology with command-and-control, market-
based mechanisms or information. In terms of corporate innovation activities they thus affect 
the adoption of a technology directly, but only have an indirect, or dynamic, impact on 
technological exploration, development and implementation. In the course of the German 
energy transition especially the feed-in tariff installed by the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG) was instrumental as it created a market for RES-E technology and made the business 
case for investments in the development and improvement of such technology. Furthermore, 
the design features of the EEG led to a re-structuring of the energy industry by enabling 
small-scale electricity producers and inducing a decentralization of electricity generation. 
These changes to the energy system then set off another round of innovation activities 
regarding more systemic aspects such as smart grid, energy management and energy storage. 
Besides the EEG, a couple of other demand-pull instruments such as energy-efficiency 
regulation, and RES heating and combined heat and power incentive schemes also played a 
role. However, the case studies also expose difficulties. First, boosting demand in one 
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national market may not be sufficient to incentivize large multinational firms to invest in 
risky technological exploration, especially if there is also doubt regarding the sustainability of 
such demand. Second, market growth from demand-pull instruments can become excessive 
and lead to opportunistic behavior especially if, again, firms do not have a long-term 
perspective on the market.  
6.3.2.2.1 The Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 
There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the EEG was tremendously successful in terms of 
incentivizing the adoption of renewable energy technology. As was elaborated previously (cf. 
section 6.2.2.1), the EEG's attractive rate of return on electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E) caused the mass installation of RES-E technology in Germany throughout 
the 2000s, as residential, commercial and industrial actors invested in solar panels, wind 
farms and biomass plants. Also electricity suppliers contributed to this diffusion by investing 
in a shift of their generation portfolio towards renewables. 
Also in terms of exploration, development and implementation, the case studies find a 
positive effect of the EEG (cf. section 6.2.1). The growth of the RES-E markets in Germany 
increased potential returns and hence spurred innovation in that way. Energy technology 
incumbents and start-ups invested in technological improvement and the exploration of 
technological options in order to become more competitive. 
- "It is demand that is decisive. If there is one thing that has promoted innovation 
towards Energiewende in Germany in the past 20 or 30 years it is the priority 
given towards renewable energy in the grid coupled with feed-in-tariffs. This 
created a market without which we would not have proper wind turbines and PV 
panels today. […] It turned out to be an unbelievable success. Albeit one must 
say, this was predictable. If it is that attractive financially, many players enter the 
market." (interview 10-1, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical engineering firm) 
- "Private investments [in innovation] flow naturally if the market is attractive. [...] 
Batteries do not get cheaper in the lab [...], but through learning and scale 
effects." (ibid.) 
And it was not only RES technology that got an innovation incentive because of the 
EEG. Innovation in several other technology areas was also triggered by the EEG, or, more 
precisely, the systemic developments that the EEG initiated. The specific design features of 
the EEG were remarkable in the sense that they fostered systemic change and challenged the 
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prevailing balance of power in the energy system. Although not explicitly mentioned as a 
target, the EEG aimed at a decentralization of the German energy system. The fixed tariffs 
over an extended period of time and accessible to everybody provided attractive investment 
opportunities for small-scale investors, but much less to large incumbent firms who were 
historically used to higher rates of return. In terms of systemic regulation (cf. section 
6.3.2.3.2) the EEG also ensured that all of the RES electricity produced could be fed into the 
grid by giving it precedence over conventionally-generated energy. As such it prevented the 
electricity suppliers (and later also the carved-out TSOs) from using their strategic position as 
owners and operators of the electricity grid to block renewable energy.  
- "The change happened at such a pace that electricity suppliers did not have the 
time to alert to problems […] and blocked the development. They just had to 
integrate a lot of PV very quickly, they solved this by doing it, and it worked." 
(interview 13-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
- "A significant characteristic of the energy transition is that it started decentral 
and brought thousands of new actors into the energy market. […] This is how 
creativity and innovation were promoted." (interview 27-1, start-up foc. solar 
tech. firm) 
The systemic change that unfolded throughout the 2000s was marked by rising 
electricity generation from renewables, corresponding fluctuations in electricity load, 
decentral and small-scale generation, the emergence of "prosumption", the resulting strains 
on the grid, new players on the energy market, and declining wholesale prices due to the 
merit order effect (cf. section 6.2.3.5). These developments triggered innovation activities 
related to smart grid, energy management and energy storage (cf. sections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.1.5) 
as well as business model innovation on parts of the large incumbent electricity suppliers (cf. 
section 6.2.3.5) in the late 2000s and 2010s. So the EEG had spillover effects on innovation 
activities in areas beyond its immediate target RES-E generation technology. 
- "The first EEG [in 2000] this is since when we have been monitoring the system 
and doing smaller innovation and research activities." (interview 1-1, incumbent 
div. software/IT firm) 
- "For us it's not the energy transition as such, but what its effects are. And the 
effects are that our world is becoming decentral. That is why the energy system 
changes. […] Our strategic direction is to develop business models for this 
decentral world." (interview 3-2, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier) 
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- "The decentralization […] and the increase in the number of small market 
participants […] have been underestimated. […] We are still looking for a way to 
enter this market." (interview 2-2, incumbent div. electrical/mechanical 
engineering firm) 
- "Matching fluctuating generation with consumption – that's the topic that we 
work on." (interview 17-1, start-up foc. national electricity supplier) 
- "The fluctuating renewables have made energy an interesting topic for new 
business opportunities." (interview 24-1, incumbent div. chemicals firm) 
- "Decentral is the growth story for the coming decades." (interview 4-1, 
incumbent foc. municipal electricity supplier) 
6.3.2.2.2 Other demand-pull instruments 
Although it exceeds the others in its impact by far, the EEG is not the only demand-pull 
policy in the German Energiewende policy mix that has come up in the case studies. Other 
policies discussed in the course of the case studies include energy efficiency standards and 
incentive schemes for the deployment of renewables in heating.  
A variety of energy efficiency standards have driven the exploration, development and 
implementation of energy-efficient technology and energy efficiency services (cf. section 
6.2.1.3) as well as the adoption of energy-efficient technology (cf. section 6.2.2.2). Although 
no specific policies were discussed in detail during the case studies, there is a couple of 
regulations that define the energy efficiency standards in Germany. The Energy Savings 
Decree (Energieeinsparverordnung, EnEV) which was first installed in 2002 and revised 
several times, sets standards, limits and reporting guidelines for the energy use of new and 
renovated commercial and residential buildings. The Law and Regulation on Energy 
Consumption Labelling (Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz, EnVKG, and 
Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsverordnung, EnVKV) set out how to label the energy use 
of products. These standards, however, do not originate from German politics, but are 
European Union directives transposed into German law. Although transposition is not 
straightforward and to a significant degree influenced by national policy-making (Falkner, 
Hartlapp, & Treib, 2007; Steunenberg, 2007), the objectives and basic principles for these 
standards have hence been set outside of the realm of German politics. They are still part of 
the German Energiewende policy mix, but also constitute non-German environmental policy, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter (cf. section 6.4.1.2). 
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Another German demand-pull regulation that affected innovation in energy-efficiency 
is the requirement to have a certified energy management system if energy-intensive firms 
want to qualify for an exemption of the RES-E financing mechanism (EEG Umlage). This 
regulation was mentioned by case study participants as having had an influence on the 
development and implementation of energy-efficiency services (cf. section 6.2.1.3.2), 
In addition, other demand-pull instruments such as the 2009 Renewable Energy 
Heating Act (Erneuerbare Energien Wärme Gesetz, EEWärmeG), which mandates a certain 
share of renewables for heating and cooling in new buildings, the 2002 Combined Heat and 
Power Law (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungs-Gesetz, KWKG), which sets a feed-in-tariff for 
electricity generated in CHP plants, as well as unspecified loan programs by the public bank 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), which grant interest-free or interest-reduced loans for 
installations related to RES-E or energy efficiency, came up during the case studies. Several 
interviewees have noted the allure of CHP as a technology in the context of Energiewende. 
Especially municipal and start-up electricity supplier have constructed CHP plants since the 
mid 2000s because of an attractive financial return for the power produced and the possibility 
to use CHP to balance fluctuating renewables. Municipal suppliers also frequently have 
synergy potential due to the increased efficiency of producing power and heat together. 
However, the frequent and considerable changes the KWKG make conditions for investment 
rather insecure. While these instruments appear to have supported demand for the respective 
technologies their impact does not seem as significant as that of the EEG on RES-E 
technology.  
6.3.2.2.3 Limitations and downsides of demand-pull 
While demand-pull instruments were critical drivers of innovation activities in the context of 
Energiewende, a couple of qualifications need to be made.  
First, national demand-pull policies may only partially be relevant to the activities of 
global firms. Demand-pull policies do not cause technological exploration, development and 
implementation directly, such as technology-push instruments. Instead, they fuel market 
growth in a certain product or segment and this consequently triggers these activities as firms 
compete for a share of that market. The effect of demand-pull policies on corporate 
innovation activities varies greatly across the firms of the energy technology value chain 
depending on their respective market reaches. The case study participants have repeatedly 
emphasized that they define their relevant market with respect to the geographies where they 
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engage in business activities. This means if firms are globally active, demand-pull 
instruments that are installed by a national government will only affect that particular fraction 
of a firm's demand that is in the respective country. The larger the share of a firm's market 
affected by the politically-induced creation of demand, the larger the impact on exploration, 
development and implementation. This was especially the case for the energy technology and 
materials firms surveyed. All of them realized the majority of their revenue outside Germany. 
Electricity suppliers and TSOs in contrast had Germany as their core market even if they had 
some other activities in other countries. This is relevant for assessing the effectiveness of the 
EEG as it only applied to Germany. The energy technology and materials firms surveyed 
claimed that while the EEG in general had the potential to incentivize innovation in RES-E 
technology by increasing the demand for it in Germany, their own decisions to invest 
depended on the development of demand across all relevant markets. Germany alone was too 
small to trigger significant investments in R&D. The increasing innovation activities in 
renewables after 2000 were hence due to global demand as not only Germany, but other 
countries as well, implemented RES support schemes. Nevertheless, Germany had a 
considerable market share of 5-10 % across all RES-E technologies (cf. Figure 22), hence the 
EEG was important, but it would most likely not have been if no other country had installed 
comparable incentive schemes. As such the EEG has supported technological development 
through contributing towards the expectations of a global market for such technology. 
 
Figure 22: Annually installed RES-E capacity by country and German market share 2008 - 2014 
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Source: Own graphic with data from IRENA (2015) 
 
Second, another downside of demand-pull instruments, at least where they constitute 
strong incentive mechanisms like the EEG, is that market growth that is too strong can lead to 
opportunistic behavior where firms seek to reap maximum short term benefits without having 
a long term perspective on the market (cf. section 6.2.1.1). Either firms enter and exit 
quickly, or they are led to damage their long term competitiveness by neglecting exploration, 
development and implementation relative to revenue, investing in production capacity 
instead. This might have been the case in solar PV. When the German solar PV market made 
up around half of the world market in the mid 2000s (cf. Figure 17) the boom associated with 
the EEG provided such an incentive. However, as stated earlier, not all firms subdued to such 
opportunism. In fact all of the firms interviewed with activities in the solar industry stressed 
their continuous commitment to innovation in solar PV, however, they did not rule out that in 
the wider industry such behavior might have taken place.  
Third, following both qualifications just made, case study participants were wary of 
the installation of strong "EEG-type" incentive mechanisms for other technologies. Looking 
at areas that will have to develop in order to successfully complete the energy transition, 
energy storage, smart grid, or energy management technology could also benefit from a boost 
in demand. Interviewees noted repeatedly that the main reason why development in these 
technologies is comparatively slow is because there is little market demand for them 
currently. However, despite this the firms surveyed did not support incentives for energy 
storage or distributed energy in the same way that the EEG incentivized renewables, claiming 
that it would distort the market: a strong incentive such as, e.g., paying a feed-in-tariff for 
electricity from storage would enforce an artificial regulatory selection of technology, rather 
than a natural market-based one. Furthermore, it would entail the risk of overheating the 
market just as happened in solar PV. 
- "The problem [with solar PV feed-in-tariffs] was that the industry had a 
learning curve too steep for politics to follow. […] Degression always came 
too late, because it was a political process." (interview 19-1, start-up foc. solar 
tech. firm) 
- "If my business case depends on returns that are not generated by market 
mechanisms I run a portfolio risk. […] I've stressed this in all political 
discussions regarding energy storage. Short term we would of course like to 
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have subsidies, but it does not help us long term." (interview 21-1, incumbent 
div. chemicals firm) 
These findings regarding the impact of demand-pull instruments in the context of 
Energiewende are largely in line with existing research in environmental economics. 
Demand-pull instruments are generally attributed a critical role in environmental innovation 
(Jaffe et al., 2003; Jaffe & Stavins, 1995; Nemet, 2009; Peters et al., 2012). A closer 
discussion of the significance of the EEG, also in light of the controversy identified at the 
beginning of this thesis (cf. section 4.3), as well as the potential negative effects of strong 
policy-induced market growth will follow in the next chapter.  
6.3.2.3 Systemic regulation 
The case studies show that systemic regulation has also affected innovation activities. In the 
context of innovation policy, systemic policies are typically understood as policies that affect 
the performance of an innovation system. Such policies are mainly directed at 
communication, interaction and knowledge sharing between players in innovation systems 
(Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004; Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012). Clearly these are important, but 
were in no particular focus and did not emerge as relevant topics from case studies conducted 
for this thesis. The systemic policies that were discussed during the interviews are directed at 
the functioning of the energy system in Germany at large, not specifically the innovation 
system.   
The systemic instruments identified from the case studies are laws and regulations 
governing access to and pay-offs from elements of the energy system, be it the physical 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, or the virtual trading of it. Such laws 
and regulations form the basis of the governance of network industries, such as the electricity 
sector, and the operation of regulated traded markets, such as electricity exchanges. They 
have an indirect effect on innovation activities through setting the basic rules and framework 
conditions in which firms have to operate. As such they do not lower the barriers of R&D 
investments (such as technology-push instruments) or provide a strong incentive to act (such 
as demand-pull instruments), but more subtly enable or disable certain conduct e.g., by 
providing the access and return required to participate in a market that will yield returns for a 
novelty in the first place. Systemic regulation can constitute a gateway, but also a major 
barrier to innovation e.g., by restricting market access limiting the ways to make money in a 
market. Four incidences of political intervention, some enabling, some restricting, turn out to 
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be of particular importance; the liberalization of the electricity sector in the 1990s, the 
systemic elements of the Renewable Resources Act (EEG), rules and regulations for 
electricity market participation, and electricity market design. 
6.3.2.3.1 Liberalization of the electricity sector 
The amendments to the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) in 1998 
implemented an EU directive to liberalize the electricity markets. This permitted the 
exploration, development and implementation of new business models in the electricity 
industry and consequently the emergence of new actors such as electricity suppliers and 
traders with no physical generation assets (cf. section 6.2.3.5.1). As these new actors are very 
active innovators now especially in critical areas such as smart grid, energy management, 
energy storage and respective business models (cf. sections 6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.5, and 6.2.3.5) , the 
liberalization was an important early enabler of some of the innovation activity in the 
electricity supply sector that is envisaged today. In addition to this, incumbent electricity 
suppliers have mentioned liberalization as an important driver for their business as a whole, 
however, not clearly so for innovation activities. One electricity supplier affirmed that they 
diversified their innovation activities after liberalization presented them with more market 
opportunities. Another one contemplated cost reductions after liberalization that cut into the 
funding for non-targeted, exploratory technological projects. It is hence clear that 
liberalization had an important impact on all activities in the sector, however not a 
unidirectional and unambiguous one. 
- "We divested [PV] through liberalization, financial results pressure and lack of 
effect." (interview 3-1, incumbent foc. national electricity supplier)  
These findings are roughly in line with, but further illustrate empirical findings in 
environmental economics on the effect of liberalization on innovation in the electricity supply 
sector. Liberalization seems to affect priorities and intensity of innovation activities and 
outputs in the electricity sector, however, is no kick-start for innovation per se. Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2008, 2011) find a decline of R&D expenditures following the liberalization of 
electricity supply in the United Kingdom, but at the same time a rise in R&D productivity 
and outputs, such as patents. Tõnurist, den Besten, Vandeven, Yu and Paplaiyte (2015) 
investigate subsequent rounds of electricity market liberalization in Belgium and the 
Netherlands and discover that innovation has tended to become more customer-oriented and 
dynamic because of market competition, but R&D spent overall has declined and the 
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diffusion of new technologies (in their cases RES-E generation technology) does not seem to 
be positively affected. For the case of the German Energiewende, the liberalization of the 
1990s has introduced competition in the electricity sector which in turn has shaped all 
activities of the actors involved subsequently including innovation activities. It has previously 
been shown that renewable energy policies are more effective in countries with liberalized 
energy markets (Nesta, Vona, & Nicolli, 2014)  This competition probably facilitated 
innovation towards a sustainable transition of the energy system, but did not trigger or 
exclusively determine it. 
6.3.2.3.2 Systemic elements of the EEG 
In addition to the EnWG and liberalization, another systemic instrument was critical to 
innovation activities through its impact on market access. The EEG, mainly known for its 
feed-in tariff, a demand-pull instrument, also has elements of systemic regulation. The 
priority and guaranteed grid access for electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) 
was instrumental as an enabler of systemic change. Since it is difficult to separate the effect 
of this systemic aspect of the EEG from the feed-in tariff, the combined effect of the two has 
already been discussed in the previous section (cf. section 6.3.2.2). To briefly summarize 
here, the priority and guarantee given to electricity from RES ensured market access and 
consequently the pay-off from an investment in RES electricity generation technology.  
Without this element incumbent market participants in strategic positions (i.e. owners and 
operators of distribution and transmission grids) might have had the opportunity to rig market 
access and hence reduce the attractiveness of the feed-in tariff. As such the systemic element 
of the EEG contributed to its success in terms of RES deployment. Furthermore, it also 
supported the change of the German energy system as a whole by allowing non-incumbent 
producers of electricity to access the market. In a series of dynamic effects this lead to the 
rise in renewables and decentralization of electricity generation that underpins the change of 
the German energy system.  
6.3.2.3.3 Rules and regulations for energy system governance 
However, systemic regulation in the context of Energiewende has not only had an enabling 
role. Some of the rules and processes for the governance of the energy system in Germany 
that were set by the EnWG have proved to be rigid and inflexible when it comes to 
innovations. This has impeded the successful implementation of some inventions, especially 
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those that seek to introduce new nodes, new activities or new ways of compensation in the 
system. 
Actor conduct in the electricity system is governed primarily by the German network 
industries regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA). The BNetzA sets rules and regulations 
such as compensation mechanisms and permissible returns for grid operators and standards 
and process of grid planning and accounting (Bilanzkreismanagement). These rules determine 
how the electricity system is operated and are hence manifestations of a particular way of 
understanding its functioning and priorities.  
An example where these rules and regulations have constituted an obstacle for change 
is the struggle of demand side energy management providers to integrate their service 
offering into the energy system. At the outset of their efforts around 2010 the rules and 
regulations to maintain stability of the transmission grid network were only defined with 
respect to electricity supply, not electricity consumption. That means while suppliers could be 
rewarded for increasing or decreasing electricity supply to balance electricity load in the grid 
as needed, rewards for increasing or decreasing electricity demand were not defined. Raising 
awareness and implementing the required regulatory changes took years i.e. impeding, or at 
least delaying, the implementation of demand management (cf. section 6.2.1.4). The complex 
regulation has hence constituted a barrier to innovation in at least this area. 
- "Liberalization has not made it easier to implement new solutions. Because we 
have a separation of the electricity grid and market that is cemented in the 
management system for grid planning and accounting1 it is really hard to 
implement changes. […] You can have an amazing innovative idea, but not be 
able to introduce it to the market if you have not written the law and regulation 
for how to implement it in advance." (interview 16-1, start-up foc. software/IT 
firm) 
- "[I wish politics] left space for liberal markets and new business models 
wherever it is possible." (interview 18-1, start-up foc. electricity supplier) 
Another example is the provision of innovation and modernization incentives to 
transmission and distribution grid operators. As their returns are fixed by the network 
regulator, excess cash to invest in innovation activities for invention, implementation or 
diffusion needs to be acquired through special regulatory mechanisms. The case studies 
                                                 
1 The German term Bilanzkreismanagementsystem for was used in the German interview 
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provided some evidence that especially in the case of DSOs the current mechanisms may not 
be sufficient to ensure the required extension of distribution grids and in particular their 
update to become smart grids (cf. 6.2.2.3). 
Both examples may hint to a possible failure on part of policy makers to anticipate the 
systemic implications of their decisions and consider how established systemic regulation and 
the objectives and effects of other policies, such as vision and strategy or demand-pull 
instruments and how it might have to be adjusted. This was frequently contemplated by case 
study participants. Systemic regulation requires policy makers to have very detailed expert 
knowledge of the areas supposed to be regulated. The energy system is a particular challenge 
with a high degree of complexity as it combines a physical supply, transmission and 
distribution system with virtually traded contracts and markets. Throughout the case studies a 
failure to foresee and adequately address the systemic consequences and requirements of 
other policies was mentioned in a couple of areas, e.g., regarding the fast growth of 
renewable energy generation and the delay in developing corresponding plans for an 
extension of the physical grid in order to be able to connect renewable capacity and transport 
electricity to places of consumption far away, a possible change of electricity market design 
to provide for adequate reserve capacity, and the aforementioned flexibility of the grid 
planning and accounting system to integrate novelties and investment incentives to grid 
operators. 
- "With the increase of renewables it became foreseeable […] that the energy system 
needs to be overhauled; not only technologically, but also in terms of regulation." 
(interview 16-1, start-up foc. software/IT firm)  
- "There are very few experts that understand the clashes that can take place on the 
most granular levels of detail. […] [Politicians typically don't.]" (interview 16-1, start-
up foc. software/IT firm) 
- "In many areas there is so much contradiction that there is no clear market signal." 
(interview 6-1, incumbent foc. electricity supplier) 
- "When you define market rules you automatically limit the range of possible 
technological solutions that emerge." (interview 13-1, start-up foc. solar tech. firm) 
These findings are largely in line with what would be expected from the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the impact of such systemic laws and regulations on innovation 
activity. While there is little empirical research in this particular area, applying theoretical 
knowledge from evolutionary economics and sustainability transitions (cf. chapter 2) one 
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would expect institutional change such as the adaptation rules and regulations to be slow and 
path dependent and especially institutions at a very low level of granularity to be among the 
last to adapt. This tension will be further discussed later in this thesis (section 7.2.1).    
6.3.2.3.4 Electricity market design 
Lastly, the current debate about electricity market design i.e. the definition of the individual 
tradable market segments in the electricity wholesale market and the way in which market 
participants are compensated also bears on innovation activities. On a very simplified level, 
there are two basic principles for the organization of wholesale electricity markets: First, in 
an energy only market only the provision of electric energy is explicitly compensated for. 
This means the market price is determined based on the marginal supply of and demand for 
energy. This is the market principle in the German electricity markets today1. In contrast to 
this, in a capacity market, the provision of electric capacity is compensated in addition to 
electric energy. I.e. even power plants that are not running or not running at full capacity can 
earn a return just for being able to provide that capacity to the market if required. At the time 
of the empirical research (2015) the German government was contemplating a reform to the 
electricity market design with the potential introduction of a capacity market.  
The link between electricity market design and innovation is a very indirect one, yet 
nevertheless important. New business models and products will be oriented on the pay-offs 
they can generate in a given market design and little effort will be put into developing and 
implementing these as long as the market design question is not solved. Furthermore, for 
market participants with large electricity generation capacity, i.e. incumbent electricity 
suppliers, the electricity market design has a significant effect on the returns of their assets 
hence their financial situation overall. A capacity market has the potential to improve their 
strained finances and make available more resources, for example, to put into innovation 
activities.    
There was a general consensus among case study participants that a capacity market 
or capacity mechanisms are important to adequately reward the provision of reserve capacity 
to balance fluctuating renewable energies. Clearly this is not a surprise for incumbent 
electricity suppliers, however, also start-up firms tended to express support for capacity 
                                                 
1 This explanation remains extremely simplified. A detailed discussion of the German electricity market design 
and alternatives to it can be found in the BMWi (2014b) Green Paper for electricity market design. 
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markets. Furthermore, participants agreed that the electricity market should be designed in a 
way that flexibility is rewarded, without elaborating this point in more detail. None of the 
case study participants explicitly mentioned an impediment of innovation activities given any 
particular outcome of the electricity market design debate. However, anticipated returns from 
electricity trading will certainly influence the selection of viable products, technology options 
and systemic elements and hence determine the future set-up of the energy system. Just 
exactly how this will look like is difficult to anticipate at the moment.  
- "The extreme growth in renewable energy is not compatible with the current 
electricity market design." (interview 17-1, start-up foc. electricity supplier) 
- "[In the discussion about electricity market design] innovation is not a big 
topic currently. However, […] [innovation] is also about the competition 
between different technologies, and markets are the best way to discover the 
technologies that will be successful in the future." (interview 6-2, incumbent 
foc. electricity supplier) 
Also, although energy-only markets versus capacity markets is the major debate right 
now, it might in fact only have limited impact on the transition of the energy system. 
Empirical research indicates that while capacity mechanisms naturally provide an incentive 
for increased investments into generation capacity, esp. of the conventional type, they do not 
per se encourage measures for a more efficient energy system such as demand response 
management or ancillary services to stabilize the electricity grid (Roques, Newbery, & 
Nuttall, 2005; Roques, 2008). The authors conclude that electricity market reforms should 
target these areas first before worrying about capacity mechanisms. 
6.3.3 Process 
The case studies show that as the last element in the Germen Energiewende policy mix also 
the policy process had some impact on innovation activities, albeit it seems to be less relevant 
than the previously discussed aspects. Policy process refers to the series of steps through 
which policies come into existence, are implemented and changed. While the policy process 
of Energiewende naturally started with the environmental movement in civil society and 
politics following the 1970s oil crisis (cf. section 3.3.1), the focus of the case studies turned 
out to be the more recent policy process and the evolution of energy policy and 
Energiewende since the installation of the EEG and the nuclear exit of 2000. Two aspects 
relevant to innovation activities were discussed in particular with regard to policy processes; 
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first, perceived uncertainty of the policy process, and second, corporate participation in its 
outcome.  
6.3.3.1 Uncertainty and volatility regarding the outcomes of the policy process  
Many case study participants have perceived the past political process regarding 
Energiewende as messy, incoherent, and to a certain degree even arbitrary. This perception 
stems especially from the back-and-forth regarding nuclear exit. The nuclear phase-out 
decision of 2000 was recurrently questioned and debated in the years following its 
implementation, eventually softened with longer phase-out periods in the 2010 Energy 
Concept and finally accelerated with the definite decision to end all electricity production 
from nuclear sources by 2022. In addition, some smaller political processes and turnarounds 
in the political endorsement of certain technologies or applications e.g., solar PV, combined 
heat and power, or the exemption from the EEG financing mechanism for electricity suppliers 
(Grünstromprivileg) have also fuelled wariness of the reliability of political opinions and 
policy mixes, esp. where they pertain to financial support for such policies.  
However, it has not become entirely clear from the case studies to what extent and 
how this critique of the political process has affected innovation activities. In general, the 
allegation that underlies the critique of a messy policy process is that market opportunities 
that rely on political sentiment or concrete financial support measures cannot be fairly 
evaluated and may rise or fall along with the changing course of politics. Markets may be 
unsustainable because they are not based on fundamental demand and the political will that 
may uphold them on one day may fade away on the next day. If firms do not expect a market 
potential longer term they are unlikely to make substantial investments into the exploration, 
development and implementation of novelties for these markets. Instead they may rush in and 
out to reap the benefits but not invest for the longer term. The potential risk that strong, but 
unsustainable political incentives can lead to short term opportunistic behavior on parts of 
market participants has already been elaborated in relation to the boom and bust in solar PV 
(cf. section 6.2.1.1 and 6.3.2.2.3). 
This uncertainty also exists regarding currently ongoing policy processes and the 
future set-up of the energy system. The greatest worries of case study participants are the 
continuation of the EEG and the direct marketing of renewables, as well as the systemic 
regulations and incentive mechanisms that will guide the further transition of the grid 
infrastructure towards smart grids and demand and supply side energy management. 
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Especially for the latter one where technological exploration is still required firms note a 
hesitation to invest in exploration, development and implementation as well as in diffusion 
given the uncertainty of what solutions are likely to yield the best returns in the future. 
- "Systemic solutions, smart grids and smart market are important now. […] The 
uncertainty of where [regulation] is going is a challenge." (interview 13-1, 
start-up foc. solar technology firm) 
The environmental economics literature has long realized that regulatory uncertainty 
plays a role in innovation activities, albeit typically rather in connection with policy 
instruments rather than the policy process (Engau & Hoffmann, 2011; Rogge, Schleich, et al., 
2011). It has, however, also been shown that the effect is not necessarily negative. Instead, 
firms have a variety of options to address uncertainty that ranges from not engaging in 
innovation at all to engaging in it even stronger (Engau & Hoffmann, 2011). The 
inconclusive findings here with regards to an effect of uncertainty on innovation activities are 
hence in line with the literature.  
6.3.3.2 Corporate participation in policy making 
Another topic discussed was the participation of firms in policy making through, e.g., formal 
consultations, green and white papers, expert statements and summits, or lobbying, and the 
link of these to innovation activities. Findings from the case studies are divergent indicating 
on the one hand that early involvement in the policy process provided an inspiration for firms 
to reciprocate the political efforts with Energiewende related innovation activities, on the 
other hand, political participation and especially lobbying was also used to cement the status 
quo and hence rather as a substitute to innovation activities. 
There was some evidence that early involvement in the political process motivated 
actors to start innovation activities where they would not have done so otherwise. One case 
study participant, an incumbent energy technology firm, described the expert opinion on 
energy efficiency that his firm was asked to deliver at a federal government energy summit in 
the mid 2000s as an important accelerator for their energy efficient modernization of 
buildings and production facilities as well as the exploration of further technological 
opportunities for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Overall most firms valued the 
participatory policy-making style employed of the German federal government and the input 
as exemplified by e.g., the 2015/2016 green and white paper process for the electricity market 
design reform.  
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However, the case studies also provide evidence for the allegation frequently voiced 
by renewable energy advocacy groups that lobbying was used esp. by large incumbent 
electricity suppliers to try to contain the energy transition in an effort to put off firm-internal 
innovation activities and change processes (Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015). Large electricity 
incumbents, and to a smaller extent also the affected energy technology firms, sought to 
influence policy-making throughout the 2000s with the ambition to revert the nuclear exit 
decision, diminish the influence of renewables and in general shape the energy transition in 
their favor. Focusing their efforts on preserving the status quo instead of preparing for 
change, they delayed certain activities to explore new business areas or not considered them 
necessary given there was still a chance to return to the cash cows of written-off nuclear and 
fossil fuel  power plants. 
- "It's partially a reaction typical for this [electricity] industry; if we are not 
100% convinced by a certain technology, we will fight it instead of searching 
for its potential." (interview 6-2, incumbent national electricity supplier) 
It was only after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident that the energy transition in 
terms of renewables without nuclear was understood as being irreversible. As explained 
before (cf. section 6.2.3.5), it was this development that triggered the big push towards esp. 
business model innovation activities envisaged in the electricity sector.  
6.3.4 Synopsis: impact of the Energiewende policy mix 
This section has discussed the impact of the individual components of the Energiewende 
policy mix on innovation activities of firms of the energy technology value chain. The 
findings provide strong evidence that all elements of the policy mix considered had some 
effect on innovation activities. However, rather than confirming an effect or even indicating 
an effect size, the objective of the case studies and the contribution of the theoretical and 
methodic approaches chosen, was to explore the nature of this effect. Indeed, the case studies 
show that while all elements have tended to have a positive effect on innovation activities, 
there are also ambiguous effects that need to be considered for a holistic assessment. An 
overview of the most important findings is presented in Table 14 below. 
The vision and strategy that has been formulated over the course of the German 
Energiewende has constituted an important point of reference for the future development of 
the German energy system that firms have taken into account when determining the strategy, 
direction and intensity of innovation activities for the longer term. The strategic decisions, 
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such as the nuclear exits in 2000 and 2011, and long-term targets for GHG emissions, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency have provided a cue towards how the associated 
markets will develop over the long term. This anticipated development of markets is an input 
for firms' strategy development and planning regarding innovation. It influences expectations 
of the future and activities targeted at the long term. It is, however, less powerful to influence 
immediate and short-term corporate activities. In terms of innovation activities, they tend to 
be more important for exploration, development and implementation, than for adoption or 
organizational change, possibly with the exemption of the business model changes that were 
initiated following the 2011 nuclear exit. However, to be taken as a basis for future decisions, 
it is important that the political vision and strategy is credible. The limited effect on 
innovation activities of the first nuclear exit was due to the fact that the affected firms did not 
believe it would actually happen in the way set out. In the short term, other components of 
the Energiewende policy mix are more important.  Although in the short term other policies 
may have a stronger impact, they are vision and strategy is essential to guide corporate 
behavior for the longer term.  
Technology-push policies have had an effect especially on exploration, development 
and implementation as the public financial contributions to R&D have lowered the barrier 
and increased the risk sharing of investments into these activities across a wide range of 
technologies and applications. They also contribute to building multi-actor networks in R&D. 
Public funds are extensively used despite the administrative burden that the distribution of 
public money entails. However, the downside of technology-push is that the technological 
development achieved is not sustainable if no market demand for the in question technology 
exists. Ultimately firms will base their decision to pursue innovation activities on the prospect 
of earning a return from these activities and discontinue activities where sufficient market 
demand does not exist. Hence technology-push can be very effective for technological 
development, especially if the technology is still in its infancy, but is ultimately not sufficient 
without a market to sustain it.  
Demand-pull policies with economic incentives, command-and-control regulation and 
informational instruments have been decisive for all types of innovation activities studied. 
Primarily the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) has set an incentive for the adoption of 
RES-E technology and hence created a market for such technology that has in turn provided 
an indirect incentive for further exploration, development and implementation of RES-E and 
complementary technologies. Energy efficiency standards have done the same for more 
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energy-efficient technology and energy efficiency consulting services. However, the case 
studies have also revealed a couple of limitations and downsides of demand-pull policies. 
First, the incentive set by demand-pull policies may not be sufficient for large investments in 
exploration, development and implementation if the market affected by a demand-pull policy 
constitutes too small a share of the market relevant for the investing firm in question. Second, 
strong market growth may create opportunistic behavior on parts of firms. Third, firms may 
be wary of the continuation of such demand-pull policies, especially where they constitute a 
financial incentive, and put off investment in the expectation that the market created is not 
sustainable.   
Systemic regulation has constituted an enabler as well as an obstacle to innovation 
activities. While systemic regulation such as rules governing market access, conduct and pay-
offs in network industries, is usually in the background and not often discussed with respect 
to their innovation impact, the case studies show that it has been important in the context of 
Energiewende. As systemic regulation defines the conditions under which players in 
regulated industries operate it sets the framework for the successful implementation of and 
return from innovations. 
The policy process has also influenced innovation activities. Uncertainty regarding its 
outcomes was noticed by firms. Corporate participation in policy-making can increase the 
commitment and willingness to be innovative regarding a certain topic, however, the case 
studies have also hinted that intensive lobbying for preserving a status quo can to a certain 
extent be used to put off activities related to corporate change. 
 
Table 14: Key findings regarding an innovation effect of Energiewende policy mix components 
Policy mix 
category  Policy mix component Key findings regarding an innovation effect
Vision and 
Strategy  First nuclear exit  • Limited effect on innovation activities because it was not considered credible  
Long term targets  
• Energy Concept  
• Limited effect on innovation activities in the short term  
• Provided important guidance regarding the future market demand for 
RES, energy-efficient and other climate-friendly technology  
Accelerated 
Energiewende  • Did for most firms not affect the strategic direction of innovation activities, but strengthened the overall change dynamics 
• Triggered business model innovation in electricity suppliers  
Instruments  Technology-push 
instruments:  
• R&D support  
• Used by almost all firms to reduce financial burden and risk of 
technological exploration, development and implementation 
• Triggered the building of R&D networks 
• Did not constitute a viable substitute for the existence of markets 
Demand-pull instruments: 
• Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) 
• Various energy 
• EEG directly supported technological adoption and hence created a 
market for RES-E and complementary technology 
• EEG indirectly triggered exploration, development and implementation 
of in RES-E and complementary technologies 
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efficiency regulation 
• Renewable Energy 
Sources Heating Act, 
CHP Law  
• EEG design features promoted systemic change, which in turn triggered 
exploration, development and implementation in all areas needed for an 
RES-based energy system 
• Energy efficiency regulation promoted innovation activities in relevant 
products, processes and services 
• Other demand-pull instruments had comparatively limited impact on 
innovation activities 
• Strong policy-induced market growth involves the risk of opportunistic 
behavior at the expense of innovation activities 
• Firms tended to be cautious to invest in markets that depend on political 
support 
• Were only effective to the extent that the market influenced was 
attractive enough to firms 
Systemic instruments • Had an indirect effect through setting the framework conditions in 
which firms operate 
• Constituted barriers as well as enablers for innovation activity 
Process  Volatile process  • Was noticed, but did not affect innovation activities in any specific 
direction 
Corporate participation  • Provided motivation as well as impediment to innovation activities 
 
6.4 Impact of context factors and firm characteristics 
While the Energiewende policy mix clearly had an impact on innovation activities, as 
elaborated in the previous section, it was not the only factor. The case studies show that a 
number of context factors and firm characteristics influenced innovation activities. Influences 
were either independent of the Energiewende policy mix or together with it as mediating or 
moderating factor. Many of these confounding factors were already mentioned in the 
previous sections when they were relevant. This section summarizes them and discusses the 
nature of their interaction with the Energiewende policy mix.  
6.4.1 Context factors 
6.4.1.1 Market and industry dynamics 
The case studies reveal that market and industry dynamics are critical drivers of innovation 
activities. Even stronger than this, they may indeed be the most important group of 
influencing factors. Especially market factors such as customer demand or the prices of 
inputs and outputs came up in each of the case studies and were always cited as critical 
influences to innovation activities. However, evidence from the case studies also suggests a 
strong interaction between some of the relevant market factors and the Energiewende policy 
mix. As such the market and industry dynamics discussed during the case studies constitute, 
at least partially, dynamic effects of environmental policy. Several market and industry 
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dynamics were mentioned by case study participants as decisive for their decisions to pursue 
innovation activities.  
First and foremost, the development of a market i.e. the strong increase in customer 
demand for environmentally-friendly energy without greenhouse gas emissions was a critical 
driver behind the exploration, development and implementation of relevant technologies. 
Customer demand and market potential were mentioned as a reason for innovation activities 
in RES technology for electricity, heating, and transport (cf. section 6.2.1.1), conventional 
non-emitting electricity generation technology (cf. section 6.2.1.2) and energy efficiency (cf. 
sections 6.2.1.3). Moreover, the demand for solutions for an energy system relying 
exclusively on RES, which emerged when RES gained market share and systemic relevance 
in the mid-to-late 2000, promoted innovation activities in such solutions incl. smart grid, 
supply and demand side energy management, and energy storage (cf. sections 6.2.1.4, 
6.2.1.5).  
Second, the expectation of higher energy prices constituted a motivation for 
innovation activities in energy-saving as well as alternative energy technologies throughout. 
The starting point to explore RES technologies was the oil crisis and corresponding price 
spikes in the 1970s (cf. section 6.2.1.1.1). Innovation activities in energy efficient products, 
processes and services were always critically motivated by the fear of higher prices of 
electricity and other forms of energy (cf. sections 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.2.2).  
Third, lower energy prices have also triggered innovation activities. The losses 
incurred on conventional generation assets due to the declining wholesale electricity price in 
Germany since 2011 were critical in fostering the attempts for business model innovation of 
incumbent electricity suppliers (cf. section 6.2.3.5).  
Fourth, competition from incumbent or start-up firms also increased the pressure to 
conduct innovation activities. Incumbent energy technology firms noticed the emergence of 
RES technology start-ups. At first they were, however, not perceived as competition, but 
rather firms operating in a different market, namely the market for small-scale electricity 
generation (cf. section 6.2.1.1.1). When the RES market expanded, these start-ups were first 
considered attractive take-over targets and then slowly evolved into competitors for the best 
product offering. Moreover, electricity suppliers and energy technology firms perceive 
competitive threats from outside their core industries. For electricity suppliers the emergence 
of small-scale RES-E producers empowered by the EEG was a surprising disruption, but did 
not have a serious effect on innovation before the systemic change was recognized. Currently 
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electricity suppliers increasingly perceive their industry to be invaded by energy technology 
firms from the more upstream sections of the energy technology value chain and firms from 
energy-related industries that have historically been separate from electricity. Energy storage 
offerings from battery producers or operators of electronic vehicles fleets with the capacity to 
feed electricity into the electricity grid for example overstep into the traditional business area 
of electricity suppliers (cf. section 6.2.1.5). In addition, all firms in the energy technology 
value chain fear an overhaul of their sector through the activities of IT and high technology 
firms. Throughout the case studies caution of these new competitors has been prominent. 
Business model motivation in the digital realm (cf. section 6.2.3.5.3) as well as smart grid 
and energy management product offerings (cf. section 6.2.1.4) are specifically influenced by 
this competitive threat. So far, however, no significant disruption has taken place. 
Many of these market and industry dynamics were in fact created or influenced by the 
policies of the German Energiewende policy mix, especially the EEG. First of all, the EEG 
was the decisive factor that increased the demand for RES-E generation technology in 
Germany since 2000 (Held et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Haas et al., 2011a; Jenner, 
Groba, & Indvik, 2013). Because of the impact of the EEG the installed RES-E generation 
capacity expanded from 17 GW in 2000 to 97 GW in 2014, a growth by almost 600% over 
the period (cf. Figure 7). As a consequence of RES-E capacity additions, electricity from 
RES gained a significant share of the German energy mix. It also empowered private and 
small corporate firms to invest in RES-E generation capacity, hence changing the customer 
structure for energy technology firms and creating new competitors in the generation business 
for electricity suppliers. Second, the necessity to make changes to the German energy system 
in order to make it fit to cope with decentral and fluctuating electricity supply was a direct 
consequence of the increasing share of RES-E in the German electricity mix. Third, the 
decline in wholesale electricity prices after 2011 was also a consequence of the higher 
generation of electricity from RES. Fourth, one of the factors influencing the current fear of 
higher electricity prices in Germany is the financing mechanism for the EEG (EEG Umlage) 
which redistributes its costs to the electricity bills of residential, commercial and industrial 
electricity consumers, although at the moment some energy-intensive industries are exempted 
from it to preserve their competitiveness. 
The critical role of market and industry factors has been well described in the 
environmental economics as well as the organization and management literature (Hippel, 
2005; Hoppmann et al., 2013; Horbach, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2003; Schmookler, 1962). Also the 
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dynamic effects of demand-pull policies do not come as a surprise. The role of the EEG in 
that respect will be further discussed in the next chapter (cf. section 7.1.1).  
6.4.1.2 Non-German environmental policy 
The case studies show that not only the German Energiewende policy mix affected 
innovation activities, but also politics and policies in other countries, on the European level 
and in the international policy arena.  
In the same way that German deployment schemes for renewable energy created a 
demand for RES technology, similar demand-pull policies did so in other countries. Many 
countries installed such schemes in the late 1990s and 2000s and for energy technology and 
materials firms active in the global market the combined effect of these influenced their 
decisions regarding innovation activities (cf. sections 6.2.1.1.2 and 6.2.2.1).  
Moreover, some of the German laws discussed and identified as relevant to innovation 
activities are mere transpositions of European Union (EU) directives into national law, 
although national governments typically have some discretion over the final outcome 
(Falkner et al., 2007; Steunenberg, 2007). This is the case for the liberalization of the 
electricity sectors, which has it origin in the EU effort to liberalize and extend the Single 
European Market (SEM) to an ever wider range of products and services (Jamasb & Pollitt, 
2005b). It has been above that this liberalization provided the basis for much of the 
innovative activity seen in the electricity supply industry later (cf. section 6.3.2.3.1). 
Furthermore especially in energy efficiency many of the German laws have their roots in 
European legislation. Several case study participants mentioned these as being directly 
relevant for their decision to engage in more innovation activities for energy efficient 
products and services (cf. section 6.2.1.3.1). The same holds for smart meters in private 
households (cf. section 6.2.1.4.3). In both areas it is unlikely that innovation activities would 
have taken place to the extent that they have, had it not been for EU legislation.  
In addition, other EU regulations as well as international politics and policies also 
affected innovation activities. The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as well as 
the Kyoto Protocol and other international multilateral climate protection efforts were 
mentioned. Especially some energy technology firms note that it was climate change 
regulation on an international and European level that fostered their innovation activities, 
however, this was mainly discussed in the context of the decarbonization of conventional 
electricity generation technology (cf. section 6.2.1.2.1). 
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6.4.1.3 Landscape developments 
Also developments and events on the landscape levels have affected innovation activities. 
The case studies show that the progress in information technology that has taken place 
over the past two decades has had a tremendous effect on innovation activities across all 
firms. Technological advancements taking place through the growth of computing power, the 
development of mobile internet, the internet connection of technical appliances, and most 
recently augmented reality and artificial intelligence define the playing field in all sectors. 
Key words exemplifying these developments such as "internet of things", "smart home" and 
"Industry 4.0" were very prominent in the discussions about innovation in the case studies. 
When it comes to the innovation activities observed, however, digitalization primarily 
functions as an enabler, rather than a driver of these activities. The possibilities provided by 
digitalization constitute the opportunity space for new solutions in the energy system. That 
means they do not motivate innovation activities as such, but they influence the direction of 
activities conducted once the need to conduct them has been realized. This is especially 
prominent in the developments in smart grid and energy management (cf. section 6.2.1.4). 
For example, the need to develop solutions for the grid to cope with the fluctuating electricity 
from renewable energy sources (RES-E) was driven by the increase in RES-E generation, 
which was in turn a result of demand-pull energy policy (cf. section 6.3.2.2). However, the 
attempts to address this need through smart grids and supply and demand side energy 
management resulted from the unfolding technological developments. 
Another landscape development that was repeatedly mentioned by companies as an 
important consideration for their innovation activities was the trend towards 
environmentalism embodied in the development of pro-environmental public opinion since 
the 1970s. The vocal support for green technologies, renewable energy and the rejection of 
nuclear energy was noted and reacted upon by firms. This seems to have played a role for 
exploration, development and implementation activities regarding renewables (cf. section 
6.2.1.1), conventional generation technology (6.2.1.2), and energy-efficiency (cf. section 
6.2.1.3). It was also a factor that led electricity suppliers to adopt RES-E generation capacity 
and modernize power plants to reduce their CO2 emissions (cf. sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2). 
Digitalization as well as environmentalism are commonly recognized as societal 
megatrends that influence all aspects of society (Rosenberg, 2001; Slaughter, 1993b; N. H. 
Stern, 2006; Tapscott, 1996). Other such megatrends such as changing global income 
structures or demographic change did not turn out to be of significance in the case studies. 
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Lastly, in addition to the general developments, some specific events also influenced 
innovation activities. Most noteworthy are the nuclear incidents at Chernobyl (1986) and 
Fukushima (2011) that drove the opposition to nuclear energy in Germany and hence fuelled 
the environmentalism elaborated above. In addition, electricity black-outs alerted firms that 
systemic changes in the energy system were taking place (cf. section 6.2.1.4.3).  
6.4.2 Firm characteristics 
6.4.2.1 Value chain position 
It has become apparent throughout the presentation of innovation activities and innovation 
dynamics (cf. section 6.2) that firms in different value chain positions have fared differently. 
The distinction between electricity suppliers and energy technology firms set out in the 
conceptual framework (cf. section 5.2.4) and explanation of the research case (cf. section 5.3) 
hence proved to be a useful one.  
First, as was to be expected, the nature of the innovation activities tended to differ 
across the two value chain positions. Being on the lower end of the value chain, in a services 
industry that does not develop technologies themselves, electricity suppliers and grid 
operators predominantly considered their innovation activities to be the adoption of new 
technologies and the contribution to their development and implementation by being partners 
in demonstration projects. The engagement in technological exploration and development 
activities in energy generation or grid technology is traditionally rare. However, this is 
slightly different for products and services involving information technology, such as 
applications related to energy management. Here electricity suppliers tended to engage in 
more development work themselves, albeit typically together with partners (cf. section 
6.2.1.4). Electricity suppliers and grid operators also heavily engaged in innovation activities 
in terms of organizational changes, especially business model innovations (cf. section 
6.2.3.5).  
In contrast to that, energy technology and materials firms occupy the upper part of the 
value chain and have the largest share of their innovation activities in the exploration, 
development and implementation of new technologies and materials. Aside from the adoption 
of energy-efficient products for their own operations (cf. section 6.2.2.2), adoption was 
hardly discussed as an innovation activity. Organizational change plays a role for energy 
technology and materials firms just as it does for electricity suppliers, however, possibly to a 
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smaller extent. Energy technology and materials firms created new business units and 
innovation teams especially for Energiewende related topics and adjusted to the structural 
changes in the energy system by developing product and service offerings specifically for 
new types of customers. However, their business model did fundamentally not change as they 
were overall affected to a smaller extent than electricity suppliers and grid operators, see this 
section below.  
Second, there is a clear difference in the extent to which the individual value chain 
steps were affected in their innovation activities by Energiewende policies. Clearly, the effect 
on the downstream firms in electricity supply and grid operation has been more fundamental 
than the effect on the upstream firms in energy technology and materials. This is due to the 
differences in exposure to Germany as a country and the electricity sector as a market. 
Electricity suppliers and grid operators based in Germany typically realize the majority of 
their revenue from activities in Germany and exclusively focus on the energy supply system 
as their market. Energy technology and materials firms tend to be more diversified in terms of 
geography as well as customer market. Hence German policies and changes to the German 
energy system affect the lower part of the energy technology value chain in their entire 
business, and the upper part of the energy technology value chain only in a certain part. This 
means that the innovation activities of the latter are only to some extent influenced by 
German policies. Especially the large, diversified energy technology and materials firms have 
emphasized that any change to the energy system in Germany is only relevant to the extent of 
its share in the global activities of the firm. 
Lastly, the different value chain positions have exhibited differences in the time it 
took them to react to the changes in their business environment. Overall, firms in energy 
technology and materials were faster to react and adjust their innovation activities than 
electricity suppliers and grid operators. All firms were equally observant of the market and 
claim to have seen changes and policies affecting their business activities early on. However, 
especially in renewables (cf. section 6.2.1.1) and energy efficiency (cf. section 6.2.1.3) it 
seems that energy technology and materials firms were always few years ahead of electricity 
suppliers. Since these upstream firms tend to provide the technology that is used by their 
downstream customers this is not entirely a surprise. Furthermore, for energy technology and 
materials firms, innovation is a more deeply engrained part of their business as they operate 
in sectors that continuously evolve, whereas the electricity supply sector had prior to the 
changes induced by the energy transition been stagnating for decades. However, energy 
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technology and materials firm tended to be more skeptical of market demand existing purely 
because of regulatory reasons, fearing that the demand was not sustainable enough to justify 
investments in innovation activities. 
Value chain position mediates the effect of the Energiewende policy mix because 
especially because firms are in a different strategic and structural set-up and because they 
possess different resources and capabilities. Similar findings have been made by other 
scholars who have contrasted and compared these value chain steps or specifically 
investigated one or the other (Rogge, Schneider, et al., 2011; Voß et al., 2003). Nevertheless, 
the lower as well as the upper part of the value chain have equally sought innovation 
activities in line with their resources and capabilities and exhibited similar biased towards an 
energy system based exclusively on renewable energy, see section 6.4.2.3 below.  
6.4.2.2 Industry position 
The case studies show that the industry positions of the firms surveyed i.e. if they are 
incumbents or start-ups in their respective sectors did in certain aspects also bear on 
innovation activities. Unsurprisingly, start-ups proved to be more dynamic and faster to react 
to changes than incumbent firms in their respective value chain steps and sectors. Also, start-
ups challenged the status quo of technologies, business models and power structures in the 
energy technology value chain on various occasions. 
Start-up energy technology firms played a critical part in the exploration, 
development, and implementation of technologies for electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources (cf. section 6.2.1.1). When incumbent energy technology firms discontinued 
or decreased their activities due to their expectations of a slow market, start-up energy 
technology firms continued to invest and keep the technology alive throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. To no surprise did many become popular take-over targets of large incumbents when 
their interest in renewable technology reignited in the early 2000s. 
Start-up electricity suppliers disrupted their industry with asset-light business models 
that did not rely on the ownership and operation of generation capacity (cf. section 6.2.3.5.1). 
Turning electricity from an undifferentiated commodity into a branded product they 
fundamentally changed the outlook of the sector. 
In contrast, incumbent firms in the upstream and downstream parts of the value chain 
had to change their established businesses and often catch up with start-ups. Innovation 
activities that were in the course of the case studies only discussed for incumbents were the 
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adoption of energy-efficient technologies and materials for the modernization of their 
operations (cf. section 6.2.2.2), the articulation of pro-environmental visions and strategies 
(cf. section 6.2.3.1), the creation of organizational departments to focus on innovation and 
other activities relevant in the context of Energiewende (cf. section 6.2.3.2) and the initiation 
of cultural change processes to make their organizations fit for a new energy system (cf. 
section 6.2.3.3.). 
Industry position hence mediated the effect of the Energiewende policy mix. While 
incumbents were affected in their established business and had to make adjustments, for start-
ups the markets created through Energiewende often constituted the basis to begin their 
activities in the first place (cf. sections 6.2.1.1.1, 6.2.1.3.2, and 6.2.3.5.1). However, once 
established, they were subject to the same dynamics and influences as incumbent firms. 
6.4.2.3 Resources, capabilities and cognition 
Across value chain positions and industry positions, the resources, capabilities and cognition 
of the firms influenced the direction and timing of the innovation activities carried out.  
Throughout the case studies, the surveyed firms stressed that they mostly sought 
activities complementary to their assets and capabilities. Complementarity was a key 
consideration for the decision to start exploring new technologies or activities in many areas 
(cf. sections 6.2.1.1.2, 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3.2, 6.2.1.4.2, 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.3.5.2) as well as to engage 
in collaborations (cf. section 6.2.3.4). For example, when discussing how to enter the market 
for renewable energy, incumbent energy technology firms thought it easier to go into wind, 
off-shore wind in particular, due to the comparatively large generation capacity per power 
plant and the capital and project management experience required to construct these plants, 
all resources and capabilities these firms thought to possess. 
In addition, corporate cognition i.e. the "dominant logic" (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) of 
how things work in the firm, industry, and system also played a major role. Corporate 
cognition influenced the way that firms interpreted the Energiewende policy mix and shaped 
their reaction to it in terms of innovation activities. Strikingly, across firms from all value 
chain and industry positions, only with the exception of a few start-ups, firms adhered to the 
idea that an energy system built on the supply of energy from large, central, and continuous 
energy sources was inherently superior to one built on small, decentral, and fluctuating ones. 
Two nuances of this bias existed. The first nuance held that such a system would deliver 
better results for the energy system in terms of costs and security of supply, the second 
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nuance held that electricity supply worked best in a vertically integrated value chain with 
electricity suppliers controlling the provision of electricity from the construction of power 
plants to distribution to end consumers. Clearly these biases disadvantage renewable energy 
sources in comparison to fossil and nuclear energy sources and imply an assessment of the 
energy system predominantly in terms of efficiency and reliability, which indeed were the 
important criteria before environmental concerns started to emerge. They hence reinforce the 
energy system that prevailed before the energy transition started. 
The first nuance of this bias prevented an earlier adoption of RES-E generation 
capacity among incumbent electricity suppliers as they turned a blind eye on the growing 
installations (cf. section 6.2.2.1). The same cognitive bias also prevented earlier larger scale 
investments into developing energy technology for RES-E generation on the parts of 
incumbent energy technology firms (cf. section 6.2.1.1). The second nuance of biases 
increased the difficulty of cultural change (cf. section 6.2.3.3) and business model innovation 
(cf. section 6.2.3.5). Strikingly though, at least in parts start-ups admit to the same biases as 
incumbent firms (cf. section 6.2.3.5.1).  
The case studies also show that firms are within their own organizations not 
necessarily united when it comes to their biases. While similar biases tend to prevail in one 
organization, there may be intra-organizational differences. The bias within a firm is not 
uniform. Individual units or members of these organizations had weaker biases and 
consequently pushed for more or different innovation activities. They may have advocated a 
faster adjustment of their organization to the changing energy system and thus promoted the 
transition of the energy system itself. Senior management plays a critical role as it defines the 
strategic path for a firm and determines whether it reinforces or seeks to break cognitive 
biases (cf. section 6.2.3.3).  
In a slightly different way, there was also a positive cognitive bias in terms of a vision 
for a world without fossil and nuclear energy sources that drove the innovation activities of 
some firms, most importantly start-up energy technology firms in the renewables industry. 
These firms strived towards an ideal even at a time where the market alone did not provide a 
strong case for investments into exploration, development and implementation of RES 
technology (cf. sections 6.2.1.1.1 and 6.2.3.5.1). 
For incumbent electricity suppliers, this bias even persisted when renewable energy 
started to grow exponentially and the market potential was not doubted anymore. It is hard to 
say when this cognition started to change and possibly fair to say that a change may still be 
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under way. Incumbent electricity suppliers typically state the energy policy decisions for 
accelerated nuclear exit with equally ambitious environmental targets following Fukushima 
as the point where it became final, that an overhaul of the system was inevitable (cf. section 
6.3.1). 
The impact of firms in the light of resources, capabilities and cognition will be further 
discussed in the next chapter (cf. section 7.1.3). 
6.4.3 Synopsis: impact of confounding factors 
This section has discussed the impact of confounding factors on the development of 
innovation activities and innovation dynamics. Context factors, i.e. factors from firm's 
external business environment, were considered along with firm characteristics, i.e. structural 
aspects and organizational factors internal to the firm. The discussion shows that these factors 
interact with the effect of the German Energiewende policy mix on innovation activities in 
three ways. First, they can have an effect on innovation activities independent of the policy 
mix, second, they can themselves be influenced by the policy mix and hence mediate its 
impact on innovation activities, third, they can strengthen or weaken the effect of the policy 
mix and fourth, they can in turn influence the components in the policy mix. Unsurprisingly 
due to the interrelatedness and co-evolution inherent in a complex transformation, many of 
the factors do more than one thing over time. 
As for context factors, the market and industry dynamics identified were crucial 
drivers of innovation activity, especially independent from the Energiewende policy mix or 
as mediators of the effect of demand-pull instruments. Risks to the supply of fossil energy 
sources and the demand for energy from renewable sources (RES) drove the exploration, 
development and implementation of RES technology. The demand for solutions for an RES-
based energy system drove innovation activities in smart grid, energy management and 
energy storage. The expectation of high energy prices was a motivation for activities 
regarding energy efficiency. Low wholesale electricity prices fostered business model 
innovation. However, some of these factors, especially the demand for energy from RES and 
the low electricity prices were effects of the German Energiewende policy mix. In addition to 
market factors, environmental policy in other countries, in the EU or on a multilateral level, 
also had an independent effect on innovation activities and in parts constituted antecedents to 
German Energiewende policy. Landscape developments such as digitalization and 
environmentalism had an independent effect, but also strengthened the effect of the 
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Energiewende policy mix and, moreover, environmentalism contributed towards its 
emergence in the first place.  
Firm characteristics mainly influenced to what degree and how the Energiewende 
policy mix had an effect on the innovation activities of firms. With regards to value chain 
position, electricity suppliers were overall more affected by the Energiewende policy mix 
than energy technology firms, but slower to react. With regards to industry position, 
incumbents were disrupted in their usual way of doing business, start-ups were often only 
established because of market opportunities that presented themselves as the result of the 
Energiewende policy mix. Lastly, resources, capabilities and cognition strengthened or 
weakened the effect of the Energiewende policy mix. Firms embraced Energiewende relevant 
innovation activities especially when their assets and capabilities were considered 
complementary with the area or requirements of the innovation activities. However, this also 
meant that some areas were avoided. Furthermore, cognitive biases towards an energy system 
relying on conventional large-scale electricity generation delayed innovation activities for a 
new, RES-based energy system. 
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7 Extended analysis and discussion 
After the detailed presentation of the case study findings in the previous chapter, this chapter 
turns to more extended discussions and implications from the empirical research conducted. 
This chapter addresses the third research interest to draw implications for political and 
corporate actors through answers to controversies in the existing literature, the identification 
of tensions, and making recommendation to policy makers and firms. 
Earlier in this thesis (cf. section 4.3) three controversies regarding the impact of the 
German energy transition on innovation were pointed out: first, if and to what extent the EEG 
had an effect on innovation, second, to what extent the accelerated energy transition post-
Fukushima affected innovation and third, to what extent the energy transition triggered 
changes within firms. The controversies are reflected in light of the case study findings and 
integrating knowledge from the relevant literature (cf. sections 2.2 and 5). In addition to these 
controversies a couple of tensions emerged throughout the case studies: Inconsistencies 
between political strategy and systemic regulation, the difficulty of providing incentives 
without leading to opportunism, and the limited effectiveness of policies confined to national 
jurisdictions have challenged innovation activities. Drawing on the case study findings as 
well as the controversies and tensions, recommendations for policy makers and firms for 
innovation in the context of socio-technical transitions towards sustainability can be derived. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the three controversies will be revisited. 
Second, the three tensions that emerged recurrently throughout the analysis of the case 
studies are elaborated. Third, implications for politics and companies are drawn.  
7.1 Revisiting the three controversies regarding the impact of 
Energiewende on innovation  
7.1.1 Effect of the Renewable Energy Research Act (EEG) 
The first controversy pertains to if and to what extent the EEG had a positive effect on 
innovation in the sense of exploration, development and implementation. Two groups of 
researchers, first, the federal government's expert commission for research and innovation 
(EFI), and second, researchers around the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
come to opposing conclusions in this question. The first group maintains that the EEG did not 
have a positive effect as it did not increase patent applications in technologies for electricity 
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generation from renewable energy (RES-E) (Böhringer et al., 2014; EFI, 2014; Frondel et al., 
2010). The second group argues that the EEG had a positive and far-reaching effect on 
innovation as it drove cost-reductions and performance improvements in RES-E technology, 
and in addition spurred innovation in complementary technologies and organizational and 
institutional novelties (Ragwitz et al., 2014; Rennings & Rexhäuser, 2014). 
The empirical findings of this thesis provide evidence to support the views of the 
second group. The case studies show that the EEG is the single most important policy of the 
German Energiewende policy mix and is widely known and recognized as the core policy 
element of the energy transition. It had a direct positive effect on innovation in the sense of 
the adoption of RES-E technology, but also several indirect, dynamic positive effects on the 
exploration, development and implementation of novelties in complementary technologies 
and systemic solutions. The dynamic effects span technological and organizational changes. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize the EEG not only for its feed-in tariff, which the 
discussion typically tends to do, but also for the design features that contributed to a 
transition of the energy system. At least five ways in which the EEG has affected innovation 
activities can be identified. 
First, the feed-in tariff and preferential grid access for RES-E installed by the EEG 
2000 had a direct effect on innovation in the sense of adoption of RES-E technology. Many 
of the firms studied installed RES-E technology in order to profit from the guaranteed feed-
in-tariff rates. However, only a small fraction of the RES-E capacity installed in Germany 
was actually owned and operated by incumbent electricity suppliers (Geels et al., 2016) 
because the return on investment offered by the EEG was more attractive to private and new 
corporate investors than to the electricity supply incumbents. The diffusion of RES-E 
technology was hence primarily through the actions of niche actors, which were enabled by 
the specific design features of the EEG that, first, provided an attractive return to smaller 
investors and second, guaranteed preferential  grid access to ensure that this return could be 
realized (Geels et al., 2016). It was only since the mid 2000s that incumbent electricity 
suppliers got serious about the installation of RES-based generation capacity and then used 
the EEG to boost the profitability of their German renewable generation assets (cf. section 
6.2.2.1). 
Second, the above mentioned provisions of the EEG 2000 had an indirect positive 
effect on innovation as the increased demand for RES-E technology provided energy 
technology firms with a rationale to invest in the exploration, development and 
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implementation of technological improvements and cost reductions for RES-E technology. 
Incumbent and start-up energy technology firms entered the market for RES-E technology 
and increased their investments into activities leading to technological improvement and cost 
reduction against the background of the increased market potential. The case studies have 
explored this effect across the range of RES-E technologies, however, with a particular focus 
on solar energy (cf. section 6.2.1.1.2).  
Third, the adoption of RES-based generation technology also contributed to the 
adoption, and consequentially also the further development of technologies directly 
complementary to RES deployment, especially power lines and other physical technology for 
the expansion of distribution and transmission grids to be able to take on the renewable 
electricity generated in decentral locations (cf. section 6.2.2.3).  
Fourth, the EEG had a further indirect, dynamic effect on innovation as it provided 
for a transition of the energy system as a whole. The increase in RES-E installed capacity, 
electricity generation, and share of RES in the electricity mix created the need for solutions 
for an RES-based energy system and consequently triggered exploration, development and 
implementation in systemic solutions such as smart grid, energy management, and energy 
storage. The case studies show that issues resulting from a rising absolute and relative 
amount of RES-E in the Germany energy system were important motivations for firms to 
start developing such solutions. Especially as the developments set off by the EEG took on a 
systemic dimension i.e. challenged the stability of the electricity grid, shifted the 
geographical distribution of electricity generation capacity, and enabled new players in the 
energy system, the need for solutions became apparent. As "need" signifies a market demand 
and this in turn signifies earnings potential, corporate actors were motivated to react and find 
solutions through innovation activities. The effect of the EEG hence multiplied beyond 
electricity generation and RES-E to several other areas such as smart grid, energy 
management and energy storage, triggering proper "innovation cascades" (Berkers & Geels, 
2011) where knock-on effects and second-order learning processes lead to a reconfiguration 
of a systemic architecture (Geels et al., 2016). The significance of this development is also 
exemplified by incumbent firms fearing new competitors from other industries in the energy 
technology value chain (cf. section 6.4.1.1). Figure 23 summarizes the four innovation effects 
just described by depicting important design features of the EEG and their dynamic influence 
on innovation in RES-E technology, complementary technology, and systemic solutions.  
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Fifth, albeit the majority of the discussion around the EEG revolves around the EEG 
2000, also provisions of the later amendments to the EEG did also bear on innovation 
activities. For example, the provision for the direct marketing of RES-E introduced by the 
EEG 2012 amendment created the demand for electricity market access for owners of RES-E 
generation capacity and hence motivated firms, in particular incumbent and start-up 
electricity suppliers, to develop and implement service offerings and business models to that 
end (cf. sections 6.2.1.4.2 and 6.2.3.5.2).  
 
Figure 23: Innovation dynamics triggered by the EEG 2000 
 
 
The controversy in the literature is due to an often narrow understanding and focus 
only on the second effect. Moreover, in the investigation of the second effect innovation is 
measured in a narrow way and a linear and timely influence of political provisions is 
assumed. This is done first, by focusing only on patent counts, which are an incomplete and 
imperfect representation of innovation as elaborated elsewhere (Del Río González, 2009; 
Griliches, 1990), and second, by seeking to infer a direct effect of feed-in tariffs on 
exploration, development and implementation when the actual effect is indirect via the 
market demand created by adoption, and also not linear given the structural, strategic and 
cognitive barriers that were identified in the case studies and that interfere with innovation 
activities (cf. section 6.4.2.3 in findings and discussion in section 7.1.3). 
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For the environmental innovations literature the findings of the case studies suggest 
that in addition to exploring the effect of demand-pull policies on technological innovation in 
the specific area targeted by the demand-pull policies, it may be a viable path to investigate 
effects in complementary technologies that were not targeted by the demand-pull policy, as 
well as non-technological innovation and innovation in systemic solutions. Previous 
empirical investigations have especially provided evidence for an effect in the same 
technology area that was targeted by the demand-pull policy, e.g., an effect on innovation in 
RES-E technology after the installation of RES-E deployment schemes (Johnstone et al., 
2010; Wangler, 2012). However, to get a more complete picture of the innovation effect, 
innovation in adjacent technologies, non-technological and systemic innovation should be 
considered, a fact that is already recognized in the literature (Del Río González, 2009; 
Rennings, 2000). In the context of the energy transition this applies to e.g., innovation in 
energy storage technology (complementing electricity from solar PV), the organizational 
changes within firms, and the attempts to introducing new elements such as supply and 
demand management to the electricity system as a whole. Furthermore, using insights from 
actors in innovation as to why innovation activities occur and what the barriers are is also 
fruitful. Lastly, the case of the EEG illustrates once more that in addition to the elements of a 
policy, its design features are also critical.  
The EEG presented a simple logic that provided investors from outside the 
incumbent electricity supply sector with an attractive, zero risk investment opportunity. It 
was almost reckless in its ambition to increase electricity generation from renewables, 
empower small scale electricity producers and in this way change the energy system. This 
recklessness, however, proved to be essential to increasing RES-E to the extent done and 
consequently changing the energy system. 
Looking into the future it remains to be seen whether the EEG will continue to drive 
innovation to the same extent that it has done in the past. In the 2016/2017 amendment of the 
EEG a paradigm shift to the promotion of RES-E was introduced by replacing support tariffs 
determined by policy makers with payments determined through an auctioning mechanism. 
Prospective investors bid for the rate that they require to install RES-based generation 
capacity and bids get accepted from low to high until the additional capacity requirements 
planned by the federal government are fulfilled (cf. section 3.3.4). This may have 
implications for the ability of the EEG to fuel innovation in the way it has done in the past.  
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On the positive side, the expectation is that auctions will lead to lower subsidy rates 
than those set by regulators as competitive pressure forces prospective investors to bid as low 
as possible to secure a winning bid. In order to be able to bid low they will adopt the most 
cost-efficient technology as soon as it becomes available and hence contribute to the 
diffusion of such technology. Cost reductions due to technological improvements will be 
reflected in auctions without the delay that comes with the regulatory review of previously set 
tariff rates. Slimmer margins due to reduced subsidy levels may also induce investors into 
RES-E capacity to get more innovative around their other sources of income and e.g., 
improve their direct marketing capabilities or combine their RES-E capacity with more 
sophisticated energy management and energy storage in order to be able to maximize the 
value of their capacity installations. As the market premium is paid out as the difference 
between the average spot price for electricity in a given month and the successful bid price, 
every price realized above the average spot price is additional income. Furthermore, to 
encourage novel applications of RES-E generation technology in combination with systemic 
elements, the 2016/17 EEG provides for so-called innovation tenders 
(Innovationssausschreibungen) to be held for a certain amount of capacity. Contenders in 
these auctions will need to combine RES-E generation technology with elements that support 
the wider energy system and grid network and contribute to an integration of the three energy 
forms electricity, heating and transport (Sektorkopplung). Details of these are, however, yet to 
be worked out in 2017 and 2018 (BEE e.V., 2016a). These dynamics could also constitute a 
positive impulse for innovation in terms of exploration, development and implementation of 
novel solutions for combined applications of RES-E technology as well as organizational 
change, in particular new business models. 
On the other side, however, the cost pressures introduced through auctions may 
reduce the willingness and capacity to experiment with new technologies that are more costly 
in the short term, but may prove beneficial in the long run. Furthermore, an auctioning system 
is more complex and more costly to administer for prospective investors than the compelling, 
simple process of guaranteed feed-in tariffs that marked the EEG since its beginnings. 
Significant upfront investments in terms of planning a project, pricing it and participating in 
the auction are required while there is a significant risk of not securing a winning bid and 
hence losing out completely. Smaller actors that do not have the knowledge and resources to 
compete in an auction will be disadvantaged. The EEG amendment seeks to prevent this by 
granting energy cooperatives (Bürgerenergiegesellschaften) easier access to the auctions, but 
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it remains to be seen whether this will be sufficiently effective. From the outset, larger, more 
capital-intensive player will have an advantage. Given that the dynamics introduced by new, 
emerging players in the electricity system greatly helped to foster innovation activities in the 
context of Energiewende this is worrying. The growth in capacity additions may also be 
slower than before since the time needed for the auctioning process will come on top of the 
time needed for financial and technical planning and obtaining permissions (BEE e.V., 
2016a). If this means that the anticipated growth pathway cannot be sustained it significantly 
lowers the attractiveness of the RES-E market and hence adversely affects innovation 
activities in the technological as well as non-technological sphere. 
The EEG 2016/17 is not overwhelmingly negative for innovation activities in RES-E 
and may even give some new, positive impulses. It is not likely that the amendment will stall 
innovation overall since the market has grown to a sufficient size, the system has already 
fundamentally changed, and there is the clear expectation that RES-E capacity will continue 
to be added until the 2050 targets of the Energy Concept are reached. The fundamental basis 
for competition and innovation hence remains intact. However, the EEG 2016/17 will 
decrease the dynamism and cement a mature state with steady, but lower growth. It certainly 
does not create much opportunity space to disrupt going forward.  
7.1.2 Effect of the accelerated energy transition post-Fukushima 
The second controversy revolves around the extent to which the so-called "accelerated energy 
transition" that was proclaimed by the federal government in 2011 following the Fukushima 
nuclear incident had an additional positive effect on innovation. The federal government and 
some researchers proclaim this view, especially for the electricity supply industry (BMWi, 
2012a; Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015; Kungl, 2015; Strunz, 2014). Other researchers do not 
attribute specific importance to 2011 in terms of innovation (Böhringer et al., 2014; EFI, 
2014; Geels et al., 2016). 
The empirical findings of this thesis provide a differentiated perspective on the 
significance of the accelerated Energiewende for the innovation activities of firms that is in 
the middle between the two controversial poles. The findings of this thesis support the 
hypothesis that the political decisions of 2011 finalized the shift from a fossil-nuclear to an 
RES-based energy system, however, it had a disruptive effect only on the activities of 
electricity suppliers, not of energy technology and materials firms. The accelerated energy 
transition that was proclaimed after Fukushima increased the change dynamics and the 
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urgency with which innovation activities supporting Energiewende were carried out across all 
sectors. Firms stated repeatedly that topics relevant to the energy transition gained more 
senior attention and found it easier to get company internal resources (cf. section 6.3.1). For 
energy technology and materials firms, however, 2011 did not lead to a change of the 
principal direction of innovation activities. Significant strategic changes had been made 
before (cf. section 6.2.3.1) and innovation activities across a variety of areas relevant to the 
energy transition initiated (cf. section 6.2.1). Given the mostly global activities in the sector 
the decisions in Germany did not have strong enough impact to change the overall direction. 
Merely adjustments at the margin such as re-locating nuclear research activities or further 
pursuing nuclear divestments took place. For electricity supplier, however, the accelerated 
energy transition constituted the final realization that a systemic change of the energy system 
was inevitable and catalyzed their search for new business models. Write downs on nuclear 
generation assets and the decreasing wholesale electricity prices that diminished the returns 
of conventional generation portfolios drove the need for action (cf. section 6.2.3.5.3). Having 
no other market than Germany to diver to, the impact of 2011 on electricity suppliers was 
hence far more substantial than the effect on energy technology firms.  
7.1.3 Effect within incumbent firms 
The third controversy concerns the extent to which Energiewende has triggered changes 
within incumbent firms. There are a couple of investigations on incumbent electricity 
suppliers claiming that they reacted too late to Energiewende, but offering opposing 
explanations for this behavior. One explanation puts this delayed reaction on corporate inertia 
and complacency in general (Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015), another one holds it to be a 
deliberate strategic decision intended to avert a profound change of the energy system 
(Kungl, 2015). Both position incumbent firms as regime actors of the old, fossil-nuclear 
based energy system. However, none of these publications has directly studied members of 
the firms in question. Furthermore, they are exclusively focused on electricity suppliers.  
The findings of the empirical investigation in this thesis provide a middle ground 
between the two, but critically expand the understanding of this controversy through the 
insider's perspective gained in the case study interviews with managers of firms of the entire 
energy technology value chain. Three findings advance the current understanding of the role 
of firms in the German energy transition: First, not only incumbent electricity suppliers, but 
also energy technology firms struggled to embrace renewable energy sources and pursue the 
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respective innovation activities. Second, strategic, structural as well as organizational factors 
influenced this behavior on part of the incumbents, although the cognitive bias towards a 
fossil-nuclear energy system may have been the most important one. Third, the way that 
change unfolded on the level of individual firms shows that firms are not unitary in their 
beliefs and actions, but that niche-regime struggles that can be observed on a societal level 
can also found within individual firms. 
First, all incumbent firms in the energy technology value chain fundamentally 
struggled with RES technology and suffered from similar barriers to change. Contributions 
on technological change and the energy transition in Germany tend to focus on the electricity 
supply industry i.e. only the downstream part of the energy technology value chain (cf. 
Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015; Fuchs, Hinderer, Kungl, & Neukirch, 2012; Geels et al., 2016; 
Kungl, 2015). Electricity suppliers clearly are more profoundly affected by the systemic 
changes and have more fiercely defended the fossil-nuclear system (cf. section 6.4.2.1). 
However, incumbents of all value chain steps surveyed in the case studies agreed that they 
did not anticipate such a fundamental change to the energy system to occur over such a short 
period of time and admitted difficulties in finding the appropriate response for an RES-based, 
decentral energy system.  
Second, structural, strategic and organizational reasons are important to explain the 
behavior of incumbent firms. When it comes to RES technologies, the case studies find that it 
took all incumbent firms very long to embrace them. This was partially due to the structural 
and strategic conditions provided by past decisions and the respective value chain positions, 
e.g., the perception that the market for RES was too small or the commitment to customers 
who were focused on conventional energy sources (cf. section 6.4.2.1). A deliberate decision 
to prevent systemic change was not brought forward in the case studies. It was also the 
perception that company resources and capabilities were better aligned with fossil-nuclear 
energy technology than with technology for RES. However, underlying this was a cognitive 
bias towards a fossil-nuclear energy system that was shared by all incumbents studied (cf. 
section 6.4.2.3). The dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) of 
the incumbent firms was that an energy system with energy supply from central and stable 
energy sources was inherently superior to an RES-based system relying on decentral and 
fluctuating energy sources. Other technologies in the context of Energiewende such as energy 
efficiency were not subject to the same bias, but faced a more rational cost-benefit analysis. 
This logic was shared across firms of the energy technology value chain, implying that it 
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constitutes not only the dominant logic of these individuals or firms, but also regimes in the 
sense of the multi-level perspective  i.e. semi-coherent sets of rules that are shared by a group 
of actors within a system (Geels, 2004). 
The dominant logic or rules of the regime determined how the incumbent firms of the 
fossil-nuclear based energy system noticed, interpreted and acted upon external 
developments. Challenges to these beliefs as they emerged over time from environmental 
movements in the 1970s, renewable energy technology start-up firms, and then increasingly 
also from policy makers, first timidly with R&D budgets for the exploration of alternative 
energy sources, then forcefully with the strong endorsement of renewable energy and the 
nuclear exit of 2000, were considered illogical. As a result, the activities started by incumbent 
firms as responses had at best the objective to explore these alternative views and determine 
their business potential. Especially in the beginning of the energy transition in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, however, they were primarily initiated to appease public opinion, convey the 
impression of being a responsible corporate citizen to policy makers, or opportunistically 
utilize the financial incentives provided (cf. section 6.2.1.1). Early reactions, especially by 
electricity suppliers, were rarely considered strategic, business-driven and consequently did 
not result in the profound strategic and organizational changes required to ensure their long-
term implementation.  The dominant logic and cognitive bias hence significantly contributed 
to maintaining and defending the status quo instead of exploring new ways or giving 
alternative options a chance. Because of the cognitive contingencies that had over time 
resulted in strategic, structural and organizational ones, the firms as a whole did very long not 
realize that there was a potential for an entirely new system to emerge and did not position 
themselves for it. 
Third, the struggle of the energy system to transform was mirrored within its 
incumbent firms. When changes within firms in the energy technology value chain started to 
take place, they exposed similarities to the niche-regime struggles observed on the systemic 
level.  
It is typical in the multi-level perspective to analyze systemic changes through the 
interactions of landscape, regime and niche. Actors are often associated with either niche or 
regime and hence seen as niche or regime players. Consequently, a transition through the 
emergence of niche players that overtake and replace regime players is a frequent illustration 
of a transition pathway (Geels et al., 2016; Geels & Schot, 2007). The failure and demise of 
incumbent firms in the light of disruptive technological change is also a feature in the 
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organization and management literature (cf. section 2.2.3.2). However, the literature has also 
increasingly realized that firms can survive technological change processes or even enact 
these change processes from within. The solution is seen in the right balance of the 
exploration and the exploitation method to organizational learning (March, 1991), an art that 
when mastered is also called ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008, 2013).  
The notion of the combination of two methods of learning in one firm suggests that 
firms are no unitary actors, but can be internally divided. The case studies here show that 
within firms of one group, and even within one firm, differences exist. Firms, especially large 
ones, are heterogeneous organizations made up of several units and many individuals whose 
opinions, albeit having the tendency to revolve around a dominant logic, may still diverge 
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). The semi-coherence of rules of the regime that the MLP notes 
between actors hence also exists within actors. This opens up the possibility to suggest that 
firms themselves go through a transition. Individuals or organizational units within firms can 
constitute niches and promote change. As a consequence, the transition pathways and patterns 
typically used by the MLP to describe systemic transitions (cf. section 2.2.1.2.4) may also be 
found in individual firms. 
 On a systemic level, Geels et al. (2016) frame the transition of fossil-nuclear 
electricity generation to RES-based electricity generation in Germany fundamentally as a 
substitution pathway hence holding that new entrants replace the main electricity producers 
of the old regime. For some of the large incumbent electricity suppliers internally, however, it 
looks like an attempted and failed transformation pathway shifted to de-alignment. When 
they started to consider changes, electricity suppliers worked on a transformation where they 
tried to fit RES niche technologies into their established business (cf. sections 6.2.1.1 and 
6.2.2.1). They partially succeeded when they expanded their innovation activities regarding 
RES and even established RES business units (cf. section 6.2.3.2), however, never fully 
overcame their own bias regarding the superiority of a conventional central energy system. 
The external shock from declining electricity prices and the post-Fukushima accelerated 
energy transition disrupted this pathway. The surge in business model experimentation that 
occurred after 2011 can more suitable be framed in terms of a de-alignment pathway as the 
regime (exemplified by the conventional business model) is destabilized beyond the point of 
repair and collapses as a consequence (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 408).  
The split-up of the largest German national electricity providers E.ON and RWE 
illustrates this de-alignment. E.ON announced the carve-out of its fossil-fired power plants in 
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a new legal entity under the brand Uniper in late 2014. The E.ON parent retains all activities 
related to renewable energy, electricity grids, end customer solutions, and, after political and 
public pressure, also the nuclear assets (E.ON SE, 2016). RWE followed suit in 2015, but 
took another route by placing its renewable energy, electricity grid and end consumer 
activities in the separate entity Innogy while conventional assets incl. nuclear remain with 
RWE (RWE AG, 2016). Both transactions were completed with the listing of the new entities 
on the German stock exchange in fall of 2016 and operate separately from their parent firms. 
RWE, at least for now, retains majority ownership of Innogy while E.ON has floated more 
than 50% of Uniper. Both firms explain their split-ups with the fundamental differences 
between the conventional and new business models in the electricity sector and as a 
consequence the inability of capital markets to correctly value firms that engage in both 
(Chazan, 2016). The divisions furthermore illustrate a de-alignment pathway and how firms 
are no unitary actors, but can combine a variety of different, even opposing, cognitions, 
interests, and strategies – at least until a certain point. Clearly the transition here is still 
ongoing and a re-alignment of the sector has not occurred yet. Instead the exploration of new 
business models continues and is marked by the "prolonged period of co-existence, 
uncertainty, experimentation and competition for attention and resources" (Geels & Schot, 
2007, p. 408) that defines a de-alignment/re-alignment pathway. Incumbent electricity 
suppliers are still searching for their business models for the coming decades.  
In contrast to this, the transition of incumbent energy technology firms towards RES 
technology appears to be a successful transformation pathway for the most part where they – 
after overcoming their cognitive bias – integrated niche technologies into their established 
way of doing business (cf. section 6.2.1.1.2). The sources of niche activities within firms 
seem to stem from dedicated search efforts and innovation departments as well as leadership. 
Energy technology firms are used to navigating a volatile business environment and therefore 
have dedicated departments for innovation that monitor technological change and other 
disruptive influences. The activities of these departments provided the internal niche where 
ideas could develop and grow before being implemented in usual corporate activity (cf. 
section 6.2.3.2). Leadership played a role as well (cf. section 6.2.3.3). CEO agendas shaped 
innovation strategies and mandated the reorganization of business units. The profound 
strategic and organizational change could not have been initiated by other hierarchical level. 
Energy technology firms were hence better than electricity suppliers when it came to 
exploration and exploitation at the same time.  
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7.2 Tensions in the policy mix impeding innovation activities 
7.2.1 Innovative political strategy versus path dependent systemic regulation 
The case studies show tensions or inconsistencies between the articulated Energiewende 
vision and strategy and some of the systemic regulations governing the energy system. In 
their conceptualization of policy mixes for environmental change, Rogge & Reichardt define 
consistency as the "absence of contradictions" or the "existence of synergies within and 
between the elements of the policy mix, thereby enabling the achievement of policy 
objectives" (2013, p. 23). The case studies find inconsistencies between the political objective 
to change the energy system towards being exclusively RES-based and systemic regulation 
that impedes or inhibits innovation for enablers of such an energy system, especially when it 
comes to smart grid, energy management and energy storage.  
During the case studies barriers to the market and grid integration of demand side 
management and electricity from storage were explicitly identified (cf. section 6.2.1.5.1and 
6.3.2.3.3). Rules and regulations for the governance of the energy system have limited more 
profound changes to the system such as new actors, new nodes or new ways of earning 
revenue in these areas (cf. 6.3.2.3.3). Moreover, the inconsistencies identified are probably 
not the only ones. Agora Energiewende, a think tank that devises political and economic 
strategies for the energy transition, continuously points out legal and regulatory barriers on 
very detailed granular levels in its studies on how to advance Energiewende. For example, a 
study identifies multiple and complex regulatory and market price barriers explaining the 
slow development of load management as a supply side energy management approach 
(Connect Energy Economics, 2015). Furthermore, also the use of power-to-heat to store and 
thus utilize RES-E instead of decrease production in times of physical grid restraints is 
limited by regulatory barriers (Gerhardt et al., 2014). 
Parts of the systemic regulation still seem to embody the rules of the regime (Geels, 
2004) applicable in a fossil-nuclear based energy system. Such rules have found to exhibit a 
high degree of path dependence and resistance to change. Administrative, legal and grid 
access can constitute "non-economic barriers" (Klessmann et al., 2011, p. 7651) in an energy 
transition. In this case they prevent a transformation and optimization of the system as a 
whole that could address the problems of volatility of energy supply that is inherent in the 
deployment of renewable energy sources. Lockwood (2016)  makes similar observations 
regarding the regulatory framework of the electricity distribution network in the UK and its 
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introduction of smart grids. The discussion of the impact of systemic regulation here is by no 
means as detailed as the one prepared by Lockwood, however, the findings point in the same 
direction. The rules and regulations of the energy system exhibit a dual force that provide for 
systemic change in some areas and with some mechanisms, but also restrict change in other 
areas through other mechanisms. 
7.2.2 Strong short term incentives versus long term orientation 
The case studies show that in their innovation activities firms notice and react to incentives 
set by politics. These can be the incentives of technology-push policies where research 
activities or the adoption of new technology is directly subsidized by public funds, the 
incentives of demand-pull policies where e.g., subsidies lead to market growth that lures 
firms to enter the market, or the incentives of systemic regulation if it is set in such a way that 
it strongly affects business opportunities. The case studies have found hints for instances of 
opportunistic behavior on parts of firms faced with such incentives. This was for example the 
case for demand-pull instruments, e.g., when policy induced market growth led to 
questionable behavior of energy technology start-ups in the solar PV industry (cf. section 
6.3.2.2.3). The notion that firms jump into markets such as energy efficiency as they are 
created by policy makers points in that direction (cf. section 6.2.3.5.2). Also the descriptions 
by incumbent firms of how, in the early days of the energy transition, they used public funds 
for research projects they did not believe in, possibly even with the intention to prove 
technologies unworthy, exhibits similar tendencies (cf. section 6.2.1.1.1). The flip side of 
such incentives is that firms can be distrustful of them to a point that they contemplate market 
entry all together (cf. sections 6.3.2.2.3). 
The finding that strong incentives can lead to opportunistic behavior that impedes 
innovation activities and transition processes is not new do the literature. For the global solar 
PV industry, Hoppmann et al. (2013) show that while policy-induced market growth in 
general leads to technological exploration in the form of R&D investments, it can also 
increase the relative strength of exploitation i.e. investment in production capacity in relation 
to exploration. This is not necessarily bad or undesirable. However, if technological 
improvement is the objective, one does not want the exploration for such improvements to 
diminish too much. Policy-induced market growth can hence be a double-edged sword for 
innovation activities. In more general terms such opportunistic behavior is also called rent-
seeking and comes as a side-effect of almost all political intervention in a market. It is widely 
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recognized and studied, both in its general implications for the economy as well as 
specifically for the obstacles it can constitute for innovation (Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 
1980; Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993).  
Nevertheless, it has been equally established that political intervention in the realm of 
environmental innovation is necessary (cf. section 2.2.2), and the case studies have shown 
that the Energiewende policy mix did indeed foster innovation activities in various ways. 
Opportunistic behavior is to a certain extent a phenomenon that has to be reckoned with and 
cannot be entirely eliminated. Also, there is nothing to indicate that this has been a major 
problem of the German Energiewende so far, nothing that has impeded technological 
progress or the transition of the energy system. Overall many firms, especially from the 
allegedly opportunistic solar PV manufacturers, stress their idealistic motivation for an 
energy transition towards renewables, the direct opposite pole to opportunism (cf. section 
6.2.1.1.1). A tension only arises when incentives are so short-term that they can be 
opportunistically exploited without actually stimulating innovation activities that are required 
for a transition in the longer term. Irrespective of type of incentive, this behavior occurs when 
market participants regard the long term market potential as insufficient to justify corporate 
activity beyond exploiting the incentive. Nevertheless, in the context of a transition incentives 
are justified if they encourage a particular desirable behavior that has the potential to have a 
long run impact in favor of this transition. In this way incentives are fundamentally a measure 
of niche protection. To ensure that incentives work in that way they have to be monitored in 
size, perception of longevity, and market fundamentals behind them. In the light of this 
tension the effect of political intervention on the incentive of actors needs to be monitored. 
7.2.3 National political jurisdiction versus international firms 
A third tension that has emerged in the case studies is the limitation of national political 
jurisdictions in the light of international firms. The limitation of national politics to induce 
innovation when firms have a global orientation has been noted several times throughout the 
case studies. Firms have emphasized that in their assessment of market potential, on which 
they base their innovation decisions, it is the global market that counts rather than the 
German one. This means that German politics influences these firms only to the extent that 
Germany constitutes a share of their global market and public policy in other geographic 
market can matter equally. Moreover, since Germany is a member of the EU and the EU has 
been conferred legal powers regarding environmental policy, energy policy and climate 
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policy, EU regulation matters as well. Lastly, international multilateral policy making such as 
the Kyoto protocol and the international climate negotiations also have an impact on firms 
(cf. section 6.4.1.2). 
When the objective is to induce innovation for an energy transition, it is hence not 
sufficient to only take a national point of view. Germany might have been less successful in 
inducing Energiewende relevant innovation had the German policies not been consistent with 
policies in other countries, the EU and the international level. What counts is a global market 
and hence also global politics that underscores that market development. This is also 
recognized by the literature. Many investigations in environmental economics consider 
international or EU policy one influencing factor next to domestic policies (Marth & 
Breitschopf, 2011; Reichardt & Rogge, 2014). Moreover the investigation of policy spillovers 
shows that firms are affected in their innovation activities by domestic as well as international 
legislation (Johnstone & Haščič, 2013; Peters et al., 2012). Peters et al. (2012) call for 
international demand policy schemes as a consequence. 
7.3 Implications for policy makers and firms 
7.3.1 Policy makers 
The findings of this thesis are highly relevant for policy makers and permit to draw 
implications for how they can induce corporate innovation in order to pave the way for a 
sustainability transition such as the German Energiewende. This section develops five key 
lessons for policy makers, which are summarized in Table 15. In addition to elaborating the 
recommendation on a general level and showing how it emerged through the case studies, 
ideas connecting these recommendations to the current state of the Energiewende policy mix 
are offered.  
First, the discussion on vision and strategy (cf. section 6.3.1) implies that it is pivotal 
that policy makers define a vision, objectives and a roadmap for achieving these objectives 
for the sustainability transition. While such vision and strategy is likely to not lead to 
immediate shifts in the behavior of firms it is an important input in their long-term planning 
process and hence induces innovation meant for the long run. The German Energiewende has 
such a clear vision, objectives and roadmap as defined by the 2010 Energy Concept and the 
post-Fukushima accelerated energy transition. Firms find it a credible and reliable indication 
of the long term transition expected from the German energy system. 
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Second, when devising strategies and policies to induce innovation it is important to 
diagnose innovation problems on an actor level in order to come up with suitable solutions 
for the respective innovation barriers. The case studies suggest that innovation barriers can 
result from a wide range of factors such as economic incentives, strategic and structural 
factors or cognitive biases. It is important to devise policies and policy mixes that are suitable 
to the innovation barriers at hand. E.g., if the barrier is that no suitable technology exists at 
all, the solution might be to fund basic research and R&D. If it is a lack of technological 
performance, implementation and commercialization, the suitable policy response is more 
likely to be the strengthening of market demand or the removal of systemic obstacles. Clearly 
this is not a new observation, also other authors have stressed the importance of the right mix 
of policies to address innovation problems (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). If a policy is suitable 
to the innovation barrier its impact can be very powerful as the diffusion of RES-E 
technology after the establishment of investment security by the EEG demonstrates. A good 
method for identifying innovation barriers among corporate actors is to involve them in the 
policy process, as is done currently in the energy transition. Examples of policy-making 
processes that extensively involve the affected actors include the reform of the electricity 
market design (BMWi, 2014b), the Grid Development Plan and other electricity grid 
extensions (Steinbach, 2013), and, on a regional level, the climate protection process under 
way in North Rhine Westphalia that systematically involves corporate actors, but also the 
wider public (Ministerium Klimaschutz NRW, 2015). However, the difficulties with systemic 
regulation (cf. section 7.2.1) demonstrate that not all barriers to innovation have been fully 
addressed yet. 
Third, the case studies have reaffirmed the role of market factors such as short and 
long term demand, supply and prices as critical in the context of innovation activities for a 
sustainability transition. Policy makers should with their policy designs hence target the 
market through careful incentives and framework conditions conducive to innovation. 
Demand-pull policies, especially when they involve outright financial incentives, are a 
powerful tool. For the market to develop an internal dynamic of innovation, market 
participants need to see the potential for sufficient long term returns together with a healthy 
degree of competition to capture these returns, the combination of which then justifies today's 
investment decisions. Political incentives should be set in such a way that they minimize 
opportunistic and short-term rent-seeking behavior. Furthermore they should be supported by 
a clear articulation of long term vision and strategy, measurable long-term targets to underpin 
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the strategy and a roadmap and set of principal plans to implement this. This anchors an 
incentive scheme in a larger policy mix and informs and guides long-term oriented actors that 
may be put-off by the incentive scheme alone (cf. section 7.2.2). 
Moreover, market factors are also shaped by the general framework conditions that 
prevail, i.e. systemic regulation. When targeting the market in an effort to induce innovation, 
both are equally important. The case studies have shown that inconsistencies between 
systemic regulation and the overall strategy have impeded innovation activities (cf. section 
7.2.1). This point is especially relevant at the current state of the energy transition. Currently 
arguably the biggest problem of Energiewende is how to make an RES-based energy system 
work overall (Connect Energy Economics, 2015; Ecofys, 2016; Löschel et al., 2015). The 
political discourse shows that nobody has a definite answer yet. The energy system is also too 
complex to be centrally planned. In that situation it is important to tap into market forces to 
come up with solutions. However, actors need to have the incentive to develop such solutions 
and the freedom to experiment. Therefore systemic regulation needs to provide this e.g., 
through electricity market design and grid access and planning rules. The right approach for 
the purpose of innovation probably means that there should be little regulation and it should 
be simple. This is not a call for a laissez-faire energy system, but rather one for the 
dismantling of regulation that inadvertently belongs to and supports a fossil-nuclear energy 
system. For innovation it is of course important changes result in a level playing field for a 
wide range of actors, and not create market power. The innovative power of start-ups i.e. 
niche actors, as well as the transformative niches within incumbent firms needs to be 
maintained and harvested for the purpose of sustainable change. Unfortunately making 
recommendations as to what these regulatory changes entail in detail is beyond the scope to 
the thesis. However, contributions on this are developed by experts on the topic (Ecofys, 
2016; Gerhardt et al., 2014; Grashof et al., 2015; Schulz, 2013).  
Fourth, policy makers need to think beyond national borders in order to fully 
comprehend what drives the innovation activities of firms and how to induce them. The 
tension between the national political jurisdiction and the international orientation of firms 
(cf. section 7.2.3) shows that international politics need to be part of national strategy and 
policy. For the current state of the energy transition that means that Germany should continue 
its involvement on the European and international levels and push for similar strategic targets 
as it has set at home. Moreover, since market potential is an important motivator of 
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innovation decisions, increasing the market size by further integrating European energy 
markets and also RES deployment schemes would probably benefit innovative activities. 
Fifth, sometimes politicians and policy makers need to dare to be bold in their 
political and policy decisions. The stronger and faster external change occurs, the more firms 
are required to make internal changes. Deep and profound changes to the external 
environment in which firms operate forces them to explore alternative options. Such changes 
can be radically positive or radically negative, which probably lies in the eyes of the 
beholder, however, they certainly trigger action because firms have no other choice. 
Energiewende has several instances where bold policy decisions were taken. The accelerated 
Energiewende post-Fukushima constitutes such a decision with implications for the business 
models of incumbent electricity suppliers (cf. section 7.1.2). The EEG with its particular 
policy design was also bold and had far-reaching implications for change in the energy 
system as a whole (cf. section 7.1.1). It first created profound opportunities for new actors in 
the energy system, and at some point profound challenges to the incumbents through the 
systemic change it initiated. Systemic change brings novelties that firms have to adjust to. To 
initiate systemic change policies must be designed in a way that they profoundly challenge 
the status quo, but provide an orientation for the way forward. This thesis does not find an 
indication that something as radical is needed at this point of the energy transition. However, 
one could possibly argue that the integration of the different forms of energy 
(Sektorkopplung) needs to be pushed more forcefully in order to make the energy system 
overall more efficient, reliable and clean. The innovation tenders of the new EEG are a step 
in the right direction, but certainly not a bold one (cf. section 7.1.1). Possibly a complete ban 
on combustion engines as it has recently been discussed (Stockburger, 2016) would constitute 
such a radical political decision that will finally lead to the breakthrough of e-mobility and in 
turn the integration of electricity and fuels.  
 
Table 15: Implications for policy makers 
Lessons for policy makers: how to induce innovation for a sustainability transition 
1.  Define a vision, objectives and a roadmap for achieving these objectives for the sustainability transition  
2.   Diagnose innovation problems on an actor level 
3.  Target the market with careful incentives and framework conditions conducive to innovation 
4.  Think beyond national borders  
5.  Dare to be bold  
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7.3.2 Firms  
This thesis also offers lessons to firms. This section presents five recommendations for how 
they can navigate a transition towards sustainability. They are summarized in Table 16. Most 
of them are geared towards incumbents more than start-ups since they struggle more with 
change, however, some are relevant to all. 
First, for most firms innovation continues to be associated with technological research 
and development, the improvement of their products and possibly the improvement of their 
processes and operations. It is imperative that firms expand their perspective and think in 
terms of systems and business models in addition to products and processes. Throughout the 
case studies it has become apparent that the understanding of what innovation constitutes and 
how firms should look at it has already evolved significantly in the past decade or so. For 
electricity suppliers it is clearly the Energiewende that plays the key role here, however, 
digitalization is of course also important and possibly also the wider academic and 
management discourse where innovation has become an important topic. For example, key 
theoretical advancements in the management literature such as business model innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2007, 2010; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002) were often referred to in the 
interviews. Nevertheless, there remains a bias towards products and processes and 
technologies and R&D throughout the discussions on innovation. Of course technology and 
R&D are important, but firms should make an even stronger effort to explore new or 
alternative business models, systemic linkages of and between their products, and the 
possibility of market and industry fundamentals changing to such a degree that the business 
environment is profoundly altered.  
Second, looking at the two modes of organizational learning, exploitation seems to be 
easier for most firms than exploration. Clearly this is the case as exploitation is more 
engrained in organizational routines, or, organizational routines are the result of exploitation. 
However, the failure of incumbent firms with established routines demonstrates that it is key 
to keep exploring and nourish firm-internal niches. In order to achieve this innovation must 
be a top management priority, best established if it belongs to the responsibilities of a 
member of the executive board. Moreover employees should be enabled to be innovative in 
their work and have the freedom to explore and implement ideas. Many such organizational 
methods to tap into the creativity and innovativeness of employees and foster intra-
organizational niches have already been described in the management literature (Gupta & 
Singhal, 1993).  
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For both, innovation beyond products and processes as well as continuous 
exploration, certain strategic and organizational elements have proven effective. Innovation 
labs for example constitute physical spaces of experimentation where employees with an idea 
for an entrepreneurial venture are provided with the resources and support they need to 
realize it. They were pioneered in Silicon Valley by information technology firms such as 
Xerox (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Hiltzik & Rutkoff, 1999) and  IBM (W. L. Miller, 
2001). They can involve external parties such as customers, universities or political actors 
(Jokisch, 2007; M. Lewis & Moultrie, 2005). Other firms have been able to create such 
creative environments through human resource tools and processes such management 
support, free time for creativity, autonomy, and incentives and rewards (Alpkan, Bulut, 
Gunday, Ulusoy, & Kilic, 2010; Damanpour, 1991). Applications of these tools in the energy 
technology value chain remain limited today, although several initiatives have been started as 
the case study results indicate (cf. sections 6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.5).  Of course traditional 
elements such as investments in R&D and technological acquisitions continue to be a core 
element of every innovation strategy, however, these new tools can complement them and 
contribute towards successful corporate innovation and renewal. 
Third, it has become clear that firms rely on cooperation and open innovation to 
navigate uncertain environments. Firms unanimously describe how they tap into the 
knowledge, competences and assets of outsiders for their activities (cf. section 6.2.3.4). Such 
collaboration can take a wide variety of forms such as e.g., business networks, distribution 
contracts, crowd sourcing, venture capital, or joint R&D projects. Often such collaborations 
are between start-ups and incumbents in an industry, but they might also be between firms of 
entirely different industries or within the same industry position. However, collaboration and 
open innovation do not solve all problems. Firms need to cautious to not let biases overtake 
the good intentions of the cooperation. For example, most firms stress that they look for 
complementary assets and capabilities when they determine with whom to cooperate. This is 
certainly a good indicator for a successful cooperation, however, the danger for incumbent 
firms is that by looking at complementarity and thus primarily their established competences 
they define partnerships too narrow and limit them to exploitation rather than engage in 
exploration. There is indeed empirical evidence for this elsewhere (Rothaermel, 2001). 
Moreover, in rather unequal partnerships between start-ups and incumbents start-ups need to 
be careful to not get overwhelmed and lose their new ideas within the established structure of 
a larger partner.  
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A large variety of tools now exists for leveraging the value of cooperations and open 
innovation. Defying traditional rules of intellectual property protection to open up source 
codes, develop common technology platforms, and reveal engineering knowledge in order to 
leverage collective intelligence and an outsider's perspective for the development of internal 
innovation has long been established in the information technology industry and the energy 
and engineering sectors are slowly warming up to it (GE Look Ahead Blog, 2015). Joint 
innovation and ideation with suppliers, customers or the wider public in the form of 
innovation platforms or topic-specific challenges  is also increasingly employed (Kellner, 
2015; Mascioni, 2011). Corporate venture capital is another suitable instrument for tapping 
into the innovative potential of external actors and has been on the rise for early and later 
stage investments for longer than a decade. Empirical research, however, suggests that many 
such vehicles do not consistently work towards strategic objectives (Ernst, Witt, & 
Brachtendorf, 2005) and often lack the activities and design elements that make external 
venture capitalists successful (S. A. Hill, Maula, Birkinshaw, & Murray, 2009). 
Fourth, the case studies show that successful firms separate very innovative activities 
from the rest of the organization and hence create organizationally distinct niches within the 
wider organizational structure. Activities that go against the dominant logic of a firm's 
established operations and business model often run the risk of being discontinued (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000). This is because they are subject to the same resource allocation processes and 
performance assessments of the established successful activities which, being emergent, they 
cannot survive. It is hence advisable to operate such disruptive units at arm's length from the 
rest of the organization by separating them physically and financially and developing separate 
performance criteria. Links between the different units, however, should be established to 
ensure the diffusion of knowledge and the relevance of the separate activities to the 
organization as a whole. Employee secondments and virtual project teams that leverage 
resources from throughout the organization seem to be appropriate methods. 
Fifth, beyond the organizational set-up it is advisable to stay close to politics and take 
an active, but open position in the policy process. If a transition is driven by political action 
as is the case for Energiewende and probably most transitions towards sustainability, it makes 
sense to stay close to the political actors shaping the transition. Such political involvement 
should of course not revolve around zealous lobbying for a status quo, financial support and 
other corporate agendas, but ideally be a constructive exchange and resourceful advice. The 
energy technology value chain and incumbent electricity suppliers in particular have always 
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been close to politics and their lobbying efforts typically come with a negative connotation 
(Bontrup & Marquardt, 2015; Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014). It is clearly not a good idea to 
lobby against change that enjoys broad public support and is consistent with larger trends and 
landscape developments. However, done right, corporate involvement in politics can be 
constructive and mutually-beneficial. Firms should be constructive partners in consultations 
and represent their interests and expertise through individual or collective efforts. They 
should present themselves as discussion partners rather than rent-seekers e.g., through 
establishing trust by providing their expertise also without the expectation of an immediate 
gain.  
 
Table 16: Implications for firms 
Lessons for firms: how to navigate a systemic transition towards sustainability 
1.  Think in terms of systems and business models in addition to products and processes 
2.  Keep exploring and nourish firm-internal niches 
3.  Rely on cooperation and open innovation to navigate uncertain environments 
4.  Separate very innovative activities from the rest of the organization 
5.  Stay close to politics and take an active, but open position in the policy process 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of the thesis 
The interest and guiding research question of this thesis was to explore the effect of the 
German energy transition on corporate innovation. To this end three steps were taken. First, 
Energiewende was positioned within the context of innovation (chapters 3-5), second, the 
effect of Energiewende on innovation was explored through a series of exploratory 
qualitative case studies with firms of the energy technology value chain (chapter 6), and third, 
implications for policy makers and firms were drawn (chapter 7). The main results are 
summarized here in terms of the research questions posed in the beginning of this thesis 
(section 1.2).  
Innovation is an important secondary objective of Energiewende. Energiewende is the 
political course of action that drives a socio-technical transformation of the German energy 
system in an effort to make it greenhouse gas emissions and nuclear free. References to 
corporate innovation as an objective of Energiewende are made explicitly and implicitly 
throughout policy documents. Innovation is sought to lower the costs of the energy transition, 
find solutions for an RES-based energy system that do not exist yet, and secure the 
competitiveness of the German economy (research question I.1, chapter 3). 
While an innovation effect of the energy transition is investigated through the federal 
government's official monitoring process as well as independent academic contributions, no 
consensus regarding such an effect currently exists. Diverging findings are especially due to 
three research gaps, first, a lack of empirical research that understands Energiewende as a 
complex transition process, second, a lack of empirical research that employs a broad 
definition of innovation, and third, a lack of empirical research on the firm level. Moreover, 
three controversies are salient throughout the literature, first, controversies regarding the 
innovation impact of the EEG, second, controversies regarding the impact of the post-
Fukushima "accelerated Energiewende" on innovation, and third, controversies regarding the 
extent to which Energiewende has triggered changes within firms. The empirical 
investigation in this thesis was designed to address the research gaps, the controversies were 
revisited after presenting the findings of the empirical investigation (research question I.2, 
chapter 4). 
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Given the definition of Energiewende as a political course of action and the research 
interest to investigate the effect of this on corporate innovation, the conceptual framework for 
the empirical investigation draws on the multi-level perspective (MLP) in sustainability 
transition research, environmental economics and organization and management studies. The 
research is predominantly positioned in the sustainability transitions literature and adopts 
basic premises of the MLP such as that transition processes are co-evolutionary, the three 
level interaction (landscape-regime-niche) is a useful heuristic to understand transitions, and 
that structure and agency are both important. However, given the research interest, the 
empirical investigation of this thesis focuses on the activities of firms on a micro level and 
the effect of the Energiewende policy mix on such activities, and does not classify these firms 
are regime or niche actors. The conceptual framework as such was a simple representation of 
firms and their external environment. Firms conduct three types of innovation activities: first, 
exploration, development and implementation, second, adoption, and third, organizational 
change. The rate and direction of these innovation activities is influenced by the 
Energiewende policy mix, other context factors and firm characteristics (research question 
I.3, chapter 5). 
The research interest was investigated in a series of 27 exploratory qualitative case 
studies with firms of the energy technology value chain i.e. firms active in energy technology 
and materials firms, or electricity supply and transmission. The main method for data 
collection were episodic elite interviews with managers of these firms, 32 such managers 
were interviewed. The findings show that Energiewende overall and the elements of the 
Energiewende policy mix influenced the innovation activities that the firm conducted over 
time. With respect to the direction of the activities conducted as well as the intensity, or rate, 
at which they were conducted a pattern of innovation dynamics emerges. From the 1970s 
throughout the 1990s innovation activities relevant to Energiewende were mainly focused on 
the exploration and development of technologies for the usage of renewable energy sources 
(RES) and energy-efficiency. Start-up firms were important in driving the technological 
development especially of RES technology. Between 2000 and 2010 the interest in all 
Energiewende relevant technology surged. Exploration, development and implementation as 
well as the adoption of RES technology, energy efficiency products and services, and non-
emitting conventional generation increased. From 2005 onwards, as profound changes to the 
energy system from the rising share of electricity from RES became apparent, the focus of 
innovation activities slowly shifted towards technologies for the energy system as a whole 
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such as smart grids, energy management and energy storage. From 2011 onwards the 
innovation dynamics increased following the post-Fukushima accelerated energy transition, 
especially when it came to the search of new business models on parts of incumbent 
electricity suppliers. Since 2000 technological changes were also increasingly reflected on the 
organizational level with changes to corporate vision and strategy, organizational structures, 
culture and collaboration through the energy technology value chain (research question II.1, 
chapter 6.2) 
The Energiewende policy mix was critical for several of these change dynamics. The 
vision and strategy embodied in long term targets for greenhouse gas emissions, energy 
consumption and RES deployment, and nuclear exit decisions was an important point of 
reference for the future development of the German energy system that firms took into 
account when determining the strategy, direction and intensity of innovation activities for the 
longer term. Technology-push policies, especially public R&D funds, were widely used by 
firms. Demand-pull policies, first and foremost the market-based instrument Renewable 
Sources Act (EEG), created a market for RES technology and hence fostered the systemic 
change towards an RES-based energy system. They also advanced energy efficient products 
and services through mainly command-and-control mechanisms such as standards. Systemic 
regulation had a dual effect of enabling the implementation of new technologies, especially 
through the systemic provisions of the EEG, but also constraining progress in other areas as 
several rules and regulations are still targeted at a fossil-nuclear based energy system and 
hence inhibit the emergence of novelties (research question II.2, chapter 6.3). 
Other external factors as well as firm characteristics have also had an impact on 
innovation activities, either independent or intertwined with the Energiewende policy mix. 
Market factors and industry dynamics such as the demand for RES were critical drivers of 
innovation activities. They were, however, partially the results of the Energiewende policy 
mix. Non-German environmental policy and landscape developments have also played a role. 
When it comes to firm characteristics the value chain position as well as the industry position 
of a firm has influenced the way firms reacted to the Energiewende policy mix: electricity 
suppliers were more profoundly affected by the Energiewende policy mix than energy 
technology firms, but overall slower to react and adjust their innovation activities. Moreover, 
resources, capabilities and cognition have also played a role, most noteworthy here was the 
cognitive bias towards central, large-scale electricity generation that impeded the take up of 
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innovation activities for renewable energy across all types of firms (research question II.3, 
chapter 6.4). 
The findings from the case studies helped to clarify the controversies identified at the 
beginning of the thesis. Regarding the innovation effect of the EEG, the case study findings 
suggest that the EEG clearly had a positive impact on innovation activities and it not only 
fostered innovation activities in RES-E technology, but also in complementary technologies 
and systemic solutions for an RES-based energy system. Regarding the impact of the post-
Fukushima accelerated energy transition, the case studies find that Fukushima did strengthen 
the innovation dynamics across all firms, but did in most cases not significantly influence the 
direction of innovation activities. However, it did trigger business model innovation efforts 
on parts of incumbent electricity suppliers. Regarding the changes within incumbent firms, 
the findings from the case studies show that incumbent behavior is influenced by strategic, 
structural and organizational conditions. It furthermore shows that not only incumbent 
electricity suppliers, but also incumbent energy technology firms struggled to adjust their 
innovation activities to an RES-based energy system. Lastly, it also showed that firms are not 
unitary, but that struggles observable on a systemic or societal level are also mirrored within 
firms (research question III.1, chapter 7.1). 
Throughout the case studies three tensions emerged with regards to the effect of the 
Energiewende policy mix on innovation. First, the progressive vision and strategy promoting 
an RES-based energy system are in tension with systemic regulation in the spirit of the old 
fossil-nuclear based energy system. Second, the allure of short term incentives might impede 
long term innovation activities necessary for a successful energy transition. Third, national 
political jurisdiction is insufficient to trigger innovation activities in firms with a global 
outlook and activities (research question III.1, chapter 7.2). 
The findings of the case studies in general as well as the insights regarding the 
controversies and the identification of tensions were useful in devising recommendations for 
policy makers and firms when it comes to how to induce innovation for a systemic change 
towards sustainability and how to navigate and succeed in such change. Five implications for 
policy makers and firms, respectively, were drawn (research question III.1, chapter 7.3). 
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8.2 Limitations and avenues for further research  
The conceptual framework and the qualitative exploratory research methods employed have 
proven useful for data collection, analysis and the derivation of results and implications. 
Nevertheless, just as every academic work, this dissertation has limitations regarding the 
empirical methods and the substantive questions that could be addressed within the scope of 
this thesis. These limitations point to avenues for further research that could enhance the 
understanding of the effect of politically-driven sustainability transitions on corporate 
innovation.  
First, some limitations stem from the qualitative research design and methods. Given 
that the thesis has investigated a complex phenomenon in a particular context no claim to 
universal validity, applicability and relevance can be made. While insightful implications 
were derived from the findings of the case studies they may be limited to their specific 
research setting and not be generalizable to other contexts. This is due to the contextual, 
interpretive nature of qualitative research as well as the selection of research cases that may 
not be representative for their population. Moreover, despite diligent pre- and post-
preparation and the effort to triangulate the information provided, interviews remain a 
subjective account of reality. Issues related to quality assurance in qualitative research and 
the downsides of interview data have been laid out in the process and methods section of this 
thesis (cf. sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.3.1). It would advance the general understanding of the 
research question if some of the findings were investigated and tested using other data 
sources. Since the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) was recently adjusted to include data collection on environmental innovation this could 
provide a fruitful way forward to explore the research question.  
Second, while it was a deliberate decision to explore a large range of topics, especially 
after the literature identified research with comprehensive understandings of innovation and 
Energiewende as research gaps, such an approach inadvertently limits the ability to study the 
emerging topics in much depth. Several interesting findings, trends and tensions of this thesis 
deserve further investigation. For example, collaborations were found to have increased in 
importance because of the energy transition. A more detailed investigation of the nature and 
performance of such collaborations would benefit firms for their own alliancing decisions and 
policy makers for their understanding of firm alliances and their desirability in the context of 
innovation. A combination of the perspective on niche-regime struggles taken by the multi-
level perspective and the literature on strategic alliances (Rothaermel, 2001) between 
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incumbents and new entrants could certainly advance this perspective, as has been argued 
before (Geels, 2011). Furthermore, firm-internal transition processes emerged as an   
interesting subject and have not much been studied, at least not in the multi-level perspective. 
Moreover, the co-evolution of digitalization and the change of the energy system is also a 
further interesting research topic. Lastly, each of the tensions pointed out (cf. section 7.2) 
deserves further investigation into root causes as well as coping strategies in the context of 
sustainability transitions.  
Third, although Energiewende has been framed as an ongoing transition, most of the 
analysis of its innovation effect conducted was indeed retrospective. It may, however, still be 
worthwhile to focus the attention further on current dynamics and barriers to innovation in 
order shape the energy transition in the coming years. Clearly there remain ample of 
interesting research questions, research subjects and methods for investigation around the 
energy transition in Germany in particular and sustainability transitions as a wider field. 
8.3 Overall conclusion 
Innovation activities by private firms are critical to the success of the Energiewende in 
Germany and, moreover, transitions towards sustainability all around the globe. This thesis 
has shed light on how firms perceive such transitions and how the policy mix that builds such 
transitions towards sustainability induces innovation activities.  
The Energiewende policy mix in Germany has had an overall positive effect on 
innovation activities as vision and strategy, the instrument mix and the systemic regulation 
underpinning it have set off innovation activities in firms throughout the energy technology 
value chain. Especially the policies targeted at market creation and the systemic change that 
was enforced through the rise in electricity from renewable energy sources have paved the 
way for firms to conduct innovation activities. Since market factors and industry dynamics 
have emerged as critical determinants of innovation activities in this investigation, targeting 
these through public policy has probably had the largest effect on innovation activities. 
Furthermore, the threats and opportunities presented by systemic change as such were critical 
in driving innovation in many areas. The conceptual framework and research design 
employed in this thesis have been useful to investigate the effect, and have also shown that 
the factors that influence innovation activities are complex and interrelated.  
This thesis constitutes a contribution to the multi-level perspective in the 
sustainability transitions literature in the sense that it introduced actor-level studies within the 
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MLP and found that transitional dynamics that can be identified between actors and nodes 
within a system also exist within individual actors. It hence seems to be an oversimplification 
to attribute actors to either regimes or niches within the multi-level perspective. This insight 
was developed by combining the MLP with contributions from the environmental economics 
and organization and management literature.  
In light of the risk to miss the achievement of the 2020 targets of the Energy Concept 
that currently haunts Energiewende, innovation is more important than ever. Policy makers 
should pay more attention to innovation on the corporate level as a pre-condition for making 
Energiewende work. They could take the recommendations developed in this thesis as a 
starting point. Likewise firms should continue to contribute actively towards shaping the 
energy transition and be careful to keep exploring and not settle too early on a specific path. 
It is yet very open how the future energy system will look like and all activities currently 
undertaken will shape it. 
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10 Appendix 
Figure 24: Generic interview guide 
 
Guidelines for Qualitative Explorative Interviews 
 
About this interview guide 
 This document is for the interviewer, not the interviewee! 
 Interviewee will receive two pages with overview/introduction of the research and areas of the 
interview, similar to what was sent in the email soliciting the interview 
 Interview will be conducted in the most natural language for the interviewee, in most cases 
German 
 Semi-structured interview style is employed where order of the questions may change and 
questions may be added or omitted 
 Archival information on the company and interviewee will be assembled prior to the interview 
(incl. role/CV of the interviewee, company facts and figures, relevant information from corporate 
website, press releases, reports and media) – questions and topics may thus be varied to include 
company-specific information 
 
Concept Questions 
Introduction Meet, greet and thanks for the time 
Overview of research and today's interview process 
Explanation and consent to further process  
1. Audio recording of the interview (alternative: interview protocol) 
2. Transcription into text format  
3. Interviewee can review/alter the transcription 
4. Transcription will be used for data analysis and documentation, not be 
included in publications 
5. Everything is anonymous: name and company of will not be revealed, 
information will only be used in aggregated form  
6. Interviewee will receive results of the dissertation after completion 
Definition and 
corporate 
organization of 
innovation 
What does innovation mean to your company? What comprises innovation? 
What is your role? What are your responsibilities? 
How are innovation activities organized (central v. decentral responsibility, 
strategy, coordination, portfolio management, non-technological 
innovations)? 
Definition of 
Energiewende 
How would you define Energiewende?  
What elements/aspects constitute Energiewende in your opinion?  
When did Energiewende start? 
Attention to 
Energiewende 
When did Energiewende become a topic on your corporate agenda/ receive 
management-level attention? 
What exactly was discussed with respect to Energiewende? When? At what 
level of hierarchy? 
How has the discussion of Energiewende at management level evolved over 
time? 
Interpretation of 
Energiewende 
Does your company support the vision behind Energiewende and the way it is 
and has been implemented? 
Have you perceived the politics of Energiewende to be stringent (sufficiently 
forceful, effective), reliable and predictable? Which aspect in particular? 
How did you interpret the effect on your company (positive/negative)? Again, 
of which aspect of Energiewende in particular? On which business area? 
 
279  
 
 
Effect of 
Energiewende on 
innovation (in 
general) 
How has Energiewende affected innovation in your company? 
 Which aspect of Energiewende (vision, policy, trend)...  
 Has influenced which aspect of innovation (strategy, activities)... 
 How and when? 
 Why? 
 
Differentiated effect 
across technologies 
How has the effect differed across technologies? 
 Generation – conventional 
 Generation – renewables 
 Transmission and distribution 
 Energy storage/ distributed energy 
 Smart grid/ demand-side energy management 
 Energy efficiency 
 Carbon capture and storage 
Effect of aspects of 
Energiewende 
What effect on innovation have individual elements of Energiewende had? 
 Energieforschungsprogramme since 1974 
 Early push for renewable energy through StrEG in the 1990s 
 Strong incentives for RES through EEG in 2000 and successive years 
and impact on market growth and size 
 Nuclear phase-out decision in 2000 
 Extended operating periods for nuclear power plants in 2010 
(Energiekonzept) 
 Accelerated nuclear phase-out post-Fukushima ("Energiewende") 
 Long term targets for RES and energy efficiency for 2020 and 2050 
(Energiekonzept) 
 European GHG/RES/energy efficiency targets for 2020 (20/20/20; 
European Climate and Energy Package Dec. 2008 
 European GHG/RES/energy efficiency targets for 2030 (40/27/27; 
European Council Oct. 2014) 
 European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
 International climate negotiations and targets (Kyoto 1990/1997 -21% 
for Germany) 
 Grid extension plans (2012 Netzausbauplan) 
 Other regulations (energy efficiency etc.) 
 Other guidelines and initiatives (Exportinitiative EE/ RES) 
 Manifestations of socio-technical process: Customer demand, 
competitor activities, supplier activities/availability of new 
technology, general trend, other 
Effect of other trends What effect on innovation did these other trends have? 
 Digitalisation/ big data 
 Demographic change 
 Urbanization/ rise of the middle class 
Effect on vision and 
strategy 
How has your company's innovation vision and strategy been affected by 
Energiewende? I.e. the objectives, time plans and allocation of resources 
across technologies etc.? 
 What? 
 When? 
 Which aspect of Energiewende? 
 Why? 
Effect on search and 
information 
approach 
How has your company's search and information approach for innovations 
been affected by Energiewende? 
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Effect on Research, 
Development and 
Demonstration 
How have your company's RD&D activities been affected by Energiewende 
(rate, direction, type)? 
 Rate = magnitude of expenditures, e.g., € per year 
 Direction = area of expenditures, e.g., specific technology, product, 
process etc. 
 Type = type of R&D spend, e.g., inhouse, outsourced, cooperative or 
basic v. applied research 
 
How has R&D for Energiewende-relevant categories developed in the past? 
Are you planning to increase or decrease in the future? 
 
How does the structure of your R&D spend for Energiewende-related products 
look like? E.g., traditional inhouse R&D, outsourced R&D, joint RD&D with 
customers/suppliers, customer/supplier on-site development 
 
What determines how much your company invests in R&D in general and in 
R&D for Energiewende-relevant products? 
 
Would you be able to break down your R&D spend according to 1. technology, 
and 2. Energiewende v. non-Energiewende induced spend? 
 
How (much) of your innovation activity is later reflected in patents? 
 
Research (basic lab research), Development (testing/small scale/piloting), 
Demonstration (testing/large scale/implementation plan 
Effect on 
Cooperation 
Has your company changed its strategy and/or activities when it comes to 
cooperating with external parties on innovation?  
With what partner has your company cooperated (or is planning to cooperate) 
on innovations? 
 Supplier, Customer, Competitor, University/ research institute, Other 
affiliation 
What kind of innovation cooperations have you established (or are you 
planning to establish)? 
 Joint R&D facilities/projects, Joint demonstration projects, On site 
development (of plants in operation), Networking/informal exchange 
platforms 
Effect on use of 
Public Funds 
Have you made use of (or are you planning to make use of) any of the public 
funds and financial support mechanisms installed as part of Energiewende? 
Had there not been public financial support, would you have pursued similar 
innovation efforts (rate/direction/type)? 
Adoption How has your company's investment into (acquisition of) external knowledge 
and technology been affected by Energiewende (rate, direction, type)? 
 Rate = magnitude of expenditures Direction = area of expenditures, 
e.g., specific technology, product, process etc. 
 Type = type of external knowledge or technology acquired (external 
knowledge: Licenses, patents, trademarks; technology: Machinery)  
Has your company acquired external knowledge through M&A/ seed funding/ 
corporate venturing? 
Exploration v. 
exploitation 
How much have you invested in the expansion of production capacity for 
Energiewende-related products v. in innovation/ R&D? 
Have you experienced a tension/trade-off between investing in exploration 
activities such as R&D and investing in the best exploitation of your existing 
technology e.g., production and sales force capacity? 
Crowding-out effect Has any shift in rate/direction/type of your innovation activities towards 
281  
 
 
Product Innovations Has your company implemented (or is planning to implement) product 
innovations as a response to Energiewende? 
 
For energy utilities: energy consulting services for households/companies, 
smart home applications, products with various energy mixes 
Process Innovations Has your company implemented (or is planning to implement) process 
innovations as a response to Energiewende? 
 
For energy utilities: development and implementation of virtual power plants/ 
distributed energy 
Marketing 
Innovations 
Has your company implemented (or is planning to implement) marketing 
innovations as a response to Energiewende?  
 Product design or packaging (incl. complementary products) 
 Placement (distribution channels) 
 Promotion (advertising, type of language) 
 Pricing 
Organizational 
Innovation and 
Change 
Which organizational units in your company had and have to innovate most as 
a response to Energiewende? 
 Strategy/Planning, R&D, Procurement/Supply Chain, Production, 
Marketing/Trading, Sales/Customer Services 
Has your company implemented (or is planning to implement) structural 
changes (innovations) in response to Energiewende? 
 New/re-structured departments, new areas, new roles, new 
responsibilities, dedicated task force 
Has your company implemented (or is planning to implement) procedural 
changes (innovations) in response to Energiewende? 
 Creativity processes, innovation time 
Change Management How (i.e. by which management and organisational methods) were the new 
innovations triggered by Energiewende implemented? 
 Leadership/ top management commitment 
 Clear vision/ plan/ process 
 Bottom-up demand for change 
From an innovation perspective, how successful has your company adapted to/ 
incorporated the novel requirements of Energiewende? Have all necessary 
changes been made or started? 
What is the best indicator to show that you have become more innovative/ 
innovation active? 
Politics Has Energiewende made your company and the technological value chain in 
the energy sector more innovative/ innovation active? 
How important is innovation to the success of Energiewende? Which areas 
(technologies/organisational structures) still require novelties? 
How successful has politics today supported innovation efforts/ created an 
environment for firms to be innovative? What else could be done? 
Conclusion Is there another topic we should cover? 
Who else in your company could participate in this research? 
Who are your top 3 technology suppliers/customers? Would they be available 
to participate in this research? 
Thanks, summary of next steps 
 
282  
 
 
Figure 25: Guidelines and data sheet used in interview preparation 
 
Guidelines for Pre-Interview Archival Research 
 
 
Content Source Comments 
1. Information on the interviewee   
1.1. Role Company website, 
Google 
 
1.2. CV Company website, 
Google 
 
1.3. Dissertation topic Company website, 
Google 
 
1.4. Involvement in innovation Company website, 
Google 
 
   
2. Information on the company   
2.1. Company data 
 Revenue 
 Operating profit 
 Net profit 
 Employees 
 Patents 
 R&D spend 
 Founding year 
Annual reports, 
company website 
 
2.2. Comments/opinions/perception of 
Energiewende 
Company website, 
company reports, press 
releases, Google, media 
coverage 
 
2.3. Innovation strategy Company website, 
company reports, press 
releases, Google, media 
coverage 
 
2.4. Implemented innovations Company website, 
company reports, press 
releases, Google, media 
coverage 
 
2.5. Innovation activities Company website, 
company reports, press 
releases, Google, media 
coverage 
 
2.6. Organizational change Company website, 
company reports, press 
releases, Google, media 
coverage 
 
 
Keywords: Energiewende/ Innovation; anything else relevant to topic and research questions 
 
 
Documentation 
 
Relevant documents documented in table of contents/ downloaded/ saved to citation program 
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Table 17: List of interviews 
# Interviewee title1 Firm Date 
1-1 Head of Investor Relations and 
Corporate Communications 
Incumbent software/IT firm Jan. 2015 
2-1 Manager Corporate Development, 
Strategy, Sustainability 
Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Jan. 2015 
2-2 1. Head of Corporate Innovation 
Management 
2. Head of Energy Innovations within 
Corporate Innovation Management 
Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Mar. 2015 
3-1 Head of Corporate R&D Incumbent national electricity supplier Jan. 2015 
3-2 Head of Innovation Incumbent national electricity supplier Apr. 2015 
4-1 Head of Corporate Strategy, 
Sustainability and M&A 
Incumbent regional electricity supplier Jan. 2015 
5-1 Head of Energy Economics Incumbent regional electricity supplier Jan. 2015 
6-1 Head of Innovation Portfolio 
Management 
Incumbent national electricity supplier Jan. 2015 
6-2 Manager Public Affairs Incumbent national electricity supplier Feb. 2015 
7-1  Head of Innovation Incumbent national electricity supplier Feb. 2015 
8-1 Head of Corporate Technology & 
Intellectual Property Management 
Incumbent heating technology firm Feb. 2015 
9-1 Head of Strategy and Innovation Transmission systems operator Feb. 2015 
10-1 Head of Corporate Research Europe Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Feb. 2015 
11-1 Head of Sales Germany Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Feb. 2015 
12-1 Chief Strategy Officer Energy efficiency service provider Feb. 2015 
13-1 Head of R&D Coordination Start-up solar technology firm Feb. 2015 
14-1 Head of Corporate Communications  Transmission systems operator Feb. 2015 
15-1 Head of Energy Economics Incumbent regional electricity supplier Mar. 2015 
16-1 Chief Executive Officer Start-up software/IT firm Mar. 2015 
17-1 Head of Energy Economics Start-up national electricity supplier Mar. 2015 
18-1 Head of Corporate Development Start-up national electricity supplier Mar. 2015 
19-1 Head of Sales and Business 
Development Europe 
Start-up solar technology firm Mar. 2015 
20-1 Manager Clean Energy and 
Innovation Management 
Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Mar. 2015 
21-1 Head of R&D Energy Storage Incumbent chemicals firm Apr. 2015 
22-1 Head of Innovation Incumbent regional electricity supplier Apr. 2015 
23-1 Site General Manager and Head of 
Corporate Communications  
Incumbent heating technology firm Apr. 2015 
24-1 Head of Energy Innovation and 
Business Development 
Incumbent chemicals firm Apr. 2015 
25-1 Head of Technological Development Incumbent electrical/mechanical engineering 
firm 
Jun. 2015 
26-1 Head of Energy Management 
Head of Corporate Technology 
Services 
Incumbent chemicals firm Jun. 2015 
27-1 Head of Corporate Development and 
Communications, Deputy CEO 
Start-up solar technology firm Jun. 2015 
 
                                                 
1 Some titles were adjusted to conceal the identity of the firm interviewed 
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Table 18: Overview of findings 
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